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Abstract 
 
Through a case study of Iraq, this dissertation examines one manifestation of the 
increasingly prevalent phenomenon in struggling de jure states of the establishment of alternative 
forms of political sovereignty embodied by defacto states. Tracing Iraq's failed state-building 
endeavor to the adoption of an ill-suited Weberian model of state-building that idealized order 
and centralization to the exclusion of Iraq's Kurdish minority, it argues that much of the 
contestation and instability witnessed by the Iraqi state since its birth into modern statehood has 
stemmed from an effort to create a state inimical to the very real dispersal of social and political 
capital endemic to its society. The result has been continual coups, instability, and civil conflict 
that ultimately defined Iraq’s modern history. 
 Using this framework, the contention is defended that democracy cannot survive in 
Iraq without the preservation of its federal character, which alone guarantees the social, economic, 
political, and coercive dispersal of power necessary to maintain a free expression of Iraq’s diverse 
interests.  By restricting the responsibilities and obligations of the central state to more 
manageable tasks while dually creating a mechanism for a minority buy-in, federal institutions 
have pulled previously contentious social sources of power into legitimate state institutions and 
laid the foundation for a genuine, inclusive state-building process that will eventually benefit all 
Iraqis. While recognizing that this model is still contested by some leaders in Baghdad, the 
dissertation traces the path of the two key outstanding issues left unresolved --the exploitation of 
Iraq’s vast natural resources and the territorial delineation of its disputed internal boundaries -- to 
argue for a resolution that will bolster Iraqi federalism without sacrificing the hope of greater 
unity.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Evolving Sovereignty Norms in Post-War Iraq: Resolving the Defacto Statehood 
Dilemma 
 
The March 2003 invasion of Iraq by American-led international forces brought to more 
prominent attention one of the most pressing dilemmas in twenty-first century political science: 
the establishment of political order in large swathes of the globe.   Garnering the international 
community’s increased attention due to evolving security concerns in the post-September 11th 
world, the challenge presented by the collapse or failure of states was revealed to only marginally 
brush the surface of a much larger problem presented by the disappointing outcome of over five 
decades of state-building in much of Asia and Africa. 
In fact, many ‘late developing’ nations have been unable to establish a sense of popular 
national identity, remain incapable of projecting authority throughout their territory, and still 
struggle to enact stable political turnovers.
1
  A significant number of states, possibly even a 
majority, have stagnated as “quasi-states,”2 recognized for their juridical right to rule over a given 
territory and granted sovereignty by international norms, yet incapable of performing some of the 
most basic functions attributed to the modern state internally. After almost a century, many have 
only briefly and sporadically exercised the sort of monopoly on legitimate force and universal 
control over territory envisioned by early European state-theorists.  While never witnessing the 
catastrophic collapse seen in Somalia, Cambodia or Afghanistan, they have failed to project 
authority over their entire territory, often facing sustained resistance among important sub-
sections of their own populations. 
Far removed from the unitary actors of classic Weberian state philosophy, this failure to 
create stable, authoritative states has been most vividly symbolized by the rise of what has 
variously been referred to as a ‘state-within-state,’3 “defacto state,”4  insurgent state,5 or, 
confusingly quasi-state.  The inverse of Jacksonian quasi-states, these political entities maintain 
the ability to execute control over their territories and populations, but lack the juridical status of 
statehood granted through recognition by the international community of states. Given the 
                                                 
1
 Kaplan, Coming Anarchy; Kaldor, New and Old Wars; Collapsing states are no longer isolated incidents. According 
to Fund for Peace’s 2010 Failed States Index, 37 countries are at “alert” for collapse, another 90 are at “warning.” 
Only 47, a minority, met the criteria for either a moderate or stable classification. 
2
Jackson, Quasi-States 
3
Kingston and Spears, States-Within-States 
4
 Pegg, International Society 
5McColl, “Insurgent State,” 613-31. 
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underlying weakness of many juridical states and the concomitant failure to establish the 
legitimacy needed to bolster and define state capacity vis-a vis society, most exemplified by 
society's authorization of violence as “accepted within as a matter of law,”6  defacto states have 
unsurprisingly become more common. While many states have thus shown a remarkable ability to 
wield brutal overt force against dissent, this has often thinly masked a profound structural 
dissonance where the “basic need that human beings want units such as nation-states to satisfy: to 
give them a feeling of ‘belonging' and identity with the group”7 remained a theoretical construct 
for important segments of their populations who just as often found this through membership in 
resistance movements or counter-nationalisms. 
 The Jacksonian quasi-state and the “defacto state” are thus closely intertwined.  Defacto 
states rely on the political vacuum left by the state-building failure of Jacksonian quasi-states, in 
so doing, challenging the state through their claim to ultimately and legitimately act on behalf of a 
given political community. In their proven ability to exercise authority over a given territory and 
resulting threat to the recognized state’s monopoly over the use of legitimate coercive force, these 
defacto states often present a model closer to attaining the Weberian ideal than the state 
recognized by the international community to wield such power. While not the only type of 
organization to challenge the authority of failed or failing states,
8
 defacto states are consequently 
the most serious challengers to existing states both through their superior organization and upheld 
assertion amongst certain segments of the population to the same authority and legitimacy 
traditionally associated with unitary sovereigns. 
While clearly a state-level issue for the respective states, these forms of political order also 
have important implications for the international community, blending international and state 
level processes through their innate weakness. Their lack of  upheld sovereignty in fact both 
invites the “external” in and pushes the “internal” out, transforming the hard borders of traditional 
sovereigns into more porous, illusionary boundaries. In fact, the sheer geographical and numerical 
spread, found in every major region of the international system, calls into question the claim to 
global authority, order, and structure long associated with the system of sovereign states, a trend 
                                                 
6
Bobbit, Shield of Achilles, 17. 
7Herz, “Legitimacy,” 318. 
8
 For contemporary challenges to state authority: Cooper, “Economic Interdependence and Foreign”; Keohane and 
Nye, Transnational Relations; Morse, Modernization and Transformation; Rosecrance, Rise of Trading State; For 
critiques, Waltz, “Myth of National Indep800-2662278endence”; Thomson and Krasner, “Global Transactions and 
Consolidation”; Gilpin, US Power. 
Page 6 of 239 
 
likely to increase as more states come under threat from rising ethno-political identification.
9  
Left 
out of the international political order, this growth is of paramount concern to the international 
community in part because the denial of defacto states' claims to statehood gives them a severely 
diminished stake in the survival of an order under which they are withheld any privilege. This is 
juxtaposed with the fact that they continue to wield the sort of actual coercive and governing 
power fundamental to the preservation of the system, lending legitimacy then to the very real fear 
expressed by many scholars from different schools of thought that the perpetuation of such a 
system could lead to a revival of medieval forms of anarchy and heightened warfare, breaking 
down the bonds of the Westphalian state order as the question of who rules a given territory 
becomes a theoretical construct discussed in distant power centres removed from the day-to-day 
lives of an important mass of the world's people.
10
  
The potential for widespread conflict based upon the successful articulation of dual 
sovereignty in some emerging defacto states has in fact already become a very real threat at both 
the state and international-level, symbolized by the periodic outbreak of war between these 
entities and recognized sovereigns.
11
  These conflicts threaten not only the weakest members of 
the international community but also the strongest, both through traditional forms of warfare 
(such as the recent South Ossetia-Georgia conflict's flare-up between the United States and 
Russia) and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, which most concur requires a 
universal system of recognized authority to coordinate effective counter-measures. Indeed, while 
those seeking the top office of the world’s last remaining superpower in 2008 did not agree on the 
policies needed to combat the spread of anarchy and collapse of weak states, they unanimously 
recognized it as one of the most important challenges facing policymakers in the first decades of 
                                                 
9
The potential is even larger, homogenous nation-states account for under 10% of states Smith, Nations and 
Nationalism, 86. 
10
The importance of this challenge is one of the few issues upon which diverging schools of thought can agree.  
Waltz, based his argument precisely on the ability to distinguish between the rule of law that governs internal action 
and the lack of such authority in IR (ibid). In a state where there is no agreement on the legitimacy of such action and 
two authorities implement a different legal system, this image of the state is fatally undermined. Likewise, Wendt has 
noted that the “Lockean culture” of our current international system “pays for its relative tranquillity with a less open 
membership policy.”  Those states left unrecognized, exist in a state of Hobbesian anarchy outside of the norms and 
structures that bring order to the interaction of recognized sovereigns (ibid 284-292). Bull acknowledged the risk 
posed by non-recognized states to the international system when he argued that unrecognized state actors’ ability to 
avoid the social rules of international society. He contended that a system could evolve in the future that is an 
alternative to the current sovereign state system which would resemble medieval Christendom (Bull Anarchical 
Society 190-192, 158-180). 
11
An example of the potential for escalation was the sudden 2008 confrontation between the United States-Russia 
over the Abkhazia enclave. 
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the 21
st
 century.
12
 Even peripheral states could after all, at minimum, threaten global prosperity in 
the highly integrated contemporary economic system. This was witnessed most visibly in the 
quake that rippled through the world economy as Yemen descended into chaos after the Arab 
Spring, forcing world oil prices up and deepening an already worrisome global economic crisis 
through the prospect that the vital Suez Canal would soon be framed by two failed states.
13
 
 However, while it is clear that ‘defacto states’ present very serious challenges to the 
current system of political order, they also offer many critical advantages to the chaos that ensues 
from the breakdown of legitimate authority in many ‘quasi-states’ on both the state and 
international stage. Given the fact that they are only found in states with existing profound 
structural dissonance, they are indeed more symptom than disease. Somalia represents just one 
instructive example, where the complete collapse of the recognized sovereign transformed the 
entire region into an important centre for piracy, drug smuggling, and terrorist activities, 
becoming a virtual no-man’s land used to spread criminality and chaos. This has a profound 
impact on the lives of its inhabitants, and the global structure of sovereign order.  The vital 
exception has been the land governed by Somaliland, a ‘defacto state.’  In contrast to the rest of 
the juridical state, Somaliland has not only managed to secure its territory from harbouring threats 
to neighbouring sovereigns, but has also fulfilled vital governing responsibilities to some of the 
world's most impoverished people despite the impediments imposed upon it by its unrecognized 
status. 
This same pattern can be found in many other defacto states,
14
 lending credence to the 
importance of these non-state entities in resolving the most catastrophic of human conflicts, 
combating the international threat of armed terrorist networks, and providing a modicum of social 
welfare to large numbers of the world’s inhabitants. In many places, defacto states bring order to 
areas that have seen perpetual warfare since the inception of the modern state system. These 
benefits are progressively more important in weighing their potential to contribute to ‘order’ at 
both the state and international level as the major threats to human security now come from 
within, rather than between, states. While most conflict used to sprout from inter-state warfare, as 
                                                 
122002 National Security Strategy recognized this, stating ”America is now threatened less by conquering states than 
we are by failing ones. We are menaced less by fleets and armies than by catastrophic technologies in the hands of 
the embittered few.” 
13
Guzansky and Striem, “Yemen: Failed State”  
14The ‘defacto state’ in Iraqi Kurdistan for example, actively attempted to cooperate with international organizations 
and regimes to address concerns with terrorism and human rights. 
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average state size has declined in the 20
th
 century, the world's most disastrous and bloody 
conflicts now come predominantly from the sort of internal and secessionist conflicts epitomized 
by defacto statehood.
15
 These conflicts inflict staggering costs on the communities they touch, 
with the ratio of military to civilian causalities 100 years ago being flipped on its head in the 
predominantly internal conflicts of the 1990s, with 8 civilian deaths to every military one.
16
 These 
statistics reflect a profound change in the nature of warfare itself, where “civil conflict is [now] 
the most common form of warfare, accounting for all but three of the wars that broke out from 
1900 to 2002 and 90 percent of civilian and combatant battle deaths during the same period.”17 
The implications of course extend beyond the brutality of these figures, with ongoing violence 
subjecting even survivors to membership in a permanent underclass of poverty and disease 
throughout the developing world's system of failed states.
18
 Spreading across increasingly porous 
borders, these conflicts defy easy state-vs-international boundaries and threaten to destabilize 
other struggling sovereigns through refugee flows and the spread of ethnic tensions. 
 Where they arise, the defacto state holds tremendous potential benefits for instituting order 
in these situations. While the legitimacy of all-ready weakened sovereigns is brought into 
question by the sheer contrast between themselves and the capabilities of many defacto regimes, 
the ability of defacto states to control territory and perform the basic mechanisms of government 
– welfare, representation, and perhaps most importantly for conflict-ridden societies: security –  
offers very tangible benefits to some of the world's longest suffering people. The very real 
political and social capital they represent could in fact bolster rather than detract from wavering 
state-building endeavors, instituting rather than destroying political order over a much broader 
territory than has been the case in most modern states.  By reflecting (rather than creating) the 
failure of many state projects, their institution of political order offers the very real promise of 
contributing to peace by aiding in the creation of stable, functioning, and integrated member 
states if their ongoing conflicts over representation and governance can be resolved short of the 
chaotic restructuring of borders. Not inherently disintegrating or destabilizing in nature, doing so 
need not re-open Pandora’s boundary-box and lead to the sort of neo-medievalism feared by 
                                                 
15
 Lake and O’Mahony, “Incredible Shrinking State,” 700; Holsti Peace and War 
16
Kaldor, New and Old Wars, 9 
17Lacina and Gleditsch, “Monitoring Trends” 
18
For the connection between internal violence, poverty, and disease, see Krug et al, World Report on Violence; Bayer 
and Rupert, “Effects of Civil Wars”; Collier et al , Breaking Conflict Trap 
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many scholars if it can be done through the development of more inclusive state structures, 
benefitting both the states involved and the larger international system that rests on such norms. 
 Consequently, even as the current system is faced with an alarming rate of state failure, 
collapse, or instability that threatens the perpetuation of the state as a universal form of political 
order, the rise of defacto states like Iraqi Kurdistan present both an interesting challenge and 
opportunity. Rather than call into question the universal nature of the state system as a source of 
political order, defacto states actually encourage the status quo as a replication of traditional state 
systems and forms of political order.  The challenge is thus to define a solution to the ongoing 
contestation over the state-building project that can both capitalize on the benefits and mitigate 
the risks associated with these new state forms. While making no claim to universal applicability, 
this dissertation enters this critical search for resolution by contributing to the growing literature 
on how the benefits of order brought to some of the most disorderly places on the planet by 
‘defacto’ states can be accommodated within the boundaries of the current system through an 
examination of the history of Iraq''s failed state-building project and its more recent efforts to 
construct an inclusive, broad-based and decentralized state that has seen the tentative re-
integration of its Kurdish defacto state into the state-building project. 
 
 
Resolving the Iraqi-Kurdish State Crisis 
 
The following examination of Iraq's tragic past and contemporary effort to construct a 
democratic state offers one potential solution to the ongoing contestation between recognized 
sovereigns and defacto states in the developing world through post-modern federal agreements. 
Tracing Iraq's failed state-building endeavor to the adoption of an ill-suited Weberian model of 
state-building that idealized order and centralization to the exclusion of Iraq's Kurdish minority, it 
argues that much of the contestation and instability witnessed by the Iraqi state since its birth into 
modern statehood has stemmed from an effort to create a state inimical to the very real dispersal 
of social and political capital endemic to its society. In the modern era, where the deployment of 
the sort of extreme genocidal violence against minorities that classified early European state-
building was no longer an option, this set repeated Iraqi sovereigns in opposition to deeply held 
values, interests, and identity of an important segment of its population.  
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Iraqi regimes consistently created a disastrous challenge to their own state-building 
efforts, defined chiefly by the establishment of legitimate political order throughout the land. 
Fundamental to state-building, the state in fact requires legitimacy to bolster and define its 
capacity vis-a vis society, exemplified by the authorization of violence as a rightful exercise of 
authority, or the state itself ceases to exist.
19
  The rich literature on the nature of state strength 
derived not from autonomy or capacity then, “but rather from the allegiance and identification of 
the community as a national community,” reveals how critical this is to achieving the sort of state-
society understanding necessary to move the state beyond the need for coercion and 
indoctrination.
20
  The state’s relationship with society goes beyond a narrow focus on resource 
distribution or rectification of Pareto’s suboptimal conditions, for through “political activity 
focused on the state, [legitimacy] sustains the ethical and moral needs of citizens,”21  rendering 
the state more than not just a set of institutions, it is also a cultural entity that manifests and 
replicates itself through representations, discourse, activities, and practices that establish the 
meaning of public interest and solidify social identities.  As such, it is an ideological project, an 
“exercise in legitimation of that which would be illegitimate.”22  
 
When the state is unable to provide such an inclusive ideological project, as has been the 
case with repeated Iraqi regimes, it can only establish its mastery over society through the sort of 
overt coercion that leaves the violence of the modern state vulnerable to sustained social 
contestation and makes it almost impossible for it to establish itself as the paramount authority of 
a territory in perpetuity. This has been the centralized states greatest downfall in Iraq, whose 
reliance on Arab nationalism and opposition to Kurdish autonomy has rendered it unable to push 
beyond the material in the Kurdish areas since the downfall of the Ottoman Empire. While 
Western states transitioned from a reliance on despotic power to the use of infrastructural
23
 or 
administrative
24
 means of control over their populations, states like Iraq instead remained locked 
in the grip of quasi-legitimacy, and thus perpetually dependent on periodic bouts of repressive, 
destructive force against segments of their population.   
                                                 
19
Bobbit,Shield, 17. 
20Barkey and Parikh, “Comparative Perspectives,” 530: Nettl “State as Conceptual Variable,”; Corrigan and Sayer, 
Great Arch; Badie and Birnbaum, Sociology of State 
21Krasner, “Review,” 233. 
22Abrams, “Notes on Difficulty,” 76. 
23
Mann, History of Power, 476-489. 
24
Giddens, Nation-State and Violence, 172-197. 
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 As elsewhere,
25
 the result has been continual coups, instability, and civil conflict that 
defined Iraq’s existence as a “soft state.”26  The state seeks to mask the profound underlying 
weakness first acknowledged at its very inception by Batatu
27
 with brutal repressive force when 
faced with inevitable social dissent. In Iraq, this failure encouraged resource-fueled despotism and 
the deployment of “extreme levels of organized violence by the state to dominate and shape 
society,” control state resources to the benefit of some and detriment of most, and exploit ethnic 
and communal divisions as a method of control over a rebellious society.
28
  In the search for unity 
through homogenization and centralization, Iraq thus paradoxically became embroiled in a state 
of decay, forced to rely on perpetuating, encouraging, and reifying societal divisions.
29
  A trait 
endemic to “soft states.”30 the resulting reliance on a cyclical hurricane of violence, merely caused 
the further deterioration of the sort of non-coercive state capacity garnered from popular 
compliance. Rather than resolve contestation, the increasingly repressive state then inspires 
greater resistance, locking itself into a zero-sum battle for survival with important segments of its 
own population, in this case the large Kurdish minority.  
 Iraq's history, like many other developing states, reveals that prior to its federation, it had 
in fact become hostage to just such a cycle, relying on an increasingly smaller sub-section of ‘the 
people.'  It was Ayubi’s proto-typical “fierce” state, lacking both the infrastructural and 
ideological hegemony necessary to join the modern state tradition,
31
 and as Buci-Glucksmann 
argued, sacrificing through its violence any hope of social cohesion or ideological consensus.
32
  In 
this warped state of affairs, the state became too weak and paranoid to cope with separatist 
movements beyond violence, too often associating constructive solutions like federalism with a 
lack of unity.
33
 Thus drowning out the most basic governing logic, which affirms that the long-
term unity of a state is least likely “when an important group within the population believes that 
the national identity conflicts with its strongly felt regional, ethnic, religious, or linguistic 
identity,”34 Iraq fell victim to a warped and destructive perception of state strength. The 
                                                 
25
Decalo, Coups and Army Rule; Welch,  Soldier and State 
26
Myrdal, Asian Drama 
27
Batatu, Old Social Classes, 1113. 
28
Paraphrased, Dodge, Inventing Iraq, xii. 
29
al-Khafaji, “State Terror and Degradation,” 18-19. 
30
Gunnar, Asian Drama 
31
Ayubi, Overstating the Arab State, 3. 
32
Buci-Glucksmann, Gramsci and State 
33
Anderson, Federalism 
34
Ibid, 71. 
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militarization of society did not in fact make the state more secure, but instead became the source 
of its repeated destruction through internal coups or devastating external wars. 
 Unfortunately this constricted thinking further obscures the choice that all divided 
societies must make, as Anderson notes, between meeting diversity with “repression, exclusion, 
and assimilationist policies…[that] often worsen the problem” or “embracing diversity as a 
national value” which can enhance unity. It drowns out basic governing logic, which affirms that 
the long-term unity of a state is least likely “when an important group within the population 
believes that the national identity conflicts with its strongly felt regional, ethnic, religious, or 
linguistic identity.”35 Even the most diehard Iraqi nationalists concede after all that there is little 
support for the ideological and cultural unity amongst Iraqi Arabs and Kurds,
36
 and the communal 
violence that swept Iraq after the Ba'athist overthrow revealed in fact just how failed the previous 
policy had been at overcoming Iraq’s communal divisions.37   
 The importance of the change promised through the installation of federal institutions in 
the Iraqi Constitution thus cannot be underestimated and goes beyond the more-oft-touted 
democratization. In fact, democracy itself cannot survive in Iraq without the preservation of its 
federal character, which alone guarantees the social, economic, political, and coercive dispersal of 
power necessary to maintain a free expression of Iraqi interests.  Indeed, negotiated federal 
agreements can offer contested states like Iraq a viable alternative to their dismal history of failed 
attempts at centralized state-building by funneling state energy into more practical efforts that 
reflect the contemporary dynamics of their diverse societies. By restricting the responsibilities and 
obligations of the central state to more manageable tasks while dually creating a mechanism for a 
minority buy-in to these institutions that pull previously contentious social sources of power into 
legitimate state institutions, federal solutions can increase the strength of the state and its ability 
to influence society through non-coercive measures, extending rather than restricting the state's 
reach.  
 In so doing, federalism has acted to combat rather than deepen state fragmentation in the 
right institutional context.  Indeed, Iraq's system is not wholly different from the post-modern 
                                                 
35
Ibid. 
36
Visser, ibid. 
37
 Contrary to what some have argued, Iraq’s divisions did not appear post-war. The divisions in Iraq were merely 
suppressed by the violence of the Iraqi regime. The parties that represented the opposition to Saddam’s regime had 
always been based in Iraq’s ethno-sectarian groups. America did not so much instigate the rise of ethno-sectarianism, 
but become trapped by its reality. 
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federalist practices that successfully preceded it, resting on a philosophical tradition for state-
building that seeks to contend with more fragmented sources of authority and decision-making in 
order to build a state that is strong, dispersed and embedded in its society. Rejecting the 
ephemeral quest for the sort of unity found in early modern European statehood, it recognizes and 
conforms to the constraints of modern state-building in highly fractious societies.  
 In order to understand how this compromise has transformed the foundation of the Iraqi 
state, this dissertation consequently analyzes the foundation of the Iraqi political system in 
relation to a long tradition of political philosophy that informed its drafting and argues in favor of 
a continued adherence to post-modern federal norms in adjudicating any conflicts between its 
people. The second chapter contains an extensive review of the theoretical foundations of the 
modern state, the challenge presented to this early model in the post-modern era, and the potential 
resolution of these rising challenges through post-modern federalism in failed or failing states. 
This theoretical overview informs the analytical description of Iraq’s despotic history and 
contestation with its Kurdish population in the next chapter, which presents a historical overview 
of failed attempts at devolution and the consequences for internal and regional stability presented 
by the perpetual, disastrous recentralization of the Iraqi state.  
The fourth chapter synthesizes and contrasts this history with the new Iraqi federal state, 
contending through an examination of the norms under-girding the new Iraqi Constitution that 
federal institutions have begun a gradual but persistent shift toward a form of political 
contestation and inclusion that lays the foundation for resolution of disagreements through the 
institutions of the state and a genuine, inclusive state-building process that will eventually benefit 
all Iraqis and bolster the democratic character of its state institutions. Throughout this 
investigation, the argument is maintained that while the compromises made to build an Iraqi 
federal state have challenged the traditional conceptions of sovereign state authority as practiced 
in most late developing nations, the autonomy of the Iraqi Kurds importantly demonstrates the 
potential to rebuild ‘failed’ or ‘collapsed’ states by capitalizing on the empirical ability of defacto 
states to govern previously unruly territory, allowing defacto states and their representatives to 
share in the legitimacy of sovereign authority, binding defacto states to international norms 
through this legitimacy, and positively restricting the operating space for failed sovereigns into 
more manageable, governable territories and obligations.  In Iraq, this has included a profound 
shift from Kurdish authorities' traditional opposition to the state to a new pivotal role in holding 
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divergent factions of the Arab majority together, which has positively contributed to rebuilding 
the Iraqi state. Not only has the institutional power of the state been extended, but through its co-
option of divergent sources of social order, it has laid the groundwork for a process of 
strengthening at the core as well.  
However, the fourth chapter recognizes that this model is still contested by some leaders 
in Baghdad, tracing the path of the two key outstanding issues left unresolved: the exploitation of 
Iraq’s vast natural resources and the territorial delineation of its disputed internal boundaries. The 
chapter attributes the roots of the difficulties in implementing the compromises found in the Iraqi 
Constitution to ongoing adherence to the failed centralized and unitary vision of state strength 
rooted in Iraq's bloody and tumultuous past.  
The penultimate chapter consequently uses this outline to construct the parameters for 
resolution of these issues in a way that will bolster Iraq’s nascent experience with federalism as 
the best opportunity to bind together its contentious society and overcome the greatest demon to 
the construction of a cohesive and stable modern state: resource-fueled despotism.  It argues that, 
given the dismal record for such a governing model, the outstanding issues between the Regions 
and the federal government should be adjudicated with an eye to preserving the vitally important 
federal nature of the new regime. While this naturally requires some dispersal of social and 
political power, it does not preclude the establishment of a vibrant national culture that can be 
shared by all Iraqis. Finding such a resolution requires not dogmatic adherence to formulaic 
answers about state strength based on an outdated and ill-suited European model, but instead an 
approach embedded in the particularities of the Iraqi case whose greatest demon has always been 
its tendency toward resource-fueled despotism.   
The final chapter summarizes the argument presented, and contextualizes the Iraqi 
experience within larger debates over defacto statehood in the international system of states.  It re-
iterates the importance of resolving the long contestation of the Iraqi state through post-modern 
federal guarantees in order  to bolster the Iraqi state-building experience, but also ties this to the 
larger processes at play in resolving the challenge presented by the ongoing failure of state-
building to the international system. In so doing, it contends that international security guarantees 
would greatly increase the odds of a successful outcome in Iraq that will not only bolster the state-
building project there and aid in the reconciliation of a century-long civil war between the 
Kurdish minority and Arab majority, but also send an important signal to other struggling and 
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defacto states that changing international norms offer a solution short of secession or destruction, 
and move international theory towards a healthy congruence with the changing historical patterns 
of political development. 
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CHAPTER 2 
The Foundation and Norms of the Modern State System 
There is little doubt that the modern nation-state has become the predominant form of 
political organization across the globe. While this fact is supported by all major schools of 
thought in International Relations theory, this dissertation approaches the interplay of states in the 
international system from a distinctive tradition related to the rationalist, Grotian or English 
school of thought. This approach sees the system of states as working in line with a practical 
association based upon “a framework of common practices and rules capable of providing some 
unifying bond where shared purposes are lacking.”38 Rather than the purely anarchical system 
articulated by those of the realist tradition, the rationalist perspective takes into account the 
importance of legitimacy, norms, and associations that bind states into a particular form of 
community. In so doing, it seeks to explain not just conflict, but also the immense amount of 
cooperative and non-coerced behaviour that takes place between states in the international system.  
The importance of norms, values, and practice in the interactions between states is clearly 
evident in the current system. As such, this study also finds the insights of a thin version of the 
emerging critical or post-modern school of thought as useful in examining the continued 
adherence to political forms of states and sovereignty. In the study of quasi (and consequently) 
defacto-states and ethnic conflict, these perspectives combine to help explain why an international 
system alleged to be solely based on force and self-reliance can continue to not only tolerate, but 
protect the legal jurisdiction of quasi-states unable to defend themselves against either internal or 
external threats. Likewise, the post-modern focus on the social construction of  norms helps 
explain both why the international community continues to deny defacto states full sovereignty 
and the potential for an evolution through social processes and interactions within and between 
states to seek a creative solution to many inter-communal conflicts and the defacto dilemma. 
While a discursive examination of all these topics would be beyond the scope of this work, the 
overall approach of taking into account the constructed meanings of norms and recognizing that 
the current order of things is neither immutable nor natural is very helpful to the prescriptions 
proposed.  
On the state-level, this approach is complimented and strengthened when it also seeks to 
understand the way that certain institutions and structures impact social relations and construct 
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incentives for group action. The evolution of institutions, structures, and the international system 
alongside a set of norms that idealized and legitimized a centralizing, strong state changed the 
social dynamics and interaction patterns of certain groups, laying the foundation for conflict and 
contestation over the state project. Thus, a more fluid and flexible normative approach that 
encourages institutional relationships that provide alternative sources of state-society relations, 
mediation of social conflicts, and more incorporating institutions of shared power have the 
potential to resolve long-standing contestation. The importance of norms, values, and institutions 
at both the international and state level are consequently examined, with the understanding that 
these processes compliment and impact each other in very profound ways. 
This aims to contribute to the emerging literature on the post-Cold War evolution of state-
building theory through an examination of the impact of the state system on state-society conflicts 
in Iraq. While its approach as a case study of the Iraq-Kurd dilemma inevitably causes a focus on 
specific domestic issues, the argument has implications for the underlying aspects of the 
international system of states, its norms, and its structure on the development of political order 
among and within its members, in part due to the more fluid and porous boundaries between these 
levels of analysis and action in weak states. The case is implicitly made that continuing and 
increasing levels of secessionist movements and the emergence of defacto state areas of order 
amidst state-level disorder since World War II have been promoted in some states by a group of 
inter-related factors that include: (1) the spread of an idealized form of statehood best exemplified 
in the work of Jean Bodin, Max Weber, and Thomas Hobbes (2) the continued adherence of 
leadership in many states to this idealized Weberian model, despite the demonstrated lack of 
practicality for many new states to achieve its requirements given their extremely diverse 
populations, social fissures, and changing international norms on coercive force, (3) a change in 
state-society interactions alongside international opportunities and resources that encourage the 
continued maintenance of social movements and defacto states in some quasi-states despite 
rejection as potential sovereigns, and (4) the simultaneous adoption of contradictory norms 
throughout the globe that prevent the consolidation of states through traditional methods of 
coercion or accident but still hold political communities to the outdated ideals of sovereignty that 
sprung from them. Having thus identified both normative values and their institutional expression 
as a core source of ongoing conflicts in many states, the dissertation recommends a fundamental 
normative and institutional shift at both the state and international level that recognizes a more 
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fluid, nuanced model of state-building based on an acceptance of social diversity and new forms 
of divided sovereignty, namely through the construction of post-modern federal regimes. 
A review of important themes in support of these points follows, and is used to illuminate 
the current impasse between defacto states, their home states, and the international society of 
sovereign states, particularly in the context of the Iraqi case in subsequent chapters.  This 
background and the historical context of the Iraqi-Kurdish case found in chapter 3 inform the 
study’s finding that the solution to overcoming the current impasse while contributing to the 
spread of political order and decreasing the risk for future violence, must allow for the 
incorporation of the Kurdish defacto state and the rival sources of social and political order it 
represents into a viable system of legitimized governance in Iraq, without undermining the 
currently held norms that prevent state disintegration or extreme aggression against civilians. 
Using the Iraqi example, a particular path forward is found through an emphasis on the evolution 
of post-modern federal norms regarding non-state political communities as a mechanism for 
conflict resolution, encouraging movement away from overly-centralized Weberian models of 
statehood towards more loose federal principles and flexible definitions of sovereignty. The 
conclusion upholds that since the evolution of norms and patterns of interactions in these 
countries will take time to change, the success or failure of these negotiated settlements between 
conflicting parties rests on an active, sustained, and believable international commitment to a new 
set of values and practices that can provide the security guarantees necessary for norms and 
institutions at the state level to embed themselves in their societies.  
 
The Rise of the Weberian Ideal 
While many political entities have undergone a disappointing century of state-building, 
even the large number of ‘quasi-states’39 that exist in the international system today are compared 
against the modern, bureaucratic ideal that originated in Western Europe.
40
 While this form of 
statehood differs greatly from the majority of states in today’s system, a thorough understanding 
of its characteristics are important for understanding the behaviour and actions of many 
developing states because of its universal adoption as “the” legitimate or ideal form of political 
community. Despite their failures to accomplish this ideal type, the security assured by the unitary 
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Weberian state described by early modern European historians remains a beacon for many leaders 
in the developing world. Understanding the foundations of the Weberian state also reveals the 
historical and situational differences between its appearance and the prospects for developing 
nations like Iraq in seeking to follow its path in the world today. 
Characterized by Weber as a corporate group that has compulsory jurisdiction, the 
capability of continuous organization and maintenance of a powerful monopoly over its people 
and the use of force within its jurisdiction,
41
 the state system that developed in Western Europe 
was grounded in the empirical and distinguished through its capabilities, rather than its juridical 
status in international law.
42
 As Herz describes the political philosophy of the time, the decisive 
criterion for recognizing a sovereign was “actual control of one’s ‘estates’ by one’s military 
power, which” must also be capable of excluding “any other power within and without.”43 
The spread of this system of political organization occurred through a variety of processes, 
but when seeking to explain this seemingly universal appeal of the modern nation-state,
44
 most 
writers agree that its ability to perform the functions of modernity more ably than its rival 
political forms played a significant role, differing mainly over whether this success was due to 
superior war-making capabilities,
45
 economic and bureaucratic organization,
46
 mutual recognition 
of legitimacy,
47
 or even a smidgeon of chance.
48
 In reality, all of these capabilities aided the 
formation of the modern nation-state. No one particular factor explains the emerging consensus 
away from the myriad forms of political community seen previously in the international system to 
the universal system of states. Rather, the state’s ability to control resources, mobilize sentiments 
and loyalties, collect taxes, and conduct war along with the historical breakdown of other forms of 
community aided the spread of the Weberian state across Europe and then the rest of the world as 
it was able to build on new technology to create larger political communities that were militarily, 
economically, and socially more cohesive than rival political forms.  
This new form of political community was epitomized in Weber’s classic definition of: 
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 “A ‘ruling organization’ will be called ‘political’ insofar as its existence and order is 
continuously safeguarded within a given territorial area by the threat and application of 
physical force on the part of the administrative staff. A compulsory political organization 
will be called a “state” insofar as its administrative staff successfully upholds the claim to 
the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of its order.”49 
 
The Weberian nation-state thus differed from its feudal predecessors both in size and 
complexity,
50
 and from empires because of its increased administrative tasks, extreme 
centralization of authority enabled by improvements in technology,
51
 economics,
52
 weaponry,
53
 
and administration,
54
 and fixed territoriality.
55
 It was the master of its domain, able to mobilize the 
largest per capita armies in history and extract ever-larger sums from its population to support its 
military and bureaucratic machine. It was thus increasingly defined according to Skowronek by 
four key characteristics: “[1]the concentration of authority at the national center…[2]penetration 
of institutional controls from the government center throughout the territory…[3]the 
centralization of authority within the national government…[4]the specialization of institutional 
tasks and roles within the government.”56 
The centralization of authority and penetration of the state became increasingly necessary 
as the population density of Western Europe began to expand more rapidly around the 11
th
 
century, thus increasing competition over land which challenged the traditional empires that had 
governed the region with comparatively flexible, oscillating borders and tributary systems. The 
development of the modern state consequently started out as a means of creating more stable, 
defendable polities that could extract the rising value of both land and labour, as well as 
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addressing the resulting social changes in class dynamics.
57
 This new state, as Bean argues, 
existed in a world where competition tended to “eliminate firms whose size is outside the optimal 
range,” which was ultimately determined by “the interaction of centripetal and centrifugal forces.” 
Under this model, “states larger than the optimal range tend to disintegrate, and those smaller tend 
to be absorbed,” with the key determinants raising the cost of administration and control being 
“language, religious and racial barriers and regional particularism.”58  In other words, processes of 
natural selection operating on the basis of Boulding’s calculation of “the law of diminishing 
strength” or “the further the weaker,”59 determined the boundaries of the modern state system that 
arose in Europe as states sought to draw together often disparate populations though the 
expansion of state control. The result was more culturally and socially unified politics, dependent 
upon homogenized cultural exchanges. Areas that effectively resisted homogenisation eventually 
formed their own states or were incorporated into other states more capable of integrating them.  
Once formed, and at least in part due to its newfound social and cultural unity, the 
Weberian state, with its ability to raise taxes and mobilize armies was an undeniably effective 
fighting machine, capable of destroying competitors that did not follow suit.
60
 In particular, states 
were able to take advantage of more complex economic trading and labour specialization, which 
had greatly increased the value of maintaining stable borders by sustaining standing professional 
armies. As both Bean and Tilly describe, once a state had adopted the Weberian bureaucratic 
structure, surrounding political communities were faced with two choices: enact similar reforms 
of face coercive incorporation.
61
 Herz calls this transformation of the imperatives of political 
survival the “gunpowder revolution,” which “caused a real revolution in the superstructure of 
economic, social, and political relationships because of its impact on the units of protection and 
security.”62 Borders naturally fluctuated in the state formation process as groups were 
incorporated, removed, moved to other competing states with improved capabilities, or melded 
into their own unique states. At its heart then, the state-building process in early modern Europe 
was deeply rooted in the use of coercive force, both against potential competitors and its own 
society. 
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Thus, the military and bureaucratic might of the modern nation-state on the international 
level was ultimately only one factor in its long-term success, a reflection in fact of the changing 
nature of state-society relations. Equally important to establishing its hegemonic status as the sole 
form of recognized political order were state-level sociological factors, namely its increasing 
dominance over its own society. As Spruyt demonstrates in his comparative approach to the 
evolution of the modern state system, other forms of European political order were successful into 
the modern era despite the drastic changes that occurred from the 13
th
-15
th
 centuries.
63
 
Consequently, the modern territorial state was not a foregone conclusion. Instead, as Ruggie 
argues, the “modern system of states is socially constructed,”64 and thus illuminated by Walzer as 
personified, symbolized, and imagined before becoming “reality.”65   The modern territorial state 
was not merely a matter of inevitability, but was constructed out of a changing set of norms and a 
revived emphasis on Roman values such as the ownership of personal property, thus allowing for 
both the evolution of individual and sovereign rights to defined territorial units.
66
 This was most 
often a heavily coerced transformation that involved the complete destruction of alternatives 
sources of social and political legitimacy throughout the state’s domain, culminating in a Hegelian 
triumph of the state, seen as a moral expression of unity over diversity.
67
 
Not surprisingly then and related to this focus on the social dynamics leading to the 
emergence of a global state system, the importance of the ideological underpinnings of early 
states in nationalism
68
 was a critical tool for expressing a sense of self in increasingly large 
political communities.  The power of nationalism could be witnessed in the decline of mercenary 
forces during this period, in favour of national citizen armies and it was this process that drove the 
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military might of the modern state.
69
 States increasingly used new institutions and processes to 
advocate a “unitary” vision of society, aiming to ultimately “overcome local ethno-cultural 
diversity and to produce standardized citizens whose loyalties to the nation [and its state] would 
be unchallenged by extra-societal allegiances.”70 The nation-state and its society were thus 
intimately intertwined through this process, with the state representing the ultimate expression of 
a people, setting them apart from other political communities through a unique set of cultural 
expressions and practices. As Nagengast articulates: 
 
“Among the primary goals of the modern, post-Enlightenment state are assimilation, 
homogenisation, and conformity within a fairly narrow ethnic and political range, as well as the 
creation of societal agreement about the kinds of people there are and the kinds there ought to be. 
The ideal state is one in which the illusion of a single nation-state is created and maintained, and 
in which resistance is managed so that profound social upheaval, separatist activity, revolution, 
and coups d’etat are unthinkable for most people most of the time.”71 
 
Ultimately, this involved definition of who belonged and who was to be excluded from the society 
at large, demanding a process of acculturation and assimilation that would be categorized by 
modern standards as ethnocide in many cases.
72
 It was only through this process however, that the 
modern state could effectively centralize its authority and eliminate local sources of rivalry for 
legitimate political authority at the state level and defend itself against the encroachment of other 
states, which might seek to take advantage of social cleavages to form rival state projects, at the 
international level. 
As states solidified then on national bases and sought to increasingly control the loyalty of 
their populations through universal recognition of their authority, they also sought legitimacy for 
their new type of political community through a system of mutual recognition also based in 
sociological processes at the international level. As Martin Wight describes, the system of states 
became a society, because “while claiming sovereignty for itself, [the state] recognized that every 
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other state had the right to claim and enjoy its own sovereignty as well.”73  In so doing, a more 
stable system of states was created whereby, as Strang notes, “the status of each state is thus tied 
up with that of the others in a continuing process of mutual legitimation.”74  While periodic wars 
in search of empire would continue to appear, the international society of states could now 
effectively act in concert to suppress any challenge to its system of political order,
75
 and thus 
became stronger and more continuous than the peculiarities of its parts. As described by 
Oppenheim, “through recognition only and exclusively a State becomes an International Person 
and a subject of International Law.”76  
 All of these forces thus converged in a process leading to the first global system of 
political organization, characterized by an empirical commitment to Weberian statehood,
77
 but 
underpinned by sociological processes at both the state and international level that were 
committed to the unitary, territorial state as the legitimate form and practice of power. The new 
global sovereign state system grounded the state in international law as a legal person with, a 
defined territory,
78
 permanent population, effective government, and independence from other 
political entities. The state was to be duly administered through centralized legislative and 
administrative organs,
79
 with the core of the new system resting on the concept of sovereignty, or 
the right of each sovereign to independence and supreme authority over its realm.  At both the 
state and international level, Weberian institutions would be the sole legitimate expression of the 
people, defining both “us” and “them” and subjugating rival identity markers. 
The realms of these new communities were precisely denoted, with fixed boundaries that 
avoided any confusion over legitimate authority, thus making “determinate and recognized 
frontiers…a basic institution of the state system and an essential legal attribute of any state.”80  
The period of “constitutive wars,”81 where the very issue of who could legitimately engage in 
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combat or wield the authority of a political community had at least temporarily ended in Europe
82
 
with the vestment in the state of the only legitimate means of providing for political order 
internally and fighting external wars on behalf of the political community.
83
 In the words of 
Charles McIlwain, “independence defacto was ultimately translated into a sovereignty dejure,”84 
where a successfully upheld claim to authority was legitimized through sovereign norms vis-a-vis 
the states’ own society and the international society of state.  
Instead of “constitutive wars,” boundaries would now be altered or moved according to 
the results of wars between mutually recognized sovereigns. This manipulation of the location of 
boundaries would become an important foundation in the stability of the system, providing the 
necessary mechanism for maintaining a balance of power between competing sovereigns and 
reflecting the changing fortunes of more or less successful attempts at building political 
communities.
85
 Naturally then, it would also drive or hold natural communities together that 
feared annexation or annihilation by larger groups.  Society relinquished itself to the 
homogenizing and centralized sovereign, binding itself into a larger community and subjugating 
alternative loyalties to that of the newly constructed “nation” in return for stability and protection.   
Under the protection guaranteed by the mutual recognition of sovereigns, the state thus 
evolved into a form of political organization that fulfilled three main objectives in the political 
science literature, namely providing security, representation, and welfare.
86
  It was a juridical and 
empirical abstraction that was grounded in “an ideological underpinning, an ethical code, or a 
cultural vocation that inspires that state.”87 While even “strong” or “hard” states often failed to 
provide in all three areas simultaneously,
88
 the model of the state as exported from Europe became 
an “ideal” type that held potent sway over the political organization of the globe as modern 
nation-states engaged in imperial and colonial projects.  
By the mid-twentieth century the major powers of the new state system had effectively 
divided up the globe into replicas of themselves, treating new sovereigns based on often 
haphazard colonial boundaries as the legitimate political order in their respective territories, thus 
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bestowing upon them incalculable benefits despite their often dubious ability to actually control 
territory under their jurisdictions or “represent symbolically the existence and unity of the 
political community” as their predecessors had done.89 As Krasner argues, “sovereignty was never 
quite as vibrant as contemporary scholars suggest,” with conventional norms under constant 
challenge, few states ever achieved the complete unity to which they aspired normatively,
90
 yet 
the ideal of what a state should look like based on the logic of early Europe continued to drive 
behaviour at both the international and state level. 
Thus despite its often suspect performance and bearing testimony to the hegemony of the 
nation-state system and its roots in sociological processes, even when modern scholars have tried 
to explain the failure of many states, few have been able to flesh out what an alternative would 
look like.
91
 Rather many mainstream scholars have focused on how to achieve a liberal, 
bureaucratic state through alternative routes such as military authoritarianism,
92
 
institutionalization before liberalization,
93
 the destruction of the power of local elites that 
challenge the central state,
94
 an adjustment of the political calculus that leads to economically 
detrimental policies,
95
 or other more technocratic and holistic solutions.
96
  
These approaches unfortunately focused on the symptoms of a much larger problem 
rooted in the failure of the homogenizing and centralized Weberian state to create a normative and 
institutional project that could capture or defeat social competitors inside the artificial boundaries 
bequeathed many states through the de-colonization process. Changing norms at the international 
level that sanctified many states (like Iraq) that would have otherwise been destroyed in the 
Hobbesian world of early Europe before the community of states had fully developed, could limp 
along under the new rules of the game. Consequently, many states, having been created from 
external sources of coercive force and unable to engage in the sort of destruction of rivals on both 
the state and international level that their predecessors used to establish unitary, strong, 
                                                 
89
Krasner, “Review,” 228 
90
Krasner, “Sovereignty,” 20. 
91
Post-modernist critique: Ruggie, “Territoriality and Beyond”; Rosenau, “Once Again into Fray” 
92
Huntington, Political Order; Often referred to as Bureaucratic Authoritarianism, O’Donnell, Modernization and 
Bureaucratic-authoritarianism and  “Reflections on Patterns,” 3-37; Hirschmann, Bias for Hope;  Malloy and 
Seligson, Authoritarians and Democrats; Collier, New Authoritarianism ; Also applied extensively to state-making  
in Asia: Im, “Rise of Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism “; Haggard, Pathways from Periphery; Crouch, Army and 
Politics ; Han, “Political Institutionalisation,” 116-137; For Middle East, Barkey, State and Industrialization Crisis 
93
Paris, At War's End 
94
 Migdal, Strong Societies 
95
Bates,  Markets and States  
96
Milliken and Krause, “State Failure, State Collapse”  
Page 27 of 239 
 
homogenous Weberian states – were birthed into life with institutions and normative values out of 
place with their particular societies and time. Striving inevitably toward a perpetual dead-end, 
only a change in the “ideal” and normative values that under-girded the extreme centralization of 
early European state-society relations could begin to address the conflicts found in many of these 
new states. Despite what many critics have claimed, these states were not completely without 
logic but were ill-suited to the sort of processes that drove the creation of Weberian states in early 
Europe. 
 
Weberian Sovereignty as an International Force in the Post-Colonial Era  
Modern state-society conflicts are clearly embedded in a particular time and space, but 
also in the particular society of states to which they are members. Modern states are thus heavily 
influenced by a unique set of international norms and values associated with the post-World War 
II era, which through its fundamental re-ordering of the requirements for membership intimately 
impacted the evolution of its members and constrained their paths to development.   Before the 
end of World War II, weak political units were most commonly eliminated by alternative state 
projects and despite the theoretical respect among sovereigns for one another’s rule, territorial 
expansion through conflict was a common reality.  As described earlier by Bean, the boundaries 
of the European modern state were based upon optimizing conditions, whereby the state received 
diminishing returns for enlarged size when faced with the increased administrative and control 
costs of expanding across linguistic, religious, racial, and regional barriers and thus states that 
were too large disintegrated and those too small were absorbed.
97
 
However, after two wars that decimated the power centres of the global system, 
colonialism’s normative and financial exhaustion, and the revelation of incredibly destructive 
nuclear weaponry, a new set of normative values that highlighted the de-stabilizing aspect of 
territorial changes and emphasized a particular type of self-determination created a more rigid 
boundary system than had existed in any previous epoch.
98
 This evolution of normative values 
and corresponding institutions at the international level especially witnessed through the end of 
super-power expansion brought on by the Cold War, combined with the spread of anti-colonial-
based national movements throughout the developing world, froze “the political map in a way 
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which has never been previously attempted.”99 As Kayaoglu points out in his research on the 
abolition of extraterritoriality in legal systems, it was not until the leading Western states began to 
abolish the practice after World War 1 that the new norms of Westphalian sovereignty and 
exclusive territoriality were employed as universal and inalienable concepts across the global 
spectrum of political sovereigns.
100
  
These changes fundamentally impacted the potential for state-building in weak states 
throughout the developing world, such as Iraq, limiting the ability of state borders to reflect the 
failure of particular models or forms of state-building through the re-organization of member 
states. The development of international norms resistant to the challenging of post-World War II 
boundaries, upended Tilly’s classic story of the formation of the modern state with casual 
relationships leading from a “change or expansion of land armies (2) new efforts to extract 
resources…(3) the development of new bureaucracies and administrative innovations (4) 
resistance…(5) renewed coercion” and finally ending in “durable increases in the bulk and 
extractiveness of the state.”101  Instead international norms now protected often haphazard state 
boundaries and was marked by legitimising legal concepts such as uti possidetis (Latin for: “as 
you now possess”) which developed in Latin America as a means of preventing endless territorial 
wars and claims between the colonial creations of the Spanish and Portuguese Empires.  The 
concept solidified existing boundaries as the only legitimate configuration of interaction between 
states. Its success in this regard allowed it to spread to other regions as their decolonisation 
process picked up steam and weak rulers suspiciously eyed their neighbours from a perspective of 
often-profound domestic weakness. Adopted as a founding principle of the Organization of 
African States for example, its acceptance in a wide array of border disputes led to the 1986 
determination by the International Court of Justice that it was of universal applicability.
102
  
Universal applicability came to apply not just in wars between states, but also a means of fixing 
boundaries against the dissolution or breakdown of states due to internal conflicts,
103
 which was 
often the more real threat to the survival of many new states.  
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The primary objective of international society thus became, according to Jackson and 
Rosberg, the “legal protection for member states from any powers, internal and external, that seek 
to intervene in, invade, encroach upon, or otherwise assault their sovereignty.
104
 This new system 
based on mutual recognition was incredibly stable even outside of Europe. Speaking to the power 
of the socialization of outside political communities into the modern state system, research over 5 
centuries of non-European sovereignty reveals that only 11 non-European polities recognized as 
sovereign were formally subordinated as dependencies and only 15 times were they ever merged 
or dissolved, which stands in “sharp contrast” to the frequency with which “unrecognised polities 
are subordinated and colonial dependencies merge, dissolve, or are transferred between Western 
powers.”105   
This was not surprising in a world governed by a new logic, summarized by Former UN 
Secretary-General U Thant speech at a 1970 press conference when he stated, “As far as the 
question of secession of a particular section of a member state is concerned, the United Nations’ 
attitude is unequivocal…[it] has never accepted and does not accept and I do not believe that it 
will ever accept the principle of secession of a part of its member states.”106 
Rather than based in the logic of early European states then, which went through an 
empirical process grounded in sociological transformations whereby they were forced to create 
national projects and destroy potential rivals, many of the new 20
th
 century states were born into 
existence as bulky, unsustainable administrative giants with little actual extractive or authoritative 
control over their populations.
107
 As David Strang points out, “what Weber takes for the special 
distinguishing characteristic of the state—namely, a successfully upheld claim” has substituted 
for other standards in modern international relations,
108
 and that, in line with the work of James, 
the claim that matters is now the one within the international community, “rather than the internal 
claim to constitutional independence”109 that represented the forced or accepted reign over a 
particular society by a state. State institutions consequently came to draw their legitimacy not 
                                                 
104
Jackson and Rosberg,ibid, 13. 
105
Strang’s research shows that in this same time period that only 26 changes in status occurred in recognized 
sovereign states, 436 occurred in dependent states, and 274 in unrecognised states. In those involving recognized 
sovereigns, most were peaceful mergers and dissolutions, “Anomaly and Commonplace” 
106
U Thant quoted in Suzuki, “Self-determination and World Public,” 845. 
107
Diamond, quoted in Reno, Corruption in State Politics, 10. 
108
Strang, “Anomaly and Commonplace” 150 
109
James, Sovereign Statehood 
Page 30 of 239 
 
from projects that solidified their traditional, charismatic, or even legal
110
 authority over defined 
populations, but were rather bequeathed it from above over sometimes important segments of the 
population which saw little rational, emotional, or traditional appeal in the new institutions of 
central power. 
Rightfully so, Strang concludes that “the stability associated with recognition is 
extraordinary in a world” supposedly governed by Hobbesian logic, making sovereignty 
“virtually an ‘absorbing state’ which once entered is not left.”111  The root of this stability in fact 
lies in Ashley’s discussion of the “anarchy problematique,” involving a process whereby 
international society is able to spread a form of governance even in the absence of government 
through its hegemonic control of the institutions, values, and norms that guide the interactions 
amongst sovereigns.
112
 Membership criteria are decided by those recognized to hold power in the 
capital and over the “legitimate” (in the eyes of the international community) institutions of the 
state, even if these authorities are fundamentally not in control of the political community they 
claim sovereignty over internally.  
The result has been the sanctification of states characterized by Jackson and Rosberg as 
internally ‘weak,’ and marked by: 
 “political instability (as indicated by coups, plots, internal wars, and similar forms of 
violence)…[where] national governments exercise only tenuous control over the people , 
organizations, and activities within their territorial jurisdictions….the populations are 
divided along ethnic lines…Some governments have periodically  ceased to control 
substantial segments of their country’s territory and population.”113 
Rather than maintaining a Weberian monopoly of force, Jackson and Rosberg convincingly argue 
that these “states” grounded not in their empirical reality but in their juridical status in 
international law, are simply “quasi-states.”   
The “quasi-state” is internally weak, but does not face destruction or the loss of territory 
that would have driven the process of identification with a political community in early Europe or 
forced more creative solutions to its state-building endeavor. In the new system where external 
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sovereignty is now more important than internal sovereignty in the survival of states, many are 
conferred statehood by the reigning powers of a state system intent on protecting its own viability, 
and are thus robbed the chance for internal manipulations or empirical reality to determine 
boundaries. It is essentially stuck with a conundrum, the legal right to govern and control a 
population larger than its capability to do so in a central state, either through moral legitimacy or 
finite coercion.  In other words, many post-colonial states were born with only the theoretical 
apparatus of a modern state, described by Oakeshott as an “office of authority” and “an apparatus 
of power,”114 but without the actual capability of projecting authority or enforcing their decisions 
throughout their domain.  In fact, a similar process had already been noted by scholars like Tilly 
in late developing states in Europe, where “the later the state-making experience…the less likely 
internal processes…are to provide an adequate explanation of the formation, survival or growth of 
a state,” revealing just how important the growing society of states and its powers of socialization 
have become.
115
 
While these internal dynamics would have previously led to the annihilation of many of 
these political communities, the new international norms previously discussed combined with the 
inability of the two global superpowers, the United States and Soviet Union, to engage in 
territorial aggression without risking mutual assured destruction, allowed the time and space 
needed for many of these states to begin a process of legitimisation, dividing or combining 
national communities into states. In some like Iraq, the central regime was faced with great 
instability and repetitive coups alongside continued contestation, but could still amass an 
immense amount of coercive power and some modicum of compliance from a divided society. 
Yet even as these states gained some level of legitimacy amongst important segments of the 
population, they were robbed of the ability to expand borders and un-threatened by the permanent 
loss of territory by new international norms and thus stagnated somewhere in between collapse 
and the modern nation-state’s supremacy over the “people, resources, and ultimately, over all 
other authorities within the territory it controlled.”116 They could neither conquer their society, 
nor be forced through natural processes of selection to compromise with it. 
The survival of these new states was unsurprisingly then subject to different constraints, 
opportunities, and incentives than their European predecessors, resting not upon supportive social 
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institutions. Because their existence was not based on the defeat of rivals, the statelessness that 
occurs in Weber’s writing when there are dual claims to sovereignty over the same population or 
territory was tolerated and perpetuated in a significant number of states, even while the 
international community recognized a single contestant as the sole legitimate source of political 
order. Thus even when these states did engage in warfare, the changing requirements of 
conventional warfare, where advance arms and machinery are acquired from developed states 
rather than from the organization of one’s own population and resources, combined with the 
ongoing contestation of the state by society, to change the impact of war on the state-building 
process. Instead of being a state-builder, research into wars in the developing world, especially of 
a protracted nature, demonstrated that interstate war had in fact become detrimental, even 
retrograde, to the development of the state.
117
 At least in part, this was a result of the fact that 
most wars were now also partially internal contests and a reflection of the inability of the new 
states to create either Mann’s ‘infrastructural power’118 or Gramsci’s ideological hegemony119 
over their own societies,
120
 that would allow them to fight traditional wars between sovereigns in 
protection of “national” projects.   
Following the writings of many scholars,
121
 new state leaders’ biggest challenges were 
thus not surprisingly internal, coming from their own societies. What Ayoob calls the “security 
dilemma,”122 these states often struggled to define an inclusive state-building project that could 
translate into viable “security software” that would allow them to build the critical survival triad 
needed for any government: legitimacy, integration, and policy capacity.  In these states, it was 
the coup -- rather than foreign invasion-- that most threatened their survival. Thus,
123
 neither 
Lippman’s traditional definition of security124 based on a nation’s ability to protect the practice of 
its core values or Wolfers’125 emphasis on the ability to deter an attack, fits precisely with the type 
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of challenges faced by most post-colonial states, where leaders were “occupied primarily with 
internal threats to the security of their state structures and to the regimes themselves.”126  
Trapped in their own borders, the process through which these states sought to build 
capacity vis-à-vis society based on an ill-suited European past engendered further instability. The 
result was the proliferation of states that are “tense, deeply conflicted, dangerous and contested 
bitterly by warring factions,” defined at the extreme by states where “government troops battle 
armed revolts…cannot control borders…regimes prey on their own constituents…criminal 
violence grows…[states] lose authority over sections of territory” and citizens turn to warlords 
rather than the state for protection and services.
127
 Consequently, even when outside forces are 
involved in their coups, it is in accordance with Litwak and Wells’ observation as a direct 
consequence of the “turbulent nature of the target environment itself,” with regional and internal 
conflict creating the pretext for outside intervention.
128
   
Even when these states maintain a high level of despotic power, their inability to extend 
infrastructural power over their entire territory through the centralized Weberian state or convince 
significant segments of their populations of their legitimate authority prevents them from being 
strong states or engendering an inclusive, stable state-building exercise.
129
 Thus, while social 
movement theorists were right to point to the importance of regional and international actors in 
driving many sub-state conflicts, their ability to so readily find willing participants was 
fundamentally grounded in the illegitimate birth of many of these nations and their failure to 
construct national projects that could appeal to the vast majority of their population. Since many 
states relied on international patrons for their continued survival instead of domestic 
constituencies, “the incentives to develop the classic attributes of states, such as professional 
militaries, strong fiscal systems, and other administrative bureaucracies, were weak while 
inducements to maintain the appearance of stability were strong.”130 The contested nature of many 
of these states and their subsequent inability to provide the services expected by their populations 
left an aching need for ever larger defence capabilities to be used against internal opposition, 
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while the consequent application of force to squash these challengers had the counterproductive 
effect of fueling further resentment amongst key segments of the population toward the state and 
its institutions. As Kelidar describes, “in the absence of a universally accepted basis for the rule of 
law, coercion and a frequent resort to violence rather than accommodation have become the norm 
in the resolution of political disputes as well as the means for the attainment and retention of 
political power.”131Stuck with borders that could neither expand nor retract to reflect their success 
or failure, many states stagnated for decades, involved in periodic wars of attrition with important 
segments of their own societies or driven toward forms of government so autonomous from their 
societies as to be based almost solely on coercive force, a spectre inimical to Weber’s vision of 
the modern state. 
 
Defacto and Quasi States in the New Society of States 
 
One of the results of this failure and the continuing contestation of national projects by 
often-substantial populations in these “quasi” states,’ was a new type of political community that 
arose outside of the legal recognition of the international community. With little chance of 
overcoming the overwhelming post-World War II international order that sanctified the 
boundaries of their home states, these alternative national projects were forced to stagnate outside 
of the typical categories of recognized political communities while constructing all the trappings 
usually associated with modern statehood: bureaucracies, legal systems, military and police 
forces, and taxation and revenue systems. Referred to by a variety of names, it is Pegg’s 
description of the “defacto state” that most aptly describes this category of political entity132 by 
clearly articulating the juxtaposition of the intertwined and related nature of the rise of these 
political communities within Jacksonian quasi-states
133
 in the current society of states.  
The two phenomenons are deeply tied to an international society of states where states are 
not rooted in sociological and empirical categories, but are instead bequeathed life from above. 
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While defacto states maintain internal sovereignty, they lack external sovereignty; whereas quasi-
states maintain external sovereignty, but lack internal sovereignty. By the old European state logic 
then, defacto states fall into a category of political communities that would previously have 
achieved the means to be recognized as sovereign states with “long-term, effective, and 
popularly-supported organized political leaderships that provide governmental services to a given 
population in a defined territorial era.” They are capable of meeting the obligations of sovereign 
statehood, but are prevented from doing so by the current system of international norms that 
provides no room for their juridical recognition and thus forces them to remain outside the 
boundaries of international legitimacy.
134
 
The most obvious and articulated defacto states are the Kurdistan Regional Government, 
the Republic of Somaliland, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, the Turkish Republic of Cyprus, and 
Kosovo. These states, most of which spawned from related ethnic movements with both real and 
perceived grievances against their home states, through both military success, outside patronage, 
and popular legitimacy, where able to establish patterns of governance familiar to the modern 
system of statehood, and are thus differentiated from ethnic movements and small-scale 
community coping mechanisms found in similar situations
135
 by the level of their ability to 
govern, their replication of typical state-like governing mechanisms, and their desire to imitate the 
form of political community represented by modern statehood (regardless of their actual desire to 
secede or seek independence).
136
  They are distinguished from warlords, bandits, and other profit-
seeking groups by their primary political goals, “its capabilities (providing some sort of 
governmental services versus solely parasitic extraction), and its degree of popular support.”137 
These political communities, while still very diverse in form and reliance on external 
patronage, are significant and institutionalised entities that rely at least partially on the political 
vacuum left in legitimate authority by Jacksonian quasi-states.  While not all quasi states have 
defacto state challengers, defacto states can only appear in quasi-states. Thomson’s analysis of the 
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different components of statehood partially captures the juxtaposition of the quasi-state and 
defacto state by contrasting the possession of power versus recognition, or authority versus 
control.
138
 While Thomson notes that “recognition without power capabilities characterizes most 
contemporary states, cases of power capabilities without recognition exist as well.”139  In other 
words, many quasi states possess recognition by the international community but lack the power 
to actually exercise their authority, while many defacto states possess the capabilities or power to 
enforce decisions but lack recognition. Another way to put this is the contradiction between 
authority, which represents the “right” or legitimacy to make a decision possessed by the 
internationally recognized sovereign, versus the control implied by the actual ability to enforce 
decisions executed by a defacto state. 
However, in contrast to Pegg’s argument, while this categorization is useful in 
understanding the function of the defacto state from the perspective of the international 
community, it is clear that among their populations, the most advanced defacto states actually 
possess a great deal of “authority.” What makes these defacto entities unique in fact is not merely 
their ability to control territory, but their attack on the centralized sovereignty of states based 
upon their presumption of legitimate authority in areas they govern. They are not mere kinship or 
tribal hold-outs, they often have very real designs on constructing the sort of political community 
and institutions epitomized in Weberian statehood. They implicitly challenge then the distinction 
made by Thomson, whereby the sovereignty of states has always predominately rested in their 
authority to wield legitimate force in the territories under their jurisdiction, rather than their actual 
ability to do so (control).
140
  The most sophisticated defacto states after-all, claim this same 
legitimacy for themselves though not always in terms of independence as Pegg assumes. This is 
what makes the presumption of legitimacy alongside control in defacto states so challenging to 
the established system of international order and political theory, and marks a transition in many 
of them from revolutionary, secessionist, or ethnic movements to state-like entities. And it is this 
combination of authority and control in fact, which helps explain the longevity of many of them, 
despite the often overwhelming preponderance of force and weapons capabilities bent on their 
destruction.  
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The classification above stands in marked contrast to Pegg’s definition, which requires the 
defacto state to seek “constitutional independence.”141 Based on Alan James’s work, 
constitutional independence refers to the aspect of sovereignty
142
 whereby an entity is 
“constitutionally apart, of not being contained, however loosely, within a wider constitutional 
scheme.” Thus, working backwards on traditional notions of sovereignty, Pegg becomes trapped 
in the status quo ideas of a past era, whereby a state whether defacto or not must seek 
independence or ultimate sovereignty. A tautological presumption, there is no reason to presume 
this to be the end goal of a state-like entity. In fact, as the analysis of the development of the 
defacto state in Iraqi Kurdistan demonstrates, there are other avenues open to the defacto state 
which allows it to both maintain its large degree of sovereignty and gain international recognition, 
while remaining part of a larger sovereign entity. Beyond Pegg’s reliance on Buchanan’s 
distinction between national and local secession, 
143
 this compromise is reflected in the national 
rather than local sense by adopting and adapting to changing notions of sovereignty found in new 
federalism. In fact, even at the state level, the idea of constitutional independence is eroded by the 
advent of a stronger European Community. Thus, while Pegg’s defacto state must be 
independence-seeking, this study holds that the defacto state is only required to seek the lesser 
goal of maintaining the attributes of a traditional sovereign needed to maintain its governing 
independence from the central state. 
While the end goal of such a claim may very well be independence or secession, it is not 
required, and is contradicted by the growing empirical evidence of the evolution of defacto states. 
However, the defacto state does seek international and national recognition of more than just its 
control of territory. It also desires recognition of its authority to govern its population. Again, the 
development of Iraqi Kurdistan demonstrates that this does not require recognition of its 
independence. Likewise, the defacto state seeks recognition of its authority from the international 
community of states and its own homeland, but does not wish to merely take over an already 
existing state. Rather, it seeks a redefinition of authority structures based on its claims to 
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legitimately represent a subsection of an already recognized state or states. This may include an 
independence claim, but it need not. 
 
In summary the defacto state is/has (as adopted from Pegg): 
1) A territorial entity with a claim on a particular and defined population 
2) Governmental structures with a primary political purpose that offers its population services 
3) Control over a given area for a sustained amount of time 
4) Local authority or popular support 
5) No preponderance of international or national recognition of its authority, but has a desire to 
achieve international and national recognition 
 
Of course, within this categorization there are important differences between them that will vary 
the applicability of the Iraqi solution to their own conflicts, both in terms of the way in which they 
emerge and maintain themselves, and in the strength of their domestic or foreign support; but by 
abandoning the notion that defacto states must seek independence, the door is opened to solve the 
dilemma presented by some defacto states without re-ordering major international borders as was 
the case in past epochs. This is most likely to occur through a process of new institutional 
frameworks that devolve significant aspects of sovereignty within states through federalism and 
develop new methods to tie sub-state actors into regional frameworks that resist domination by 
ethnic majorities. As Maier argues, “to grant every people its own sovereignty is not feasible, but 
they can have their representation, cultural institutions, a share of the public purse and a 
delegation in international overarching structures.”144  
This argument follows the belief that many of these conflicts were caused by the 
development of centralizing, ethnocentric states in the developing world, which excluded 
significant minorities from the same privileges afforded to those belonging to the ruling group. 
Stuck in a vicious domestic security dilemma, in states like Iraq, authoritarianism and anarchy are 
not in opposition, but instead co-exist because “rulers are unable to impose their arbitrary 
authority throughout the country: anarchic conditions provoke them to treat protesters and 
dissidents as enemies to be suppressed or killed, not as opponents to be respected.”145  In Iraq, 
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repeated governments in Baghdad with differing political philosophies have thus spent immense 
amounts of treasure and blood attempting to bring the Kurdish regions under their domain. In the 
process, they have not only caused great human suffering and destruction, retarded the economic 
growth of their society, and left a legacy of distrust between Arabs and Kurds, but they have also 
destabilized and undermined their ability to control the core Arab territories of their domain. A 
brief look at the history of Iraq found in the next chapter reveals that while the war has been 
against the Kurds, the greatest effect on Baghdad has long been its resulting inability to establish 
its legitimacy against regime detractors closer to home.  
Able to limp along for the reasons described above, the state has neither been forced to 
collapse and re-order along more rational lines, nor to reach a compromise resolution with its 
society and engage in a legitimized, inclusive state-building project. This reveals the paramount 
advantage of ending the contestation between defacto and quasi states. It is not only about 
recognizing the rights of defacto states or incorporating them as members of an international 
system. It is also not solely about justice or securing human rights. The resolution of these 
conflicts holds immense benefits for the reconstruction of more viable sovereigns in their 
homelands that will contribute to political order and benefit the entire population of these 
countries.  As Weller argues, the current configuration of the international system creates a “self-
determination trap,” whereby “compromise constitutional settlements that might maintain the 
unity of the state, while permitting a greater expression of diverse identities through the legal and 
political system, have…been denied.” Using the challenge to their territory and international 
norms regarding secession as a shield, “most central governments [therefore] feel under no 
pressure to accommodate demands for change.”146 The result is ongoing despotism, poverty, and 
instability subjected over the entire population. 
 
Where International Society Meets the State: State-Building, Ethnic Groups, and Defacto 
States 
 
“Indeed, most of the evidence suggests that Kirkuk’s ethnicities lived in relative harmony before 
the founding of the Iraqi state.”147 
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In analysing the rise and success of movements that have challenged “new” states, this 
dissertation argues in-line with a grounded constructivist approach that pays particular attention to 
institutional and structural incentives that engender conflict along certain lines and provide the 
opportunity for the successful mobilization of social resources in opposition to the state.
148
 Given 
that the majority of defacto states are reflections of ethnic or parochial divisions in their states, 
rather than religious cleavages, this is the predominant focus of this inquiry although it is 
certainly imaginable that religion and other cleavages play an important subsidiary role in many 
cases and have the potential to be the primary driver in the right context. This approach is based 
in an appreciation for the constructed, fluid, and yet very real nature of ethnic differences, but 
does not ignore the important over-arching structural and institutional insights of social 
movement theory, instrumentalism, and structural theories that pay particular attention to the 
importance of incentive structures in shaping contestation. In so doing, it points to the importance 
of a re-structuring of the state-level institutional environment in which these conflicts take place, 
with a corresponding shift in the normative and structural environment at the international level. 
The continued presence of ethnic or sectarian movements that express a desire for 
representation of their non-state nations is in fact an enduring and important challenge for the 
society of states. For too long, mainstream international relations theory largely ignored the 
continued sway of ethnic and sectarian movements under the belief that modernization would 
inevitably create assimilationist tendencies as people became increasingly mobile and tied 
through economic and political interactions to larger societies.
149
 Most modernization theorists 
argued that ethnic challenges would eventually disappear as traditional societies industrialized, 
moved through the stages of modernity, and developed new forms of modern social identity or 
civic nationalism.
150
  This was all seen as a natural outcome of the developmental state-building 
process in new states, which would replicate the process of European state-making whereby 
increasingly efficient and centralized Weberian states provided a range of services in terms of 
representation and protection for their communities. 
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However, as scholars like Connor noted and the above discussion of the creation and 
structure of the new society of states attests, these processes were in fact just as likely to make 
populations more aware of their difference from others within their states. Just as inter-ethnic 
communication would be enhanced, so would intra-ethnic communication and the likelihood in 
the age of self-determination and nationalism that these differences might become more 
politicised and important rather than less.
151
 In fact, the enduring nature of ethnic movements and 
their re-emergence throughout the Western world led to a profound re-thinking of the 
modernization thesis. Led initially by primordialists arguing that the lingering nature of 
nationalist challenges to status quo states stem directly from a system whereby there are only 
around 200 recognized governing bodies existing amongst communities that speak over 8000 
languages,
152
 some scholars relied heavily in their critique of modernization theory on the fact 
that large swathes of the globe have had artificial states implanted over cultural, religious, and 
racial differences that often coagulate along ethnic lines to produce conflict.
153
   
 This line of thinking was myopic however, fatally undermined by the fact that not all 
ethnic groups became politicised and contested the state, and weakened by the fact that primordial 
theory could not explain the intra-ethnic fighting that occurred in many developing states between 
different religious groups, tribes, or other sects. Leaving out an institutional or instrumental 
analysis, it succeeded in challenging the equally limited modernization thesis that saw ethnicity as 
an ephemeral and passing phase in human social evolution, without explaining why it was 
sometimes (but not always) a source of conflict. Modern case studies of nations such as Turkey 
and Sri Lanka, which had in fact seen rising violence between ethnic groups that had historically 
co-existed peacefully in more de-centralized pre-modern regimes begged for a deeper, 
institutional explanation for the change in their group dynamics. Although in these cases, the 
respective groups had fought wars in the past and recognized their ethnic differences for 
centuries, giving weight to primordialist explanations for the existence of distinct “natural” 
identities, during long historical periods the groups had also cooperated successfully in different 
institutional frameworks. In addition, the boundaries between groups in many of these cases had 
historically been relatively fluid, only gaining rigidity with the onset of the modern nation-state. 
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The identification of Sri Lankan Sinhalese and Tamil, for example, was a relatively modern 
phenomena,
154
 as was the Turkish state’s definition of Turkishness.155 This begged the question 
then as to what was unique about the modern state system that was contributing to the violence 
between respective ethnic groups in many developing countries. 
 The field of ethnic theory was significantly progressed then by the introduction of more 
critical theories based in constructivist, institutional and instrumentalist arguments. These theories 
focused more on an understanding of the specific context in which group consciousness could 
arise and lead to coordinated movements for group’s rights, and consequently shifted the focus in 
ethnic theory from the unending need to destroy states to grant sub-state groups their own 
representation to a more productive study of the institutions and structures that could both 
encourage or ameliorate group demands in specific contexts.   
 While scholarship still tended to under-emphasize or “wish away” the ethnic factor in 
many developing states,
156
 leading scholars like Anthony Smith, noted that while ethnicity can be 
just one manifestation of group identity cleavages (that could be rooted in history, language, 
religion, or other patterns of social differentiation) ethnic groups held tremendous sway over the 
loyalties of people because they were deeply rooted in shared myths of descent, history, and 
culture and typically tied to a certain homeland or defined territory.
157
 While open to 
manipulation and the institutional structure around them, Horowitz and others drew out how 
enduring and powerful these notions could be in driving human action.
158
  
Thus, while instrumentalists critically highlighted the importance of ethnic entrepreneurs 
in capitalizing on ethnic differences to drive many ethnic movements in pursuit of their own 
interests,
159
 these were not mere transitory or idly constructed identities that could be re-figured 
by elites at will. They could also not successfully be constructed without due cultural basis.
160
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Instead they were abiding differences that could be politicised when the institutional context made 
them a salient and important basis for mobilization, and they could in fact come to eclipse all 
other identity markers.
161
 Not surprisingly then, following the logic of the work of early 
proponents of innate nationalism found in the writings of Herder, Fichte, and Weber’s stande,162 
territorially-bound ethnic minorities most often led to the rise of the sort of sustained counter-state 
social movements that could establish the necessary scale for the creation of rival state projects by 
mirroring the nationalist under-girding that led to the initial construction of modern states in 
Europe.
163                                                                                                                                       
 
Ethnographers such as Benedict Anderson and Ernest Gellner convincingly argued then 
that while the boundaries of ethnic groups evolve over time and require the mutual recognition of 
members of the community to a shared identity,
164
 ethnic movements were in fact deeply 
embedded in the political and social milieu around them, creating and re-creating themselves in 
order to fit particular contexts. Rather than a single traditional form of identification, 
constructivists argued that many of the social movements that relied on ethnic nationalism where 
actually manifestations of a process wherein particular identification markers were adopted and 
adapted over time to suit the conditions and needs of particular groupings of people.  For Gellner, 
this form of political nationalism was the result of a certain form of social organization found in 
modernity, whereby agrarian societies made a transition into large industrialized communities 
where personal interaction was no longer a suitable means of binding the community together and 
was replaced by culture.
165
 In both cases, studies of post-colonial states in Africa and even the 
earliest states in Europe demonstrated how essential the state and its services were in creating 
both the nation, and counter-nations.
166                                                                                                                                                                                                        
 
It was not merely that a transition was taking place in these societies, but rather that it was 
taking place in a certain way under a particular form of political community. The quest for a 
centralized, unitary Weberian state politicised many ethnic identities and brought groups into 
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conflict throughout the developing world.
167
 Empirical evidence suggests that in most cases of 
ethnic conflict, antagonists had previously co-existed in at least periodic peace before the 
introduction of new forms of political community came from the West. Prominent cases have 
ranged from the Kurds in Turkey to the Sinhalese and Tamil in Sri Lanka and the Hutus and Tutsis 
in Africa. As just a few representative cases of a much larger and documented phenomena, it is 
clear that the introduction of centralized ruling institutions through the establishment of a form of 
political community that differed greatly from de-centralized empires played a fundamental role 
in politicising some ethnies in opposition to one another. The increasing encroachment of the state 
into the daily lives of its citizens, inevitably heightened the political importance of identity 
representation making it evident that the institutional relationship between the two groups matters 
as much to their cooperation/conflict as any primordial tendencies, and that certain contexts could 
exacerbate or ameliorate differences between ethnic groups. 
 Horowitz touches on this fact in his analysis, noting that the rise of ethnic challenges are 
intimately tied to the state-making experience itself in the developing world, with the over-
centralization and over-extension of the state in the post-colonial era exacerbating ethnic 
cleavages and creating resistance among local elites.
168
 This process is abetted by the drive for 
Weberian centralization, and the Hegelian idea adopted from the early European experience that 
strong states are in fact unitary and homogenous. The phenomena whereby modernization efforts 
by the Weberian state cause social structural changes that increase the salience of ethnic politics 
has duly been argued by a broad range of scholars.
169
 This has occurred both through the growing 
realization of inequality between core and peripheral ethnic groups
170
 and the intensification of 
inter-group exchanges between formerly segregated groups that naturally occurs with the 
centralization of state institutions in urban centres.
171                             
The importance of this particular type of state-building to the rise of ethnic movements is 
witnessed in the need to increasingly classify, homogenize, and standardize cultural exchanges, 
with the result being the definition of rigid ethnic groups in previously amorphous communities. 
Many new modern states worked to create a common ethnic identity by re-classifying tribes and 
religious sects into a dominant ethnie, and either subverting or limiting the right of other non-
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dominant groups’ access to the state.172 This brought not only problematic and invasive new forms 
of bureaucratic centralization that heightened attention to linguistic, religious, and cultural 
differences, but also placed increased importance on the existence of these differences. In the new 
system, acquiring state status meant access to the international system, vast resources, legitimacy, 
and prestige. In most cases, minorities could no longer achieve autonomy from the centre as they 
had done in vast multi-cultural empires based upon their unique traditions, because all 
sovereignty and authority was vest in central Weberian state institutions run in the interests of a 
particular group of state elites. This fundamentally re-ordered relations between peripheral groups 
like the Kurds and the new nations they found themselves suddenly apart.  
In the context of the aforementioned security dilemma of many states, the adoption of 
Weberian and Hegelian norms was a potent, but often lethal elixir then for relations between 
different ethnies. While other theories helped explain why ethnicity in particular had become 
important during the formation of modern states, it was the institutionalist approach which most 
aptly described why this new identity formation often led to such violent conflict between groups. 
For those left out of the national process and forced to live in minority status, local methods of 
social control became a target for destruction in the effort to build “modern” states. As the 
previous analysis of state consolidation illustrated, the Western-imposed idea of a Hegelian 
modern state viewed these local methods as the enemy of modernity.  
In fact, scholars still measure the success of state consolidation in the developing world in 
terms of its hegemony over forces that were the bedrock of social organization, control, and 
identification in minority regions during the age of empires.
173
 The best-case scenario in many 
states was tragically what Smooha called “ethnic democracy,” democracies based on the 
“contradictory combination of democracy for all with ethnic ascendancy.”174   These ethnic 
democracies instituted a system in which access to the new states’ vast resources were mediated 
solely through the majority language, denying equal access to the minority groups and threatening 
the previously harmonious ethnic balances. In cases like Sri Lanka, the issue of linguistic 
nationalism would come to play a defining role in pitting the Sinhalese and Tamil against one 
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another, leading ultimately to institutional decay and the isolation of the Tamil from the national 
government.
175
   
Even under these best-case types of arrangements, a far cry from sectarian despotism 
found in totalitarian Iraq, the hallmarks for ethnic conflict identified by scholars were created and 
perpetuated: perceived affronts to a community’s honour or dignity, tangible threats to the vital 
interests of a community, and fresh opportunities to gain advantages or redress grievances.
176
  In 
the context of the drive for a Hegelian version of the modern Weberian state then, ethnicity 
through language became the dominant instrument through which groups interacted with one 
another and opened the gateway for ethnic entrepreneurs. All states were not equally prone to 
such conflict based solely on the presence of ethnic diversity. Instead the mere presence of ethnic 
diversity and previous ethnic conflict was a low indicator of the potential for state violence and 
seperatism, whereby states like Malaysia were able to avoid such pre-indicators, while other less 
likely states fell into extreme violence based upon state-building practices at odds with the 
inclusive opportunities of the past.
177
 
In most violent form, these conflicts should not have been unexpected, for they were after 
all based on a transformation that had originally begun in Europe and while bloody and brutal did 
ultimately stumble largely in the direction of stable, modern states (even if the cost was often 
genocide). What was different though was the institutional and structural context in which these 
states sought to replicate the path. As previously discussed, the spread of rigid state boundaries 
around the globe was not so much an empirical reality, as a matter of socialization. Many of these 
states were ill-equipped to follow the European path being based on colonial boundaries that 
made little sense in pursuit of hard-rimmed cores, yet the concept of the Weberian state became 
increasingly important not only as a theoretical tool, but also an ideal type to which “quasi-states” 
aspired.  Even if they were not capable of living up to the standard, the new states were not 
immune to this inherited ideological baggage. As Krasner aptly summarizes: 
“Choices made by leading states at a particular point in time influence not only their 
future range of options, but also the options of later developing states. The functions that 
are viewed as proper and legitimate for the state are influenced by general norms and 
practices. In the modern system the institutional characteristics of states in more 
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industrially developed areas have set an agenda for states in less developed areas. These 
characteristics come to be associated with the essential nature of the “modern” state and 
cannot be ignored even by states with very different needs.”178 
 
While never fully realized even in the West then, Weber’s “compulsory jurisdiction” 
became the epitome of a strong state, with a centralized administrative core capable of protecting 
the political community from challenges to its independence. So even while the actual process of 
state-building in Europe contained a variety of paths toward modern statehood in its lexicon, the 
model through which the most successful and earliest of Western states achieved Weberian status 
became the dominant source of inspiration to which the leaders of new countries looked, 
regardless of how problematic its application was to their particular societies.
179
 While this 
socialization did not prevent deviation, it did effectively “define appropriate behaviour“180 for the 
new members.  
 In so doing, the drive of the Weberian state rested in part on its status as what Ruggie 
dubbed the  “hegemonic form of state-society relations”181 and Ashley called a “hegemonic 
exemplar of a normalized sovereignty”182 of its day. A naturally appealing concept in a region of 
the world new to nationalism and still shaking off the colonial chains of the early 20
th
 century, the 
new states of the post-colonial world order were quickly and summarily adopted into what 
Keohane describes as the “complexes of rules and norms” that make up the “institution” of 
international relations and the modern state system,
183
 and were subjected to a logic that 
recognized them as the sole source of social and political order, even when adoption of this 
philosophy created the basis for conflict and chaos amongst their citizens.   
 The incongruous model, which through its external sovereignty legitimised the domination 
and unrivalled control of states over populations that did not necessarily see them as legitimate, 
consequently laid the framework for ongoing contestation between many states and large 
segments of their societies. In places where new states were found such as Africa, the Weberian 
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logic that drove the forcible inclusion of hinterlands into central institutions held no local logic 
and was fiercely resisted. The territorial model developed in Europe out of revolution in the value 
of land, made little sense where people were more valuable and thus little gain could be made 
from efforts to create territorially cogent political units from often-vast hinterlands.
184
 Even in 
these cases though, the lines were drawn from initiation – no boundary changes,185 unitary 
success or failure, despite any subsets’ desire to the contrary.  
 This potent mix created a highly problematic mentality throughout the developing world 
summed up by the speech of the 1963 Kenyan delegation to the Organization of African States on 
the matter of ethnic Somali secession, “if they do not want to live with us in Kenya, they are 
perfectly free to leave us and our territory…this is the only way they can legally exercise their 
right of self-determination.”186 Of course, this sort of logic was particularly complicated in the 
case of those ethnies left out of the state formation process, who were left bereft of any state of 
their own.  While the superpower rivalry virtually assured these groups a constantly available 
friend to aid their struggles for a homeland of their own and the weakness of their states 
encouraged a belief in eventual success, the entire structure of international norms and society 
prevented the realization of their ultimate goal to re-define state boundaries. As Rupert Emerson 
so aptly phrased, “the nation has in fact become the body that legitimates the state,”187 leaving no 
room for those nations who felt they were not represented by their states’ institutions once the 
formative era of state-building ended and providing attractive incentives to would-be state-makers 
to deny, reject, divide, or annihilate alternative projects to the state. 
Pitted against their societies in an effort to live up to a model no longer based in their time 
and place, many developing states thus became beholden to a seemingly ceaseless struggle with 
elements of their societies, unsurprisingly using the same coercive methods of the original 
Weberian creators, steeped in extraordinary violence where “early years [are] marked by 
despotism that was often as vicious as it was enlightened.”188 The ahistorical form of this model 
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in an era of democratic and participatory norms, inalienable state boundaries, developed sub-
nationalism awareness and the right of self-determination, made it a failure before it had even 
begun.
189
 Weak states fought segments of their population in pursuit of strength, but could not 
either through the pressure or reluctance of the international community or benefactors forcibly 
assimilate entire segments of their population (ie. achieve “victory”) or accept defeat without 
relinquishing the idea of a strong, centralized, and unitary state. The state system duly transitioned 
from one where most wars were fought between states, to one where most conflict was with-in or 
across them, with very few ending in victory for any side.
190
  
 This was particularly attenuated in cases of authoritarian rule, the predominant type of 
regime in much of the developing world. A circumscribed range of options for counter-state 
movements in light of the authoritarian nature of many of their states left little opportunity for 
grievances to be accommodated through political institutions. Rather, excluded from the power 
centres of their states, the political opportunities for mobilization of their grievances inevitably 
tilted toward armed conflict.
191
  Through this process, the “over-development” of some states and 
the incredible growth in administrative and coercive capacities in post-World War II developing 
states along a particular path that excluded many from the state project, created the extreme forms 
of resistance found amongst their population to these very same institutions.
192
 Even in cases 
where the state appeared to have gained tremendous coercive capacity (and in fact often because 
of it), ethnic resistance successfully continued to the state-building project, revealing that the 
“power” of the new states was not grounded in the sort of political-social cohesiveness found in 
early modern Europe.
193
  
 Thus, while the cost differential of violent action was often high and prohibitive to ethnic 
movements, it was also often the only available means to protest their economic and political 
isolation from the central state,
194
 and the capital for such movements building upon already 
existing social cleavages drove many secessionist movements.  In fact, given the weakness of 
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many of the states, war was not that prohibitive. Fluctuating perceptions undoubtedly shifted 
ethnic mobilization in favour of action when the state was faced with other setbacks. Not only did 
this happen in the case of communist revolutions,
195
 but can also be witnessed in the timing of 
uprisings that led to defacto statehood in East Timor, Kurdistan, and Somaliland following major 
military setbacks in their home states. These military setbacks coupled with the economic 
weakness of most quasi-states, limited the room for the suppression or appeasement of 
conflicts.
196
  
This explanation has been particularly telling in the failure of regionalization attempts in 
Sudan
197
 and has been more often the case in the defacto struggle than the more popular 
explanation for rebellion found in J-curve theories.
198
 When already faced with violent attempts at 
assimilation, absence from the political and economic benefits of state institutions, and weak 
states that provided little in the way of services, the opportunity to mobilize the discontented 
against the status quo was certainly greater than in societies with open political systems, civil 
rights regimes, and strong infrastructural power.
199
 The calculation further tips in favour of 
violent ethnic mobilization statistically when the group has separatist tendencies stemming from a 
previous experience with autonomous government and territorial congruency,
200
 as has most often 
been the case with defacto states like East Timor, Somaliland, Kurdistan, Chechnya, and Eritrea. 
These state level processes were deeply impacted by the nature of the international 
system, which both denied their chance for independence and conversely provided many with 
additional room for manoeuvre and external patronage. The Cold War and post-Cold War era 
have been critically important to the ability of many movements to persist against the coercive 
power of the state, exacerbating already simmering ethnic tensions. Afterall, while divorced from 
the time and place of early modern European states, the new post-World War II states were still 
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subject to Tilly’s logic that, “strong forms of nationalism wax and wane with the manifest value 
and feasibility of ruling your own state, which depends on two factors,” one at the state level (the 
ability of the state to circumscribe resources) and the other fundamentally at the international 
level: the willingness of other state’s to support its objectives.201  
In this context, the continued readiness of regional and international actors to aid 
secessionist movements has helped maintain nationalist movements and the aspiration to control 
resources, such as vast oil wealth, give a strong impetus for ethnic minorities to continue to seek 
independence. With a changing normative base that derided efforts to directly restructure 
boundaries between states through open warfare and a Cold War imposition of mutual-assured 
destruction, the support of ethnic insurgencies in rival states became a tool for super-power and 
regional confrontations. The Post-World War II system thus provided ideological and institutional 
structures conducive to building on already existing ethnic and religious cleavages to create a 
system prone to ethnic conflict, especially when coupled with the rise of non-governmental 
organizations and an international civil society committed to furthering implementation of human 
rights regime to provide political opportunities for ethnic mobilization.
202
 These groups crafted 
avenues through which incipient movements could air grievances, garner support from trans-
national groups, and legitimate their concerns among fellow minority ethnics.
203
  
As with the Weberian sociological principles that became self-reinforcing at the state 
level, non-governmental group actions that take place below and above the level of the state in 
pursuit of human rights, either for individual or groups, provide a legitimising sociological 
structure and consequently social capital for many ethnic movements.
204
 They also provide the 
political opportunity for incipient states to avoid military annihilation even if they do not support 
their secessionist claims.
205
 This most clearly demonstrates the incongruent and often conflicting 
nature of international norms that at the government level prevent the recognition of new states, 
but at the civil level support the legitimacy of challenges to the existing status quo of many 
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member states.
206
 Already faced with infrastructurally weak states, pressure by international 
human rights groups on developed governments has occasionally been able to inflict costly 
sanctions or aid injunctions.
207
 While not all governments have responded positively to these 
sanctions, it undeniably affects an already weak states’ ability to suppress rebellions and provides 
legitimisation for the actions taken by the ethnic movement as being normatively justifiable. It 
also at least partially circumscribes the actions that any given regime can take to suppress 
rebellions without facing new challenges to its rule and possible interference from regional or 
international foes. The current nature of the system of states and the preponderance of weak, 
authoritarian states then provide this room for manoeuvre and is intimately associated with the 
rise of defacto states.
208
 
 The institutions of the Weberian state, laying the groundwork for new forms of ethnic 
contestation have thus occurred within an international and local context that often incentivized 
groups to “instrumentalize” their identities in order to further their own political interests and 
resist the destruction of their authority by new state institutions.  While as part of the larger trend 
toward rational choice theories and the continual encroachment of economic theory on political 
science, instrumentalists argued that many ethnic social movements and in particular, their 
leadership, show a consistent and demonstrable ability to reconfigure group aspirations based 
upon their own desire to maximize gain,
209
 it is the internal weakness of their own states that most 
renders these states vulnerable to such movements.
210
  Certainly, this has been the case in most 
recent history, with contradictory forces at the international level providing further impetus for 
bloody stalemate between the state and its detractors. 
 In summary, both structure and environment (beyond mere ethnic difference) aid conflict 
between different ethnic groups. The adoption of highly centralized, unitary state institutions 
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which failed to develop mechanisms for representation of the diversity of the vast majority of 
societies, were rigid and inflexible, and un-open to compromise, drove many ethnic groups 
toward violence and secession. Constructivist approaches to identity conflicts, also informed by 
structural and institutional approaches to state-society relations, are thus critical to understanding 
the symbiotic nature of ethno-nationalist movements continued growth in strength despite the 
imposition of ethnically foreign states and forced assimilation drives.  The core point is that 
grievances are mobilized along ethnic lines with varying degrees of success because of the 
particular form and imposition of the centralized, Hegelian, unitary state on previously disparate 
ethnic groupings within an international context that prevented the sort of mass genocide or 
fluctuation of borders that characterized European predecessors.
211
 The continued maintenance of 
such challenges has prevented the realization of Brownlie’s “stable political community” by 
offering an alternative source of loyalty for a state’s population,212 a loyalty often propagated on 
the use of legitimate force by non-state actors in the eyes of a significant portion of the 
population. Ethnic movements and defacto states consequently represent an enduring legacy of 
defeat at creating viable political communities along the Weberian model in much of the world. 
 While some scholars have been encouraged to argue for re-opening the issue of rightful 
secession, arguing that that “question of self-determination should not be divorced from the issues 
of human rights and the welfare of minorities” when  “intense communal cleavages and 
violence… left a legacy of fear and mistrust that would rule out mutual co-operation except by the 
use of force,”213 the majority of international relations scholarship continues to recognize the 
inherent danger in such a move and has turned instead to the justification for international 
interventions to protect basic human rights at the individual rather than group level. Known most 
widely as the “right to protect” movement, the failures and cost of these interventions at 
protecting vulnerable minority groups has led many to return to the idea of the reconstruction of 
the state as being critical to the realization of individual rights. It has become evident that while 
groups remain stratified by ethnic markers in states devoid of developed civic values, group rights 
may in fact be nearly synonymous or at least required for the protection of individual rights. The 
fact that ethnic movements continue and seem to be strengthening in the new millennium has led 
important scholars to note that it is time to re-consider the institutional arrangements that have led 
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to such ongoing contestation, “[I]t is time for confederalism, cantonization and overlapping 
citizenship claims to receive more creative attention.”214  
 With this in mind, an understanding of the way in which ethnic group identities have 
contested the state-building project and its ideological hegemony is critical to understanding how 
quasi-states can begin to address these challenges in a manner more in-line with the normative 
values, institutions, and consequent restrictions of the modern era. This focus is intended to move 
states in the developing world from “fierce” to strong states,215 capable of projecting authority 
throughout their realm and able to rely on social and cultural capital, rather than merely coercive 
force, to extract compliance from their societies. 
 
Re-solving Ethnic Conflicts through State Institutions 
 With the increasing bankruptcy of the Hegelian-Weberian centralized state model in many 
developing countries, theorists looking to solve decades of conflict between rivals within many 
states began to look for an alternative model for the construction of viable state institutions. 
Although neglected, there was a wealthy tradition of political institutions dating back to the Greek 
era of political communities establishing bonds that sought to tie communities together without 
destroying their individual ability to act in a sovereign capacity. Before the heightened 
competition in the European system that drove the first modern states to consolidate power in 
centralized ruling mechanisms, there was also a tradition of thought that saw sovereignty as 
divided into different spheres that could be allocated among different levels of government, with 
security and economic concerns binding the respective units together. 
 These early experiments with fragmenting sovereignty were largely undermined by the 
philosophical move toward centralized states and the response by the European community to the 
destructive chaos of the late feudal era, coupled with the perceptions of both weakness and 
instability tied to their practice.
216
 Much of this stemmed from their largely consensual nature, 
whereby the central institutions binding the communities together held so little sovereign ability 
to act in times of crisis that they were susceptible to constant instability, weakness, and attack. In 
modern terms, these first agreements were not more than loose confederations. 
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 This was in fact the primary challenge to modern theories of divided sovereignty, how to 
devolve enough power from the central institutions of the state to allow for the expression of sub-
state identities without fatally undermining the ability of the state to act on behalf of the entire 
political community. The primary concern of early European theorists exploring divided 
sovereignty, known now as either confederal or federal arrangements, was the threat to liberty and 
enlightenment values that could result from the “excessive concentration of power in the 
polity.”217 Not surprising then, it was the American experience that would lead the way in re-
opening federal theory as the colonial leaders sought to avoid the despotic tendencies of their 
centralized colonial birthright and lay the foundation for the willing participation of all colonies in 
a project that would both unite them and respect their uniqueness. In their first attempt, they 
replicated the confederal methods of the past, hoping to maximize the amount of power retained 
by the states. When that was quickly subjected to the sort of strains found in the earliest examples 
of divided sovereignty in Europe, the model was abandoned in favor of a federalist form whose 
success would re-invigorate the model of divided sovereignty. 
 The American revival of federalism would be just one manifestation of a larger effort to 
create agreements of divided sovereignty that would address the security and economic needs of 
different communities, while still leaving significant room for the expression of difference 
amongst constituents.  These first federal systems, referred to as classic federations, most often sat 
atop an already recognized people that shared similar linguistic, religious, and cultural habits, and 
were excessively focused on protecting individual rights and preventing tyranny. Their paramount 
concern was to prevent Montesquieu’s three functions of government residing in a singular body, 
instead dividing these functions to balance the impetus for tyrannical abuse.
218
 However, they also 
recognized implicitly in their concern for singularity a tension between being a society of 
individuals or following Aquinas’s claim that society was naturally composed of a multiplicity of 
groups of familial, social, economic, religious, and political characters, with each having its own 
function and jurisdiction, brought together in a “unity of order” which allowed each the space 
necessary to both function independently and interact, and thus becoming a society of societies.
219
 
Their division into separate units and jurisdictions would maintain this tension, but also prevent 
the collapse of the democratic way of life Montesqueiu feared by limiting the prospect of tyranny 
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through administrative barriers.
220
 
The distinguishing characteristic of these federal governments was the existence of at least 
two functionally independent levels of government,
221
 represented by their enjoyment of 
“constitutionally separate competencies, although they may have concurrent or shared powers.” 
Both government levels are co-sovereigns under this system. They “can deal directly with 
citizens,” and cannot have their authority, territory, or power unilaterally altered by the other.222 In 
other words, they must have a position that is constitutionally entrenched vis-à-vis the federal 
government.
223
 While distinct, they also exercise intergovernmental cooperation on some issues, 
both sharing and submitting in governance.
224
 They are importantly grounded in their foundation 
in an agreement between the respective parties that sets out respective commitments and the 
grounds for which changes can be made,
225
 to ensure against transgression from either party that 
might threaten the independence of character of either level. 
However, contemporary states faced with violent conflict or secessionist movements 
stemming from identity contests have also looked to divided sovereignty as a means to avoid 
ongoing civil wars or secession.  Unlike the classic federal regimes, these states were often not 
embraced by respective groups as the best case scenario, and were not necessarily designed to 
protect shared values. Instead, federalism for these states was sometimes merely a matter of the 
most palatable of a range of bad choices, or a utilitarian calculation that it was better to unite on 
security and economic matters in order to protect their cultural and social way of life from 
competitors both within and beyond the state. Often referred to as “post-modern” federal systems, 
these systems in particular were used to address issues where states sat atop bi-national or multi-
national polities.
226
 Often lacking a sense of shared purpose, the question in these states was how 
best to prevent implosion or the tyrannical abuse by one group of another,  while duly creating the 
sort of security and stability needed to provide room for development and the growth of national 
prosperity and consciousness over time. 
 In contrast to the basis of the American federal system, the division of sovereignty and 
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institutions of these states naturally focused more on the expression of group rights. Sometimes 
misconstrued as “ethnic” rather than “territorial” federations (for in fact, almost all federations in 
the modern era are based in territorial units rather than resembling the non-territorial sovereignty 
found in the Ottoman Empire’s treatment of religious minorities or modern Belgium’s creation of 
dual political structures throughout its territory), these states were much more fluid and flexible 
than their “constitutional” or “classic” predecessors. They also often maintain a high degree of 
asymmetry between their respective units, something unconscionable to classic federations.
227
 
Table 1: Marchildon’s Classic Federations vs Post-Modern Federations228 
 Classic Federations Post-Modern Federations 
Examples United States, Australia, 
Germany, Switzerland 
Canada, India, Belgium, Spain, 
United Kingdom, Iraq 
Trends Centralizing Devolution, decentralization 
Relationship of Federal 
Government to Constituent 
Units 
Informal and formal 
symmetry between 
constituent units 
High degree of informal and 
formal asymmetry between 
constituent units 
Identity Language Policy is not 
deemed an important national 
issue 
Protect and Promote Language 
Rights and Sub-National 
Identities 
Stability of Institutions Stable, Agreements based on 
Constitutional Arrangements 
or founding bargain 
Open to contestation and re-
negotiation, even at the 
constitutional level and subject 
to informal agreements 
 
Federalism in this context became an “indispensable tool for social and political 
accommodation,”229 and as such focused on constructing institutions and processes, whether 
formal or informal, that could meet the needs of sub-state ethnies for greater autonomy and 
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control over the political management of their populations while preserving the territorial 
integrity of the state and the substantial benefits in terms of security gained by the incorporation 
of these groups. By giving power, prestige, resources, and legitimacy to the leaders of sub-state 
groups, it sought to appease their demands for separation and draw their social capital into 
existing institutions. This process allowed the federal state to at least in part, reinforce moderates 
in the case of conflicts and ease tension over the foundations of the state.
230
  
Unlike their predecessors, these states show a great deal of flexibility in interpreting 
founding agreements, with many important decisions made through informal channels that allow 
for the necessary fluidity and flexibility required to deal with potentially volatile ethnic conflicts. 
While prone to stagnation, these institutions offered the best hope to prevent intensifying identity 
conflicts. The result, as O'Leary argues, was a diversity of federal systems that can be thought of 
in more traditional federal terms as a spectrum, ranging in the extent of their integrative or 
pluralist attributes.  
 
Table 2: O’Leary’s Integrative versus Pluralist Federations231 
 Integrative (United States) Pluralist (Switzerland) 
Decision-making at the 
federal level 
Majoritarian Consensual 
Powers of the federation 
versus the regions 
Centralized Decentralized 
Recognition of Identities National Pluri-national 
 
This classification describes most of the early federalist states as being integrationist, marked by 
decidedly majoritarian, centralized, and national elements, while the post-modern federal states 
tend more toward consensual, decentralized, and pluri-national modes of interaction. It is not 
difficult to see how the integrationist model would apply more naturally to a nation that already 
shared a common national culture, where the majority was much less feared than in ethnically 
stratified states where the ideas of consensual or consultative forms of decision-making that 
include the incorporation of minorities into the decision-making apparatus would be far less 
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threatening to vulnerable and easily distinguished minority groups.  
 Likewise, in highly contested states, the appeal of holding more power in constituent units 
acts as a barrier to majority domination (even under delegative democracy)
232
 and creates an 
environment more conducive to the preservation of diversity and multiplicity within the nation to 
the sacrifice of what in some cases may be an ephemeral attempt at uniformity. In general, post-
modern federations also consequently tend to remain decentralized, circumscribing the role of the 
federal government and allowing the constituent or regional entities to retain residual powers not 
enumerated in the founding doctrine. Finally, the pluralist or post-modern federal regimes are 
founded on a recognition and preservation of diversity or pluri-nationalism, rather than seeking 
the homogenisation or nationalization of culture perpetuated by integrationist regimes. In this 
sense, they “do not treat plural diversity as a threat to the integration of the nation…[but instead 
seek] to identify some common goals and purposes, and to establish not just political legitimacy 
but political accountability,” with the belief that “if power is properly shared and varied interests 
are accommodated, there need not be any threat to power.”233 
 Within these models, Lijphart and McGarry respectively argue a state can establish either 
rigid groupings known as corporate consociationalism or a more flexible liberal 
consociationalism.
234
 In the latter, group delineations are set in stone and positions of authority 
are reserved for pre-defined groups. This can be effective when the difference between respective 
groups is clear, unlikely to change, “internally homogenous, and externally bound,”235 such as the 
model used to re-establish peace in Bosnia. Liberal consociations by contrast allow for different 
groups to emerge through the democratic process and evolution of the state. They establish 
institutions and processes that are flexible, and open to changes in the identification of the people 
and thus more respective of the rights of individuals and open to intra-group heterogeneity.  
 Of course, even within these groupings, the nature of these founding agreements can be 
manipulated or simply progress with the development of the state over the time. This is most 
notably the case with the United States, which O’Leary rightfully places as a prime example of 
the integrationist model. At its founding, lacking in large part the national culture that would 
develop between its people, the constitutional dictum retaining non-enumerated powers to the 
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states is a classic example of the way in which cooperation on a limited scope of issues can lead 
to growth over time of a national culture and consequently, radically different, yet acceptable 
interpretations of key laws that define that national agreement between the federal and regional 
entities. Originally interpreted in very narrow terms, as the nation grew and strengthened, the 
dictums of the constitution were increasingly expanded to include a much wider purvey (most 
notably in the US case regarding what constitutes inter-state trade or taxation) for the federal 
government. Certainly, even with written constitutions, the laws of federations like all states are 
open to interpretations that reflect the underlying reality and needs of any given society, and the 
tension between the division of sovereignty among constitutional units and the federal 
government remains open to contestation and negotiation even in the most well-established 
integrationist federal states.  These typologies are important however in building upon 
Marchildon’s recognition of the different locus in the foundation of classic and post-modern 
federalist traditions, highlighting the key debates in the field between proponents of different sets 
of institutional arrangements. As is typically the case, translating theory into practice in specific 
contexts presents unique challenges. Naturally, sub-state groups tend to maximize gains along the 
spectrum toward more decentralized, consensual, and pluri-national regimes and those likely to be 
in control of the federal government attempt to pull institutions in the direction of integrationism, 
nationalism, and centralization. 
 Finally, although not explicit in either of the above typologies, it is important to note in the 
context of federalism in either Marchildon’s “post-modern” or O’Leary’s “pluralist” federations, 
there is a particular focus on what traditional federalism scholars would call vertical federalism as 
opposed to horizontal federalism. What is the predominant source of tension, frustration, and 
contestation between the groups is how to divide power between themselves vis-à-vis the central 
institutions of the state. This does not mean in the more developed that horizontal federalism, or a 
separation of powers does not exist or is not contested as well, but that in the later-developing, 
younger federations, these sorts of checks and balances are not seen as sufficient to protect from 
the encroachment of the central state or dominant ethnies on the interests of other sub-state 
groups. In others, like Iraq, the emphasis is placed on such guarantees in part because of the fear 
that the democratic values necessary to preserve horizontal federalism are not present. Inglehart’s 
cross-national survey of democratic countries indicates that this fear is very real in transitioning 
states, where democracy is correlated globally not to an explicit expression of desire for 
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democracy amongst wide majorities in the population, but rather in the underlying existence of 
democratic values such as toleration of difference, pluralism, and interpersonal trust.
236
  In a state 
lacking such deeply held values in the population or governing elite, the horizontal protections of 
separation of powers can be fleeting and fall easily victim to centralizing coups and the 
personalization of power characteristic of non-democracies. This indicates in part why groups like 
the Kurds seek strong vertical federal protections for their own group interests. What is at stake is 
not just the group rights of the minorities though it might outwardly appear as such, but also a 
belief that vertical protections of those interests will be fundamental to preserving individual 
liberty as the only check to balance the centralizing tendencies of a non-democratic culture. In 
fact, even integrationist federal states originally maintained a heavy focus on vertical checks on 
power (ie. the protection for slave states in early America through senatorial seats), and in a 
society without the ingrained and developed history of independent legislative and judicial 
practice of these early modern federal states, the necessity to have power structures operate as a 
reflection of the societies to provide real checks on power is even more prominent. 
 While it is thus clear that post-modern federations represent a break from the unitary states 
described previously, a growing body of evidence indicates that federal arrangements hold great 
promise for resolving some of the world’s most volatile ethnic conflicts.237 Through “power-
sharing, cooperation, and accommodation” they can provide a “more effective, cheaper, and 
lasting method of accommodation for developing plural societies” by providing a “meeting point 
for antagonistic groups and seemingly irreconcilable positions.”238 As proponents of “ripeness 
theory,” the belief that mediated negotiation of protracted conflicts are most ripe for negotiation 
when they reach a “mutually hurting stalemate,”239 implicitly recognize, protracted conflicts are 
most open to resolution when both sides are able and willing to come to some sort of 
accommodation on the demands of the other side. Looking deeper, Harris argues that not only is 
this the case, but that the circumstances most likely to bring about the resolution of separatist 
insurgencies lies in the abandonment by movements of secession in favour of autonomy and the 
corresponding amenability of the government to revise their preferred outcome from defeat of the 
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insurgency to containment.
240
 With Gurr’s assessment that “disputes over self-determination are 
best settled by negotiation and mutual accommodation,”241 within a framework that does not 
bring greater material costs or dishonor than the conflict,
242
 such an accommodation can most 
readily occur through some form of federalist arrangement that can both recognize the desire for 
autonomy of minority groups, but fall short of acceding to secessionist demands.  
 As many have noted, decentralization and federalist structures have not surprisingly been 
particularly helpful in curbing ethnic conflict and secessionist movements in Belgium, India, 
United Kingdom, Moldova, and Spain,
243
 by creating opportunities for the government to be more 
reflective of local needs, providing a creative and innovative testing ground for policy 
development,
244
 increasing the ability of diverse groups to participate in governance and hold 
positions of authority, establishing greater flexibility in institutions and broader representation of 
interests,
245
 and giving increased control over cultural, social, and economic matters to groups 
closer to them.
246
 Federalism has also been successful at lowering the level of conflict between 
ethnic groups, by allowing elites to compete for more restrained posts and expanding important 
political and bureaucratic posts.
247
 Finally, it can act to protect vulnerable minorities by allowing 
“cultural, linguisitic, religious, and ideological diversity to flourish,”248  providing “parties and 
elites with special opportunities not available in unitary states to respond to regionally distinct 
electorates”249 and “granting cultural minorities a high level of protection in crucial areas like 
education.”250 
 
However, scholars have also argued that decentralization can exacerbate ethnic conflicts 
by strengthening regional ethnic parties,
251
 creating a basis for discriminatory legislation,
252
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contributing to further separation of ethnic identities,
253
 and increasing the viability of secessionist 
conflict by legitimising ethnic leadership and opening new avenues for resource accumulation on 
behalf of their leadership.
254
 The later studies are largely tautological though, taking particular 
cases of failure and arguing in looking back that they were indeed driven in part by efforts to 
decentralize political power. In reality, in the vast majority of these cases’ efforts at 
decentralization were a last ditch effort to prevent the implosion of states where strong regional 
affiliations already existed that had access to requisite amounts of social and physical resources 
needed to press the state for devolution in the first place. Since the vast majority of the 
scholarship stems from the break-up of communist regimes, it is not difficult to see how these 
regimes were already in serious trouble before the introduction of federalism and in most cases 
these federal systems failed from the outset in the basic test of genuine federation, which “cannot 
be the result of force or coercion imposed from above and sustained by the threat of military 
power.”255 In these scenarios, while it may be fair to say that federalism and devolution failed to 
ameliorate impending conflict, blaming decentralization for subsequent ills puts the cart before 
the horse. As Brancati showed in a broad-based statistical analysis, while not perfect, 
decentralized regimes present a “useful mechanism in reducing both ethnic conflict and 
secessionism,” with demonstrably less proclivity toward intercommunal conflict and antiregime 
rebellion than centralized systems of government.
256
 This supports Preston King’s observation 
that  
“the inclination to see federations in particular as abstractly less permanent than other 
forms, has no basis in fact…We may of course cite numerous instance of failed 
federations, just as we can cite even more numerous failures for a variety of non-federal 
states…instances of failure only signal the failure of particular experiments, not of 
federations as such. In none of the cases…is there evidence for some feasible, non-federal 
alternative that would have been better placed to keep the whole intact. Nor was it clear, 
morally, that any of these systems should have been held together on the more markedly 
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oppressive terms that a continuation of union might have required.”257 
 
Consequently, while far from perfect, the evidence suggest that the need for negotiated 
agreements between warring parties must be paramount. Repeated studies show that government 
tactics aimed at defeating insurgent ethnic groups through armed manoeuvres, stoke increasingly 
radical demands among insurgents,
258
 leading to more bloodshed and lessening the opportunity to 
create stable-inclusive state-building exercises.  In countries that have suffered such repeated state 
failures and persistent ethnic cleavages, federal solutions offer the best hope of accommodating 
sub-state demands within the boundaries of the current state system. As a brief look at the history 
of the Iraqi state demonstrates, the alternative to voluntary union is a destructive level of force 
that both weakens the states and threatens the peace, security, and prosperity of its people. 
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CHAPTER 3: 
Historical Overview of the DeFacto Kurdish State 
The introduction of unitary, Weberian statehood to Iraq after World War 1 set the stage for 
perpetual conflict between the central state and Kurdish minority.  Bereft of any long-term 
willingness to devolve sovereignty to outlying areas, the Iraqi state under different regimes 
repeatedly set about bringing the Kurdish areas into a highly centralized governing structure with 
little success. The result was a disastrous cycle of instability, with failure on the battlefield against 
the Kurds contributing to coups and the collapse of successive Iraqi regimes. The internal failure 
to bind the Kurds to the state-building project invited other sovereigns into the internal affairs of 
the Iraqi state, bringing it to the brink of collapse and inflicting immeasurable suffering on its 
people. Still, speaking to the strength of Smith’s dictum that “once established as common sense, 
theories become incredibly powerful since they delineate not simply what can be known, but also 
what is sensible to talk about or suggest,” every new Iraqi regime that came to power set down the 
same failed path, and ended in a likewise manner.
259
 
 
A Nation without a State 
Often referenced as the largest nation without a state,
260 
the Kurds were originally 
promised a nation-state in the treaty that ended World War I, partitioning the former Ottoman 
Empire into new states.
261
   However, the Kurds’ failure to unify under a shared ethnic identity, 
the rise of Attaturk in Turkey, and shifting interests amongst world powers culminated in the 
signing of the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne that divided the Kurdish homeland into its modern 
configuration.  
  At the heart of this abandonment was the inability of the Kurds to use their numbers to 
form a cohesive movement for recognition of a shared ethno-cultural heritage.
262
  By 1940 most 
Kurdish communities had risen in some form of rebellion against their central states, but not in 
unison.
263
 Many did not in fact recognize a shared identity across the great mountains that divide 
Kurdistan, with religious rivalries between competing Sufi tariqahs and prominent families, 
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linguistic divisions, and a history of affiliation with larger empires all hampering a widespread 
sense of group identity.
264
   There was simply no universally politicized movement for Kurdish 
national rights at the crucial period in which the nation-states of the Middle East were formed.
265
  
This allowed geo-strategic factors to weigh importantly in the decision to divide the Kurds 
into new nation-states where they would come to represent significant minorities. In infancy, Iraq 
especially was a weak decentralized entity with little historical basis for allegiance and a legacy of 
empirical expansion from Persian and Turkish neighbors. This vulnerability enticed British state-
builders to seek security for their vassal state through control of tribal Kurdish hinterlands lying 
along its mountainous periphery. The arrangement of the border was designed to act as a buffer 
zone for newly discovered oil fields in southern and northern Iraq and to address British concerns 
over the impact removing the Kurds would have on their efforts to establish a pro-Anglo regime 
in Baghdad, led by the non-native Sunni Arab King Faysal.
266
 In the waning age of empires, the 
sectarian religious affiliations which had long-defined identity led the British to fear that Sunni 
Arab Iraqis might rather return to Turkey than be subject to rule of the “retrograde and 
obscurantist Shiah” that would likely take power without the Kurds shifting the demographic 
balance in favor of the monarchy.
267
 
The relative calm in nationalist agitation throughout late colonialism and early 
independence was largely the result of this ripeness for the functioning of groups outside the state 
that were “either in those regions which the state had only just begun to penetrate or...which had 
sources of wealth and power largely outside state control.”268  This space did not unilaterally 
challenge local mechanisms of social control or the prevailing decentralization of the crumbling 
empires, thus failing to drive the disparate Kurds together in a cohesive movement for national 
recognition. As King Faisal noted shortly before his death, the Iraqi state's predominant role in the 
Shia and Kurdish areas remained limited to “death and taxes”269 during this foundational period, 
an innately de-stabilizing and unsustainable condition over the long-run as the state sought to 
challenge local leadership in the coming years. Such maneuverability was gradually eroded in fact 
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through the rise of new Middle Eastern rentier regimes, with peripheral groups like the Kurds 
increasingly coming under pressure from bloated states and security instruments funded by oil 
profits and foreign aid. More autonomous from their citizenry than the traditional model of state-
society relations,
270
 these new state structures were accompanied in Iraq and elsewhere by a 
virulent form of nationalism among political elites which sought to build strong ethno-national 
states in the European model in order to ward off colonial influences.  
The period leading up to World War II not surprisingly witnessed growing revolts 
throughout the Kurdish areas although most were locally contained before coagulating around 
organized movements for independence.
271
 External influences that could prey upon these failures 
of the state-building project in order to sow discord would also instigate heightened Kurdish-
Baghdad conflict. The Soviet Union in particular aided in the consolidation of the Kurdish 
movement through their occupation of Iran,
272
 beginning an enduring theme of reliance on 
external patronage for early Kurdish nationalism. Indeed, a short-lived Kurdish state in Mahabad 
represented a profound shift in the aspirations of pan-Kurdish resistance to the state system.
273
 
Despite its quick capitulation after the removal of Soviet patronage and the long exile of the 
participating Kurdish leadership,
274
  new political space had been opened
275
 to unite the Kurds 
around a common vision for an alternative state project. A host of factors conducive to the 
continuation of ethnic movements found in comparative literature, namely the weakness of the 
home state, 
276
 favorable international conditions,
277
 and beneficial geo-strategic locations thus 
created the perfect stage for heightened conflict between the Iraqi state and its Kurdish 
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periphery
278
 as the state sought more concertedly to join the modern Weberian tradition after 
World War II.  
In summary, while the state grew immensely in terms of both power and prestige during 
these early years, it could not (nor did it seek to) completely destroy the alternative sources of 
power that lay along its ethnic periphery. However, as it transitioned into a more narrow focus 
around a centralized, Arab state-building project under radical regimes, the sporadic and local 
attempts to contest the state system would correspondingly gather pace as the autonomy that 
characterized center-periphery relations eroded.  The rise of the rentier state spurred broader 
nationalist Kurdish movements, while separating them into distinct national projects tied to the 
specific conditions of the recognized sovereigns that opposed them. The cause of Kurdish 
independence would be characterized by frequent fluctuations in success over the decades to 
come with a history of negotiation-betrayal-conflict soon typifying relations between Kurdish 
leaders and successive Baghdad regimes.  
 
The Rise of the Rentier State and Heightened Opposition 
As the movement toward a pan-Kurdish state grew in popularity, and educational and 
infrastructural improvements connected once disparate Kurdish populations, the Iraqi government 
was forced to seek non-coerced settlements with Kurdish national leaders beginning in earnest 
after the close of World War II.
279
  British allowance until the 1958 coup of peaceful Kurdish 
nationalism as “the cudgel that made Baghdad bow to London,” provided the means and space for 
Kurdish official political organization in Iraq on a larger scale than either Turkey or Iran.
280 
Iraq 
consequently saw the most sustained Kurdish uprisings as the state began to slowly erode this 
freedom, with frequent changes in the Baghdadi government setting the stage for a perpetual 
cycle of conflict-negotiation-renewed conflict.
281
 Agitation for Kurdish independence grew 
rapidly, becoming increasingly politicized and widespread in opposition to the growing Arab 
national orientation of the Iraqi state and its new radical regimes. This followed a pattern of ethnic 
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conflict in post-colonial states where a dominant core which “views itself as the historic 
institutional and symbolic creator, and hence appropriate hegemon of the state”282  comes into 
contact with a peripheral group like the Kurds who cannot readily adopt this mainstream 
mythology.  In Iraq, this created a “Kurdish mosaic of discord,” whereby the “Iraqi government’s 
glorification of Arabism and Arab nationalism” under a centralizing state drove the isolation of 
the Kurdish community from its state-building process.
283
  
This isolation occurred despite the fact that the Kurds had been a chief opponent to the 
Iraqi monarchy, joining forces under Mullah Mustafa Barzani with revolutionary movements to 
overthrow the regime. While many in the opposition were married to Arab nationalism, an 
ideology patently opposed to recognition of Kurdish cultural and political rights, the Kurdish 
leadership believed that their active participation against the monarchy would ensure a post-
monarchy autonomy settlement given shared Soviet patronage. The gamble at first appeared to 
pay off when the monarchy was toppled by a group of military officers led by Abdul Aziz 
Qassem that immediately promised the Kurds an autonomy deal. Barzani was invited back from 
exile in the USSR to participate in the formation of the new government, which promulgated a 
provisional constitution that gave the Kurds' national rights as a recognized minority. The 
document would in fact do so in similar language to the current Iraqi constitution, stating that 
while Iraq was an “integral” part of the Arab nation, “Arabs and Kurds were considered partners 
in this nation,” and was so liberal, it was proposed as a basis for the creation of a provisional 
constitution after Saddam’s overthrow in 2003.  
The Qassem regime initially took serious steps as well to make good on these promises, 
placing Kurds in prominent positions and utilizing their support to suppress potential competitors 
to the regime. Peshmerga were even granted Iraqi weapons to fight against pan-Arabists.
284
 
Barzani’s ability to strengthen his control over the Kurdish movement in Iraq during this period, 
instilling a unity of purpose heretofore unknown to the disparate Kurds
285
 allowed the successful 
negotiation of further concessions for autonomy. The long-term results would be profound, laying 
the groundwork for a more organized and capable Kurdish ethno-political movement, while not 
completely eliminating a rural-urban leadership rift.  
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However, this also granted Barzani a national perception as a king-maker in Baghdad 
politics, posing an existential threat to those that saw Iraq as fundamentally Arab. As with future 
conflicts, the willingness to grant Kurds a level of national recognition was tempered by a desire 
to maintain administrative unity in the ruling elite, and fear of Kurdish secession.  While Qassem 
was willing to give credence to the fact that Kurds were distinct from their Arab brethren, he was 
not prepared to grant large-scale group political rights to them, again opening the door for 
renewed conflict between the state and its Kurdish periphery. The initially close relationship with 
the Kurds was in part a strategic calculation, a classic Machiavellian move designed to deploy 
Kurds who posed little threat and held no interest in challenging Qassem's rule over the rest of 
Iraq to destroy those who might topple his new regime while it was vulnerable.
286
 
Conflict between the Kurds and the centralizing state was indeed virtually unavoidable in 
the era of extreme Arab nationalism. Qassem almost immediately faced mounting pressure within 
his own administration to curtail further Kurdish concessions at the risk of losing popular 
support.
287
 He was thus limited in his ability to negotiate, instead opting for a renewed drive to 
centralize the state in an effort to extend control over Kurdish society rather than compromise 
with it. This set Qassem’s state in opposition to power-holders in Kurdistan and other groups.288 
Barzani was likewise constricted in seeking compromise as his grip over the burgeoning Kurdish 
national movement grew.
289
   The ad hoc nature of agreements with Baghdad, which were often 
informal verbal agreements, made both sides vulnerable to internal and external manipulations 
that fueled rapid changes in the relations between them and contributed to the erosion of trust.  
Unable to reconcile the differing views on the nature of Kurdish autonomy between their 
supporters, by 1961 political conflict spiraled into armed confrontation between Iraqi forces and 
Kurdish peshmerga.   
The ensuing armed conflict between Kurdish forces and the Iraqi army would prove 
devastating. While Qassem would later regain some of the territory, initial losses for the Iraqi 
Army ceded control over much of the mountains to the Kurds. The inability of the national army 
to root the Kurds from their mountainous safe-holds forced the government into a humiliating 
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ceasefire in January 1963.
290
  Qassem's rule could not survive the popular disgust with this defeat. 
Overthrown by a coup just a month after signing the ceasefire, the new Ba'athist replacement 
regime would last less than a year itself, freeing the Kurds to again resume running their own 
affairs as Baghdad convulsed under its own political upheaval. 
The eventual rise of Abdul Salam Arif in 1963 however set the stage for renewed 
negotiations between the Iraqi state and Kurds over autonomy. This time, rivalries within the 
Kurdish movement would seriously hamper their ability to take full advantage of Baghdad's 
weakness.
291
  Despite these problems, Arif's death in a plane crash positioned the Kurds to gain 
recognition of many of their demands through a “Twelve Point Programme” negotiated with his 
weakened replacement, Prime Minister Bazzaz. Before the agreement's implementation however, 
the consolidation of the new regime under the much-less sympathetic Naji Talib saw its 
abandonment and renewed fighting between Kurdish and Iraqi forces quickly resumed until a 
second Ba’athist coup in 1968.  
In their second turn in power, the Baathists tried a new tact with the Kurds. Initially 
adhering to their virulent brand of Arab nationalism, they sought to crush the Kurdish national 
movement, only capitulating to peaceful negotiations after 20 months of intense fighting began to 
threaten their own grip on power. Iranian support for the Kurds had aided in these battlefield 
successes, illustrating again the ability of regional rivals to infiltrate and destabilize the contested 
state.
292
 Iranian aid was purposefully substantial enough to maintain serious problems for 
Baghdad in order to pressure Iraq into capitulation on outstanding disagreements over their shared 
border, reflecting the disastrous role that ongoing Kurd-Baghdad conflicts had on its vital security 
interests. As elsewhere, the weakness of the Iraqi quasi-state invited the external in, threatening in 
its failure to create a broad-based state-building project the stability of the Iraqi state and its 
ability to perform the most basic attributes of modern states in securing its own sovereignty vis-à-
vis its neighbors. 
Saddam Hussein, who would eventually wage the most brutal attempt to date to destroy 
Kurdish nationalism, thus began his tenure by stepping into the growing breech with an olive 
branch. The March Manifesto of 1970 brokered between Huseein and Barzani was a landmark 
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agreement recognizing Kurdish autonomy in Iraq and setting the stage for peace. In it, the 
government agreed to recognize Kurdish as an official language in areas where a Kurdish 
majority resided, appoint a Kurdish vice-president for the national government, conduct an 
official census in 1974 to determine the boundaries for an autonomous Kurdish government, 
establish provincial councils to allow Kurdish rule over Kurdish areas, and constitutionally 
recognize Iraq as a bi-national state.
293
  However, Hussein delayed implementation of the more 
sensitive statues until 1974, giving the Ba’athists ample breathing space to solidify their control 
over the country and exploit divisions within a Kurdish community in hopes of reneging on the 
deal. Barzani would later claim that even before signing the agreement, he knew it was a ruse.
294
  
In fact, in both its scope and its delay of the most controversial topics until after security 
had been restored, the March Manifesto had many things in common with the promises made to 
Kurds in the 2005 Iraqi Constitution. The Kurds were informally promised the second highest 
position in the land, a delayed census to determine the final status of disputed territory, and 
recognition of far-reaching autonomy over their own affairs.
295
 The Ba'athist government duly 
made strides to implement less contentious issues.
296
 However, stalemate on a suitable Kurdish 
nomination for the role of Vice President soon exposed ongoing tensions over the sincerity of 
Baghdad’s commitment to maintaining Kurdish autonomy. The major problem, as with the 
current debate over the final status of Kirkuk and the disputed territories, was the “failure to 
define the geographic area to be covered by the autonomy provisions.”297 A promised census was 
repeatedly delayed in oil-rich areas, most notably Kirkuk.
298
 Years of hostility had altered the 
demographic make-up of the city to the detriment of the Kurds and the long historical tie of a 
large Turkoman community made the ultimate status ambiguous under the autonomy agreement 
specified for majority-Kurdish areas without a census.  
Mullah Mustafa Barzani however refused to even consider Kirkuk's exclusion without 
evidence of its demographic balance, describing it as the very heart of Kurdistan. Encouraging 
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this intransigence was the support the Iraqi Kurds were receiving from US and Iranian officials. 
Cold War concerns over the security of Middle East oil in light of the socialist leanings of 
Ba’athist ideology and a strategic tilt toward the USSR, along with traditional balance-of-power 
calculations aimed at containing Iraqi power pushed the US, Israeli and Iranian governments to 
support Kurdish demands through continued funding of Barzani’s resistance fighters. This 
support, albeit covert, antagonized the Ba’athists and reinforced the idea that Kurds were the 
Achilles heel of a unified Iraq, a veritable fifth column to be exploited by its enemies. This belief 
fueled speculation that any granting of autonomy or expanded territory would be used to dissolve 
the territorial integrity of the Iraqi state,
299
 and that the solution, rather than establishing a model 
of governance that could incorporate the Kurdish leadership into the state, was to instead seek 
once again to destroy their hold over Kurdish society. 
War quickly became inevitable as trust between the sides deteriorated. Thanks to foreign 
support, the Kurds were more equipped to engage the Iraqi Army and a bloody four-year war 
ensued with both sides suffering heavy casualties. By 1974, the brutality of this war encouraged a 
cease-fire, but the first Ba'athist proposal was rejected by the Kurdish leadership based on a 
disagreement over the accuracy of using the 1957 census as a means for demarcating autonomy. 
In desperation, the Baathist government offered the most far-reaching compromises yet, giving 
the Kurds an executive council and legislature as part of an 11 March Autonomy Law.  
However, the Kurds refused this offer as well, this time because Baghdad would not allow 
Kirkuk to act as the provisional seat for the new Kurdish government,
300
 a perceived indication 
that it was still not serious about allowing the incorporation of the province into an autonomous 
zone. The law was also unilaterally announced by Baghdad without proper negotiations between 
the respective parties. However, as the interests of the United States and Iran shifted in favor of 
accommodation with the Iraqi regime, the Kurdish position became untenable. By March 1975, 
the Iranian Shah was ready to sign an agreement with Hussein in order to secure rights to the 
Shatt Al-Arab waterway in exchange for abandonment of the Kurdish cause. Again demonstrating 
the toll that the internal state-building contest was taking on the security of the Iraqi state, the 
Ba’athists were willing to capitulate to Iran’s demands to bolster their own rule vis-à-vis the 
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Kurds, resulting in the Iran-Iraq Algiers Agreement. The deal effectively decimated the Kurdish 
resistance with most fleeing Iraq immediately. 
The Americans had taught the Ba’athists a valuable lesson in how far the regime would be 
allowed to go in threatening US oil interests. Later, the US Congressional Committee on 
Intelligence would acknowledge that, 
"the president...hoped that [the Kurds] would not prevail. They preferred instead that the 
insurgents simply continue a level of hostilities sufficient to sap the resources of [Iraq]. 
The policy was not imparted to our clients, who were encouraged to continue to fight."
301
 
Indeed, the American and Iranian governments had acted according to real politick, taking 
advantage of the failure of the Iraqi state to come to terms with its Kurdish periphery.
302
 Nearly 
800 Kurdish villages were subsequently destroyed by the Ba’athists to create a security belt 
isolating the Kurdish population from the Iranian border and over a hundred thousand Kurds were 
relocated to non-Kurdish areas in southern Iraq at the beginning of what would become a 
sustained genocidal campaign to break the back of the Kurdish resistance to the Ba’athist state. 
Disagreements among the Kurdish leadership over issues regarding this betrayal would 
also have long-lasting effects on the organization of the movement, creating a permanent rift 
within the KDP. Those that subsequently chose to participate in the Ba'athist puppet government 
earned the label of jash or “donkey,” for their association as collaborators with the Iraqi regime’s 
continued suppression of Kurdish political and cultural rights.  While given nominal roles in the 
government, the forced deportation of Kurds from oil-rich areas such as Kirkuk and Khanaqin, 
the settlement of Arabs to those lands, and the creation of a 10-20 kilometer-wide corridor 
between Iran and Iraq bespoke the true nature of the “autonomy” now granted the Kurds by Iraq's 
authoritarian regime.
303
  Meanwhile, many members of the Kurdish intelligensia fled to foreign 
capitals to establish their own movements, sharply criticizing Barzani for his willingness to trust 
Baghdad.  They felt that the Kurds' had already been repeatedly subjected to betrayals by Iraqi 
regimes, and should relinquish any hope that an Arab government would willfully regard their 
national rights over the long-term.
304
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However, the Kurds were soon granted a fresh opportunity by the changing fortunes of the 
powerful states in their region to make another bid for recognition of their national rights. The 
Iranian upheaval that led to the downfall of the Shah proved tempting ground for some to exact 
retribution for the Shah’s betrayal of their cause. Khomeini's rise to prominence made it soon 
clear to most Kurds that their dream of autonomy would not be ushered in on the back of a Shia 
Islamic Republic,
305
 and the coming of the almost decade long Iran-Iraq War consequently had a 
devastating impact on both Iran and Iraq. In keeping with the pattern, both sides in the conflict 
sought to encourage and aid those Kurds willing to stand against their enemy. Much of the worst 
brutality of the devastating war was fought in Kurdish-inhabited land for this reason. With Iraqi 
support, the KDP-Iran periodically took over large sections of Iranian Kurdistan as did Iraqi 
Kurds through Iranian support begin to establish short-lived proto-states in Iraq, but fortunes 
would turn with the tide of the war with frequent re-alignments and increasingly brutal measures 
against the civilian bases of the Iraqi peshmergas.
306
 
Iraqi setbacks would in fact lead to another Baghdad reproachment with Kurds, this time 
through Talabani’s PUK, which accepted a ceasefire with the Iraqi government and began 
negotiations to become part of the anti-Iranian front. In light of the actions taken by the Iraqis 
after regaining the offense shortly afterward, namely the mass arrest and execution of 8,000 
Barzani men, women, and children, it is clear that neither Iran nor Iraq was likely to uphold an 
agreement with the Kurds when in a position of good fortune. This growing pressure on the Iraqi 
Kurds by Ba’athist Arabization policies led to another Kurdish reversal as the PUK and KDP 
sought to unify under the Iraq Kurdistan Front (IFK) in 1987. The IFK then fought to cooperate 
against the interests of the Iranian Kurds to push the Iraqis out of border regions. The continued 
success of this alliance in hindering the Iraqi war effort led Saddam Hussein to use increasingly 
drastic measures to bring the Kurdish population to heel, most infamously, the March 1988 attack 
on Halabja where the civilian town was bombarded by a barrage of illegal chemical weapons. 
Gruesome pictures of the carnage, including the horrifying sight of a man’s body futilely 
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attempting to shield  an infant have become a pillar of the shared collective memory that 
continues to drive the Kurdish movement today.
307
   
This was merely one event though in a larger operation, code-named al-Anfal, in which 
Hussein sought to permanently destroy the Kurdish threat to the centralization of the Iraqi state. 
The goal was to create a Kurdish-free barrier along Iraq's northern border, with those living 
within the zone systematically ravaged by repeated chemical attacks, detentions, executions, and 
resettlement.
308
 By the time the Ba’ath Party began full scale Anfal operations from February-
September 1988, thousands were already living in unrecognized Kurdish refugee camps in Turkey 
and Iran.  Many camps were detention facilities as Kurds were seen, especially by the Turkish 
government, as problematic temporary residents. As the numbers grew through 1988-1990, 
international visitors were denied access, barbed wire rimmed the fences, educational 
opportunities and employment were limited, and heavily armed troops patrolled the grounds to 
ensure none of the refugees attempted to settle.
309
  
Despite these overt and concerted efforts to end the Kurdish problem through the 
deployment of force, the Iraqi regime at the close of the decade was more vulnerable and less 
secure than at the outset. Its weakness demonstrated in the disastrous war with Iran, allowed it 
greatest strategic foe to ally with many of its own citizens in seeking the downfall of its 
government, subjected a large number of its population to genocide, and attracted intense (and 
soon to be unprecedented) international manipulation into its domestic affairs. It also de-stabilized 
the region, spilling its chaos over the borders into Turkey, Iran, and Syria both through large 
refugee flows and nationalist sympathy for the plight of co-ethnies in these states.  Especially 
disconcerting was the resulting rising popularity of the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK), a 
communist-oriented organization that became capable of carrying out terrorist activities in pursuit 
of “Kurdish liberation” globally310  
In Kurdish minds, the tragedy of the Iran-Iraq War highlighted the vulnerability of the 
Kurdish population to the whims of recognized sovereigns, revealing the importance of 
guarentees for their security that went beyond unilateral concessions easily revoked by states 
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fundamentally set against the realization of a strong Kurdish autonomous government. While it 
certainly heightened awareness abroad of the Kurdish plight, it did not spur the international 
community to action to prevent the continued suffering of the civilian population until Saddam’s 
direct attack on foreign oil interests in the 1990 invasion of Kuwait. In the interim, thousands of 
Kurdish families continued to be relocated from predominately Kurdish areas while Arabs were 
paid to resettle their abandoned homes. A much larger number disappeared into mass graves still 
being uncovered throughout Iraq, and the regime itself pursued heightened despotism even among 
the Arab majority to cover its own internal weakness  
 
The Emergence of a DeFacto Kurdish State 
Saddam Hussein’s decision to invade Kuwait in August 1990 set in motion events that 
would catapult the long-standing Kurdish resistance into an established defacto state in northern 
Iraq.  After years of struggle, the Kurds of northern Iraq were the most politically and militarily 
organized opposition movement within Iraq. This positioned them to take full advantage of Iraq's 
fall from grace, dramatically tilting the interests of world powers in their direction at a time when 
regional powers traditionally opposed to their goals where weakened by war or decreasing aid 
budgets. However, while these particularities allowed for the institutionalization of a Kurdish 
defacto entity, the weakness of the Iraqi state was a perpetual and cyclical factor
311   
that was at 
least partially attributable to its incessant conflict with its Kurdish periphery. The Iraqi Kurdish 
opposition during the Iran-Iraq War had greatly contributed to the stalemate, the cost of which 
drove Baathist desires to seek new revenue sources for its mounting debt in Kuwait. 
Kuwaiti oil promised to not only help finance Iraq's rentier state, but the conflict would 
also provide the notoriously paranoid Hussein with an outlet for the large standing military he had 
built to fight Iran and the Kurds.
312
 In retrospect, it is clear that Saddam seriously miscalculated 
the determination of the Western coalition to protect its regional interests and global commitment 
to a post-Cold War security order.
313 
During the gathering of momentum to push Iraq out of 
Kuwait, one of the primary justifications used by both the US and UN was the threat posed by 
Saddam’s proven biological and nuclear weapons programs. The brutal 1980s campaign against 
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the Kurdish north was thrust into the media spotlight, bringing global awareness to the oppression 
of the Kurds. The fact that at least 100,000 noncombatant Kurds had been killed in such a short 
period of time provided a vivid demonstration of the potential for these weapons to inflict 
intolerable suffering.
314
  
This publicity took on new importance when Kurds in the north and Shia in the south 
responded to what seemed to be American encouragement to revolt against the weakened 
dictator.
315
 Both rose up in spontaneous rebellion as their leaders scrambled to return and within 
two weeks, Kurdish fighters had seized the oil-rich center of Kirkuk.
316
  Retribution by Kurdish 
citizens was exacted on those Ba’ath officials unable to escape the rapid uprising, renewing the 
seeds of a deep enmity and fear amongst both Arabs and Kurds about the implications of rule by 
the other group.
317
 
When the uprisings began to collapse under renewed attacks by Iraqi aircraft, a solution to 
the Kurdish refugee crisis was sought by Coalition forces. The vengeance with which Saddam 
turned on the rebellious Kurds made even veteran reporters uncomfortable witnesses to the 
suffering of civilians.
318
 Turkey’s growing refugee population, nearing a half a million, combined 
with close to a million refugees in Iran to transform the situation into a regional crisis.
319
 
Ironically then, a Coalition originally justified to retake Kuwait in order to protect the inviolable 
sovereignty of states would take a dramatic turn as the Coalition began to lobby for the 
establishment of humanitarian safe zones for the fleeing Kurdish and Shia civilians. The United 
States, United Kingdom, and France were the primary drivers behind the movement designed to 
prevent Iraqi aircraft from attacking fleeing civilians using United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 688 as a justification. The resolution reaffirmed “the commitment of all Member 
States to the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Iraq and of all States in 
the area,” but expressed grave concerns for international peace and security caused by the 
repression of civilians, mentioning Kurds in particular.
320 
 While it did not specifically authorize 
any form of action to be taken, the preponderance of scholarship continued to assert the break-
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through in international law represented by UNSCR 688’s partial endorsement of the right under 
certain horrifying circumstances to interference in the internal affairs of another state.
321
 
This was the penultimate attack on Iraq’s sovereignty brought on by its failure to 
incorporate the Kurds into a viable state-building project. The Kurds were the first to get a 
reprieve through Operation Provide Comfort, which delivered humanitarian aid and created a safe 
haven.
322
  On March 3, 1991 General Schwarzkopf stated that Iraqi aircraft flying in their own 
territory would be shot down and two Iraqi aircraft were duly disarmed by American aircraft later 
that month.
323
  By April a no-fly zone north of the 36
th
 parallel was firmly in place. Bereft of his 
best weaponry against the Kurds, Hussein unilaterally withdrew from the zone over the course of 
the summer in an effort to starve the local population into submission. The Kurds were thus 
subjected to a dual blockade; one based on the UN enforced sanctions against Iraq and the second 
coming from the Iraqi regime itself. This kept the fragile new Kurdish government wholly 
dependent on its borders with Turkey and Iran for trade, but did not shake its growing 
independence. 
Keenly aware of their vulnerability, the Kurds set immediately about creating a 
democratic system of government most likely to garner international approval.
324
 Elections were 
duly held in May 1992 to create a parliament and head of government, which would then be 
responsible for the establishment of a civilian administration to govern the Kurdish territories.
325
 
The results were accepted by the international community as generally fair, and led to an 
agreement between the KDP and PUK to evenly split seats among them with a small minority 
allocation to Christians.  A few months later, the leadership proclaimed that a federated Kurdish 
state had been created within a (future) federal Iraq.  
This was the first visible break with the idea that independence or autonomy could best 
secure recognition of Kurdish rights in favor of a more legalistic and constitutional basis for 
devolution of the Iraqi state. The principal that this should be the basis for Iraqi democracy was 
then lobbied for and subsequently adopted by a late October gathering of Iraqi opposition groups 
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in Salahhadin, the newly-formed United Iraqi National Congress. With the major Shiite political 
parties in attendance, the resolution gave the Kurds strong bargaining position in any post-
Saddam government, but typical to Kurdish history the peace between the parties would not last. 
Within 2 years, conflict between the KDP and PUK would lead to the disintegration of the Iraqi 
Kurdistan Front and a civil war that threatened the survival of its protected status. The causes of 
the conflict were multi-dimensional and fairly predictable given the high stress placed on the 
Kurdish areas from the double blockade. This made the Ibrahim al-Khalil border crossing from 
Turkey critical to the survival of the regime, accounting for the only legal means of import/export 
to foreign markets totaling about $150,000 a day.
326
 The crossing and subsequent duties were 
under the control of the KDP, and the notoriously opaque nature of Kurdish financing led to 
accusations by the PUK that the KDP was hoarding the money.  Once again, Kurdish leadership 
rivalries and the non-institutionalized nature of their authority gave external foes ample fodder to 
exploit.
327
 
With freedom fighters desperately attempting to establish a government from scratch in a 
war-torn society, it was little wonder that the situation resembled “an embarrassing series of 
failure in administration and economic mismanagement.”328 However, anxious to stabilize the 
region, the Americans brokered a peace summit in the fall of 1995 where the parties agreed to 
demilitarize Erbil, turn over KDP customs revenue to a joint bank account, and reconvene the 
KRG.
329
 The truce would not last more than a year, with renewed fighting backed by weapons 
from both Iran and Baghdad.
330
  By the end of August 1996, Iraqi ground forces and heavy 
artillery were moving northward to engage PUK forces in support of the KDP.  This action 
remains one of the most dramatic examples of how serious inter-Kurdish rivalries are in Iraq, 
bitter enough to invite an accused genocidaire into Kurdish territory to prevent an outright victory 
for their rival, and casts serious doubt about the viability of an independent Kurdish state.
331
  
Even more telling was the lack of faith both Kurdish leaders displayed in the American 
commitment to maintain the Kurdish defacto state. Obviously based on historical experiences 
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with Nixon, the Kurdish leaders were convinced that the Americans had little interest in the 
ultimate fate of the Kurdish community.  Mistrust had grown through repeated American refusals 
to take action to alleviate Kurdish suffering under the UN sanctions regime.  Little had been done 
to secure the safety of the INC members residing in Kurdistan either, which Washington now 
professed were merely recipients of aid not allies, or for the hundreds of Kurdish employees that 
were working with the CIA and other Western agencies.
332
 As both groups were hunted down and 
systematically slaughtered by the Republican Guard troops’ advance during the inter-Kurdish civil 
war, American officials idly labeled the conflict a civil matter. By 1997, Operation Provide 
Comfort had even been demoted to a surveillance operation and many of the Western allies were 
wavering in their commitment to continue support for its operation.
333 
Further American-brokered 
negotiations culminated in a September 1998 meeting in Washington, DC in which both Kurdish 
leaders agreed to eschew armed conflict, reschedule new elections, share revenues from border 
crossings, and prevent the incursion of outside powers in internal disputes in the Washington 
Accord. While the two parties were to eventually integrate their separate governmental structures, 
in essence this agreement led to a partition of the defacto Kurdish state between the KDP-
controlled areas in Dohuk and Erbil and the PUK area centered around Sulimeniyah. Both 
unsurprisingly struggled to make significant progress at addressing the most pressing social, 
economic, and political needs of the war-ravaged Kurdish territory, although most of the villages 
and schools in the region were rebuilt.  
While the problems experienced by the Kurds were undeniably the result of deep 
cleavages between them, the ambiguous legal definition of the territory also significantly 
contributed to the chaos that reigned throughout the 1990s.  Throughout the decade, electricity 
was periodically cut off, effectively undermining any attempts to build a solid economic base and 
promoting illegal activities that bred a culture of corruption that resulted in a sharp deterioration 
in the social and political bonds of the Kurds.
334
 The equipment needed to break this dependence 
on foreign sources of aid was forbidden under international sanctions, and the traditional 
economic base of the Kurdistan Region was undermined by the nature of the Iraqi-wide 
agricultural aid that forced a certain percentage of Iraqi oil wealth to be used for food imports that 
competed with local Kurdish production. In the period directly after the war, food prices exploded 
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by 200%, demonstrations racked Kurdish streets, and unemployment was reportedly as high as 
80-90%.
335
  Security was only restored through the deployment of 70,000-100,000 well-trained 
Kurdish peshmerga to protect the enclave and perform general security duties.
336
  
Both parties also remained mired in guerilla organizational forms that proved highly 
problematic for governing, investing the small leadership with unchecked authority and seeking to 
eliminate any potential competitors for power.
337 
In this context, the power-sharing agreement 
proved a dismal failure. Both feared that the results of a competitive election could lead them into 
a dangerous downward spiral of competition. In fact, the establishment of two administrations did 
arguably produce some benefits for the Kurdish population in lieu of more institutionalized 
checks and balances, as both sides were forced into a peaceful competition to prove their ability to 
produce better results than the other with the expectation that they would one day be forced to the 
polls. 
For both the Kurds and their supporters, this era would serve as a patent reminder of the 
importance in negotiating a settlement for the legal existence of their regime with the central 
government. Such an agreement, which would define the structure of the Kurdish Regional 
Government and end the limbo under which it operated, would also provide access to markets and 
institutional oversight that could alleviate their own inter-rivalries by providing opportunities at 
both the regional and national level. It would also end the capricious way in which Baghdad could 
abuse central authority without fear of repercussion and encourage a healthy diversification of the 
KRG’s revenue stream, thus preventing reliance on hostile neighbors for basic resources. Both 
Kurdish leaders recognized this even before the war to topple Saddam in fact, stepping up earlier 
attempts to negotiate a settlement for federal autonomy with Baghdad.
338
 
However, the chance to negotiate a deal in earnest would come in an unexpected way. The 
September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States and the resulting re-engagement of an activist 
American foreign policy in the Middle East provided the Kurds with an unparalleled chance to 
create an institutionalized, recognized, and clear status for their fledgling statelet within the 
confines of a democratic Iraq. Events transpired to ensure this result, as the original invasion plan 
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had to be re-written on the eve of the war to topple Saddam when Turkey refused to allow the US-
British led coalition to use its territory or bases. This forced the Kurds to step into a key role as 
US ally in the war, providing on-the-ground intelligence and working in conjunction with 
American troops air-lifted into the north. 
Thus, as the war commenced, the Kurds found themselves the strongest local allies in the 
“Coalition of the Willing,” united once again to present a common Kurdish front for the liberation 
of Iraq. This new alliance would be the most enduring since their split in the 1970s, with both 
sides vowing to work out their differences behind closed doors in an effort to maximize the gains 
they could make for the region in negotiations with a new government in Baghdad. While the INC 
was in disarray,
339
 the Kurds were characteristically prepared to fight to institutionalize a state 
they could fully participate in for the first time. The lessons of their past failures would provide a 
platform on which they could lobby for more substantive legal rights. As active members in the 
INC, they had managed to legitimate the idea of federalism as a basis for administering the 
country and gain valuable allies amongst the majority Shia community for the idea that a weak 
central government was critical to preventing a return to despotism in the country.  
However, the Kurds were also now more skeptical of paper promises. Back in 1958, they 
were already discounting Arab commitments to their self-rule as passing fantasies and fleeting 
promises.
340
 By 2003, this legacy of negotiation and betrayal would lead the Kurds to demand 
concessions from their new partners that went much further than the deals of the past. The 
Kurdish leadership had learned that the common Iraqi saying “love your neighbor’s Kurds, beat 
your own” contained more than an element of enduring truth. This realization about the enduring 
and important divisions within Iraq would require not only the weak autonomy deals of the past, 
subject to unilateral destruction by a reinvigorated Baghdad, but more substantive institutional 
checks and balances to prevent the devastating tyranny that had characterized Iraq’s history. 
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CHAPTER 4:  
The Foundation for Resolution: Negotiation of a Decentralized, Asymmetrical, Federal State 
“Effective federal governance must be based on a written constitution and the rule of law. The 
constitution sets the basic framework and principles of the federation. A constitution can be 
symbolically important in fostering unity or discord...”341 
 
The new Iraqi state is a remarkable and revolutionary break from the unitary regimes of 
the past. Drawing away from a definition of sovereignty that allowed little room for minority 
participation, the process through which the new government formed and a broader trend toward 
federal solutions led to the introduction of vastly different political institutions. These institutions 
reified the separate, distinct, and unequal application of sovereignty in the new Iraq. This chapter 
analyzes the roots of this system in theory as the first step in arguing that it creates the foundation 
for Kurdish participation in the state-building project and improves the likelihood of an ultimately 
successful state-building endeavor throughout the country. The first section steps away from the 
Iraqi case to contextualize the historical experiences described in the second chapter into the 
broader legacy of state-building along the Weberian model in the post-colonial world, in order to 
argue that the roots of Iraq’s state-building failure lay in its long adherence to a form of statehood 
ill-suited to its society and time. The second section examines the move away from this model in 
the post-war Iraq to a negotiated form of post-modern federalism that rejected this legacy, and 
laid the foundation for incorporation of the Kurds into a more inclusive and successful state-
building endeavor. 
 
Laying the Foundation for the Iraqi State 
The historical legacy of Iraq is revealing not just because of its implications for the future 
institutions of the state, but also as evidence of a much broader trend in the development of 
modern states throughout much of the world. As previously noted, the values and practices 
associated with the Weberian state that developed out of the feudal system in medieval Europe 
were designed to address the needs of a particular time and place.
342
 Strong, centralizing 
sovereigns could provide common goods to overcome the major challenges of their day: 
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protecting against brigands, offering a larger market for trade, enabling increased specification, 
and reducing the overlapping burdens of extraction placed on the population by increasing 
standardization and administrative efficiency. However, once created and spread across the globe, 
the Weberian ideal of the centralizing state became the definition of a modern political 
community, regardless of its ability to address the particular needs, restrictions, or opportunities 
presented in the various locales suddenly birthed into statehood by the process of de-colonization 
and collapse of empires. 
These institutions were not value neutral. The dominant political philosophy of many 
European states at the time of colonization was based on a particular brand of state philosophy 
derived from the works of Bodin and Hobbes, which represented a version of sovereignty founded 
in strongly centralized and administratively unitary states, which “made the word of the sovereign 
law,” thus granting the sovereign the sort of “overweening power” that naturally “invited 
tyranny.”343  It is epitomized in definitions of the modern state in academic literature as being 
comprised of the following six characteristics: 
 
“First, it should be territorially distinct, possess a single sovereignty, and enjoy legally unlimited 
authority within its boundary. Second, it should rest on a single set of constitutional principles and 
exhibit a singular and unambiguous identity…[Third, represent] a homogenous legal space within 
which its members move freely, carrying with them a more or less identical basket of rights and 
obligations. Fourth…all citizens are directly and identically related to the state, not differentially 
or through their membership of intermediate communities. Fifth, members of the state are deemed 
to constitute a single and united people…Sixth…if the state is federally constituted, its 
component units should all enjoy the same rights and powers.”344 
 
Clearly, this dominant definition of the state is a “thoroughly homogenizing institution,”345 with 
little room for ethnic or cultural difference. It was crafted in a particular time and space as an 
answer to the disintegrating effects the end of feudalism had on Europe's political units. With the 
objective of overcoming the ensuing religious and political chaos and re-instituting strong 
sovereigns, both Hobbes and Bodin sought a strong defense for the absolutist monarch and held a 
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proclivity toward order even when it diminished or trampled on basic principles of natural 
rights.
346
 They were seeking to re-establish legitimacy for already existing sovereigns with a long 
history of political association, a task that set them, “resolutely against all disintegrating 
tendencies” in favor of a sovereign that was uniform, complete, and unquestionable.347  
This standard became the benchmark for the development of states across the globe, 
reconstituted in such works as Huntington’s Political Order in Changing Societies, which reads 
as much like a “how-to” manual for the leaders of developing states as Machiavelli’s The Prince 
once did for the Renaissance sovereign.
348
 Rejecting divided sovereignty models, the argument 
was put forth that new states must follow the “Continental European” model in which power is 
first centralized, rival social orders crushed, and the state’s claim to sovereignty made whole 
before any thought of decentralization could occur.
349
 Drawing on Weberian state theory and 
comparative works on early European state-building, these early political works were applied to a 
new era where they were pitted against the diversity in social and political order inherent to many 
societies in favor a strong, unitary state with complete mastery over its domain and people.  
Dominant for many years in state-building,
350
 the theory was bolstered by the 
developmental success of BRACs in South America and East Asia, who utilized often brutal 
measures to put down rival social forces and concentrate power in central institutions.
351
  The 
focus was inexorably on the indivisible unity of the state. Impediments to this order, most 
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commonly traditional forms of power rooted in kinship, religion, or some combination of the two, 
were treated largely as transitory impediments to the march to modernity that would spur 
increasing connections between the population and growing political and social sophistication.
352
   
However, this approach was not only ahistorical, but also failed to conceive of the way in 
which the new states differed from historical predecessors in places like Iraq. Unlike the early 
European states that evolved through a four phase progression from unification to mass inclusion 
in governance, mass political participation, and then economic redistribution, the new states were 
simultaneously faced with these challenges due to rising expectations in the modern era that 
forced them into a “cumulation of critical challenges” that was fundamentally distinct from the 
Western European experience.
353
 Indeed, while suitable to a small number of new states, this 
model was ill at-ease from the onset with the birth of most, which lacked the national or historic 
civic culture that under-girded comparable European states. These states were the complete 
opposite in fact of early European predecessors, birthed into a semi-life devoid of any unifying 
element or rational boundaries. Ethnically, religiously, and often culturally heterogenous, Lord 
Acton’s observation that based solely on nationalism many would be forced into an existence 
“according, therefore, to the degree of humanity and civilization in that dominant body which 
claims all the rights of the community, the inferior races are exter- minated, or reduced to 
servitude, or outlawed, or put in a condition of depen- dence,”354 proved disastrously true.  
Without a unifying past, many states were propelled in their quest for uniformity into 
virulent nationalism.
355
 These virulent forms of nationalism, while often successful in mobilizing 
against class-based interests in places like Latin America, were much less effective in inducing 
ethnic or religious minorities to join in the state-building endeavor. Contrary to some arguments, 
these loyalties were not simply exploited by elites, but instead were a reflection of deep 
attachments that went to the core of individual identity
356
 and thus could not easily be 
disregarded. In fact, many states excluded minority groups like the Kurds entirely from 
participating in the myth of the nation or its state-building project, creating a core conundrum, 
whereby the state placed its continued legitimacy on the support of only one segment of society to 
the complete omission of others. Those outside became enemies of the state, removed from 
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decision-making circles through sometimes explicit laws meant to further national progress on the 
basis of the chosen ethnicity. Even when these states retained periodic democratic facades, the 
laws of their ethno-democracies
357
 excluded minority participation through language laws, quotas 
or overt discrimination, all justified by the quest to build a strong and united nation devoid of 
difference.
358
 In the end, the quest for unity came not to mean that every citizen was equal before 
the state, but rather that the state would first create the right type of citizen and only through this 
process would they gain equality before the eyes of the state.
359
 
The contemporary state system, unable to solve the problem of many nations by giving 
each nation its own state, consequently became beholden in many places to a version of statehood 
inevitably mired in interminable and periodic ethnocidal conflicts. This was not just an issue with 
despotism, but rather with the roots of a state philosophy that fundamentally confused “nation-
building” and state-building.360  In an era where national consciousness had been raised, the 
increasing penetration of an alien state into previously autonomous sources of ethnic social order 
were just as likely to produce a realization that a “people” existed that were different from the 
majority (or in some cases minority) that ran the state as it was to impel them toward 
assimilation.
361
 These states were not like ethnically-homogenous Japan and Germany. Instead the 
creation of unitary states in many of these cases was not a matter of nation-building, but rather of 
“nation-destroying.”362 Without a strong commitment to consensual, federal, or inclusive 
government practices, they pitted a significant number of their own citizens through their most 
deeply felt desire for identification and representation against the state project. 
The unsurprising turmoil caused by the introduction of this political form thus culminated 
towards the late 20
th
 century in scholars questioning whether “it may not be possible, or even 
desirable, to root political identity unambiguously in mutually exclusive geographical entities.”363 
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Rather than conform to the state-building project of assimilation, minority groups increasingly 
called for the right to establish institutions that would include and represent them, whether 
through secession or federal autonomy. Even in the heart of the modern state revolution, ethnic 
groups from the United Kingdom to Spain to Belgium spoke out for representation in sovereign 
institutions that would respect not only their individual, but also group rights. 
However, nowhere was the problem of adopting the norms and values of the Weberian 
centralizing state as telling as in places with territorially-centered minority communities like Iraq. 
While some initially argued that the Iraqi Ba’athist regime seemed to be following in the footsteps 
of Huntington’s success stories, the reality that the historical socio-economic struggles of Iraqi 
society were vastly different from the BRACs’ experience became evident through repeated 
coups, bouts of genocidal ethnic-sectarian fighting, and the eventual bankruptcy of a national state 
ideology. Where the BRAC states effectively mobilized against class-based conflict, benefiting 
immensely in the East Asian case from a long bureaucratic tradition and near destruction of 
traditional elite relationships,
364
 the Iraqi state was faced with more parochial societal divisions 
that could not be suppressed solely through the developmental process. As other scholars have 
noted, these cleavages were totally different in nature and form from those in Latin America, 
having “developed over centuries, and involving an intermixture of race, social structure, and 
economic status” that posed much more serious problems for nation-building.365 A unitary Iraqi 
state, being unable to either rely on its religious or ethnic majority was instead forced to rely 
solely on coercive force,
366
 contributing to an inevitable cycle of insecurity aptly described by 
Holsti whereby: 
 
“The attempts to create "nations" where none existed before drive secessionist and irredentist 
movements, most of which take a violent form under the rubric of the inherent right of self-
determination. Without a nation, a state is fundamentally weak. But in attempting to build 
strength, usually under the leadership of an ethnic core, minorities become threatened or excluded 
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from power. This is the foundation of the "insecurity dilemma" of most new states. [AND] It is the 
source of most wars in our age.”367 
 
As the historical chapter demonstrated, the price for this has been high in internal chaos, the 
inability of the Iraqi state to defend itself against potential foreign competitors, and a genocidal 
campaign against a segment of its own population. While most visible, the Kurds have not been 
the only victims. As illuminated by Kennedy, the over-extension of a political authority’s power 
often strains its resources to such an extent that the economy becomes too weak to provide the 
basic resources for the defense of even the core political unit from potential rivals.
368
 This has 
certainly been true in Iraq, where ongoing internal conflict prevented the Iraqi army from 
effectively defeating its main regional rival even as Iran struggled to recover from a revolution.  
Repeated regimes were driven into ever-increasing levels of despotic control over an oppositional 
society.
369
 
The applicability of the modern European state model that developed from a particular 
historical social and economic context was thus inherently unrealistic given the inheritance of 
many states like Iraq of unnatural, pre-determined and incongruous state structures and 
boundaries,
370
 an international normative shift that made the previous dependence on extreme 
forms of coercion morally bankrupt and subject to armed resistance, and the widespread 
legitimacy of ideologies like nationalism, democracy, and self-determination. 
371
 The response of 
these states to such challenges was inherently limited by the time in which they lived, unable to 
follow the path of the early European states they faced a conundrum “that the only way for the 
state to have a chance to develop the capacity necessary in order to satisfy the expectations of...the 
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international community would be for it to first violate those expectations.”372 With no room for 
their expression within a unitary Arab Iraqi state, the critically important social capital of the 
Kurdish region thus seemed perennially and hopelessly pitted against the state. Iraq as a unitary 
Arab state simply did not have the capability to incorporate or destroy its peripheral areas. 
However, the problem was never with the existence of Iraq as a state, but rather with the 
type of state being constructed. In fact, outside of the particular considerations of the Iraqi 
experience, theorists disappointed by the outcome of decades of post-World War II state-building 
increasingly articulated an alternative vision.
373
  Turning first to the American experience, as 
revolutionary in its attempt to overcome the problems associated with divided sovereignty, a 
system whereby both the central government and the constitutive states maintained exclusive 
room for maneuver and attributes of sovereign authority presented the opportunity to reconcile 
competing claims to representation and sovereignty. The American system of federalism thus laid 
the groundwork for the development of a system of government fundamentally opposed in its 
philosophy to the dominant unitary state of Europe’s past. Its success in providing its people with 
peace, security, and prosperity, while binding them progressively and increasingly to a national 
system inspired the transformation of many European states themselves in the face of the 
unexpected persistence of group identity claims throughout the 20
th
 century in places as far 
abreast as Belgium, Canada, and India.  
While most post-colonial states followed the unitary Parliamentary systems of their 
colonizers, some states thus founded a discursive and inclusive project to bind disparate 
populations together in a single state by adopting and transforming federal norms to create a post-
modern framework for the unequal practice of federal sovereignty among their constituent units. 
Still lacking the underlying civic values of their early federal predecessors, these states raised 
strong institutional protections for the dispersal of sovereign power in order to protect and 
maintain the diversity of their societies from the impetus toward destructive centralizing practices 
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found elsewhere. These projects surprised many with their resilience, spurring the continued 
existence of seemingly unwieldy democracies in places like India and post-Suharto Indonesia. 
This ensuing state-building literature was much more suited to inform the process in Iraq, for 
while it tended to focus on the articulation of group interests over individual citizenship, it 
effectively contested the notion that any division of sovereignty spells disaster for the survival 
and unity of a political community,
374
 and outlined a mechanism whereby states with diverse 
societies could seek to incorporate peripheral areas into the state-building process by erecting 
barriers to the overweening power of a centralizing state. 
Naturally then, with the inclusion of Kurdish representatives in the construction of an Iraqi 
government, the first task of the new Iraqi leadership (in partnership with their American and 
British overseers) would be to determine what type of state model Iraq would adopt. After almost 
a hundred years of attempting to force a square peg in a round hole, the new Iraqi institutions 
negotiated between the Kurds and other Iraqi authorities would seek a mechanism to represent 
difference and provide a peaceful mechanism to resolve potential conflict, thus overcoming the 
brutal pattern of aggression toward dissent that began with the massacre of Assyrians by the Iraqi 
Army in 1933.
375
 The new system would need to be revolutionary to overcome this ingrained 
process of behavior, which was imbedded in “institutional structures of the past,”376 and go 
beyond the sort of ethno-democracy rooted in centralized states elsewhere.  This would require a 
reformulation to satisfy the desires of the Kurds for cultural, linguistic, and political expression, 
prevent the return of oppressive dictators that subjugated and brutalized even the Shia majority, 
and yet still hold enough power at the center to keep the country together, stable, and democratic. 
 
The Foundation of the New Iraqi State 
With the armed overthrow of the Ba’athist regime by the United States-led Coalition 
forces in March 2003, the various Iraqi opposition groups and their foreign overseers were faced 
with the monumental task of reconstructing an Iraqi state that had been historically prone to 
violent coups, armed insurrections, regional war, and the brutal suppression of political 
difference. In a regional context that had witnessed widespread disillusionment with pan-
Arabism, socialism, military and Islamic revolutions and an outside benefactor determined to 
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usher in a new wave of democracy the options could outwardly appear extremely limited. The 
deliberations were after-all predetermined to produce a constitutional republic, based on periodic 
elections, which itself would radically transform the Iraqi state. However, this form of 
government still left a wide-berth for those that participated in the drafting of the TAL and 
permanent Iraqi Constitution. Both documents, in re-constructing the coercive and administrative 
force of the Iraqi state, would critically describe the process of political negotiation that would be 
responsible for adjudicating disagreements and dividing authority between rival social forces. 
Significant questions would naturally surface over the best form for the democracy, which 
could both prevent a return to despotism and/or discourage fragmentation. In fact, the most 
important factors in structuring the new Iraqi state are also the most critical to understanding the 
potential for success at accomplishing a stable, authentic state-building experience. Each of these 
factors must be taken in turn, being 1) the roots of the new system, entailing both the type of 
federalism it embodies and the institutionalization of mechanisms to resolve conflicts between its 
different political communities and maintain a sphere for independent action for its respective 
people against the centralizing tendencies of the state, and 2) the process through which the 
institutions of the state were negotiated, rooting the new state in a constitutional covenant 
between the communities and vesting sovereignty in a compromise designed to hold the state 
together by incorporating, rather than destroying, the diverse roots of authority found in its 
society. 
 
Debating the Form: A Unique Federal System for Iraq 
As the process to form a new Iraqi state began, many pundits and scholars questioned 
whether any project no matter how cleverly constructed could hold the Iraqi state together and 
even more whether a democratic system could blossom.
377
 The Kurds, long estranged from the 
central Iraqi state and well-positioned to press their sectarian demands in the wake of its 
destruction were seen as sure spoilers. After years of long and bloody fighting for their own state, 
how could the political leaders of the Kurdish movement be expected to now work toward Iraq's 
re-construction? How would their demands be reconciled with the centripetal needs of a state, 
already subjected to a legitimacy crisis by its birth in the actions of a foreign military intervention, 
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into a viable state-building project that could appeal to the large majority of Arabs, themselves 
divided by religion and history? How could all of this be accomplished while avoiding the 
vestment of the Iraqi state with enough power to lure new tyrants? 
There is no doubt that the original meetings regarding the reconstruction of the Iraqi state 
produced very little that the respective parties could agree upon. As the central thrust of this work 
implies, the principle factors once again revolved around a desire for a strong, centralized, and 
unitary Iraqi state and the seemingly inevitable and unending Kurdish opposition to that vision. 
The chief debate within the confines of the constitutional republic was thus the tension between 
Iraq’s two major ghosts: the often deceptive centripetal pull of resource-fueled authoritarian 
despotism and the centrifugal tug of its diverse and unwieldy sectarian communities. Simply put, 
how best to construct an Iraqi state that could provide enough power at the center to prevent the 
perceived secessionist or fragmentary tendencies of its ethnic, linguistic, and religious 
differences, while still allowing strongly organized minorities like the Kurds (or traditionally 
oppressed majorities like the Shia Arabs) enough space to pursue the sort of political, social, and 
cultural independence they saw as quid pro quo for their participation in the construction of the 
new state.  
Given the open process through which the new state would be constructed, scholars and 
policy-makers flooded the public space with a series of arguments in favor of different types of 
institutional formations that could ease the centripetal-centrifugal conundrum. All brought 
ideological baggage about what constituted a strong state, some ill-suited to the reality now faced 
in constructing a voluntary union of Iraq’s people. The discussions would not be conducted in a 
vacuum. They would take place in an era where federalism had gained increasing ascendancy, and 
the resolution would duly have to contend with heightened acceptance in intellectual circles that 
rather than the model of early European states, states such as Iraq were sometimes far better 
suited in both their political and social fragmentation for certain types of federalism.  
In fact, having already (albeit somewhat reluctantly)
378
 agreed as a coalition of opposition 
forces under the auspices of the INC, that a new Iraq should be both democratic and federal,
379
 the 
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initial disagreements circled around what type of federalism could best advance the interests of 
the respective parties. Most Shia and Kurdish politicians agreed that a centralized system had 
failed and had to be radically re-worked if the democratic process had any hope of taking root. 
However, a denial of a unitary state and acceptance of federalism did not guarantee the realization 
of group rights or representation, and thus did not in fact promise in and of itself to redress the 
grievances of Iraq’s past or protect Iraq’s diversity from a renewed attempt to centralize the state 
and homogenize its society. The devil would be in the details and it was the construction of 
compromises and institutions that blended together the desires of Iraq’s various communities that 
would lay the groundwork for progress. The following sections analyze the two initial proposals, 
addressing the problems that made them ill-suited to the Iraqi case, and then the compromise that 
embedded the central state with the necessary power to protect against secessionist tendencies and 
empowered the periphery enough to correspondingly protect against the historical impetus toward 
despotic recentralization. 
 
The Initial Kurdish Proposal: Confederalism 
The Kurds initially argued in favor of a federal system so decentralized and fragmented 
that it would amount to little more than a confederal alliance. As the most organized group, in 
some respects they had a distinct advantage. The Arab groups were divided among Shia and 
Sunni parties (with many Sunni parties choosing not to participate at all), and further split into 
different unorganized and uncertain coalitions predominately formed in exile and thus with 
varying and questionable degrees of political support. The PUK-KDP alliance by contrast shared 
a cohesive vision, popular electoral mandate, and established party decision-making structures 
that were determined to maintain the institutions that had granted them legitimate authority over 
three northern provinces and defacto military control over most of Kirkuk and majority-Kurdish 
areas in Diyala and Nineva. They also held a shared determination to extract the maximum 
authority possible through sovereign devolution for the KRG, effectively dividing responsibilities 
between the parties to this end. 
Given this singularity of purpose, it was no surprise that they would be the first group to 
put forward a comprehensive platform. Submitted on 13 February, 2004 during negotiations over 
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the TAL, it moved decisively away from the unilaterally-granted (and thus unilaterally-revoked) 
autonomy guarantees of the past,
380
 opting instead for a very loose federalism. The Kurds 
recognized that in addition to autonomy, federal constituent entities (especially in post-modern 
systems) agree to give up certain rights in exchange for benefits, usually economic and security 
guarantees, without sacrificing the units’ status claim to sovereign rights. While there is 
consequently still broad room for maneuver over how much to divide authority, merely obtaining 
the status of being a constitutionally-recognized federal unit would thus be a major step forward 
for Kurdish aspirations to institutionalize and legitimize their authority in Iraq and abroad. 
The KRG thus called for a maximalist recognition of their rights through a system so 
decentralized and asymmetrical that it would amount to little more than a treaty on common 
defense between 2 equal national components. The Iraqi Government would recognize the KRG 
and all of its subsidiary institutions as the legitimate institutions of a self-governing region within 
the state of Iraq, to include all of the territory currently under control of the Kurdish forces. The 
federal government controlling all Arab-majority territory, would be limited to exclusive and 
agreed upon jurisdictions with all other powers reserved to the Region. The KRG would maintain 
under the command of the Kurdistan National Assembly (KNA) a “National Guard” that would 
only nominally be part of the Iraqi Army, as the KNA
381
 would appoint its commanding officer 
and approve any deployment outside the Region. Likewise, the Iraqi National Army (INA) would 
not be deployed within the KRG unless approved by the KNA and Kurdistan Guards would be 
responsible for control of the KRG's international boundaries. The Region would also have 
complete ownership over oil, land, and other natural resources found in its jurisdiction, collecting 
revenue accordingly, except in the case of already existing oil fields. It would further have 
complete control to administer and collect taxes with Iraqi national taxes only active upon 
approval and the Region would be granted a “block,” unregulated proportion of the Iraqi national 
budget based on population size. 
The Kurdish proposal was far-reaching, resting on an assessment of the strength of 
alliances built with major Arab groups during the long opposition. Despite later disagreements, 
Kurdish leaders saw many in the Shia parties as natural allies in the fight against a return to 
extreme centralization. In particular, prominent Supreme Islamic Council of Iraq (SCIRI) 
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members had gradually converted to a philosophy of federalization that would allow them to 
control the vast oil wealth found in their region and prevent the return of a strong, Sunni state that 
could use that oil wealth to suppress their aspirations. Since the majority of Iraqi oil wealth 
resided in Shia and Kurdish areas, a configuration of power that localized control of oil reserves 
would virtually ensure their protection from the traditionally dominant Sunni groups that resided 
in the resource-poor middle. While they did not recognize it as such, the Kurdish vision also 
offered to protect other minorities, including the Sunni Arabs, in a democratic system that they 
were now unlikely to control in perpetuity. By granting the regions a block of the national budget, 
it would ensure that a Shia government could not simply hoard Iraq's oil wealth to the detriment 
of its other communities. 
However, those who supported the Kurdish vision of an extreme form of sovereign 
devolution commensurate with the division of Iraq into 3 statelets did not hold the answer to 
securing a stable and peaceful Iraq.
382
 While the long-standing conflict between Kurds and Arabs 
indicated a pervasive division of Iraqi society, the political importance of this cultural and ethnic 
fact was not based in primordial tendencies, but was the result of the particularly problematic, 
over-centralized institutions of the previous Iraqi state. While this had deeply alienated the Kurds, 
the case for confederation in the rest of Iraq was not nearly as clear-cut. Besides an early 
nationalist flirt in Basra during the formation of the Iraqi state based almost entirely on the pre-
existing identity of the Ottoman villayet system, there was very little historical indication that the 
Shi’a and Sunni Arabs in Iraq saw themselves as exclusive communities in need of their own 
political representation based on these broad sectarian groupings prior to the overthrow of 
Saddam.
383
  
In fact, mainstream Arab thought largely indicated quite the opposite. In both cases, 
religious and secular scholars argued against the division of the Iraqi state, seeing a state of unity 
between its different sectarian communities as being the norm, rather than the exception.
384
  
While the Shia Arabs had long suffered under Saddam, there was undoubtedly a strong nationalist 
current that supported the Iraqi state historically, most often cited in regards to the large Shia 
participation against their co-religionists in Iran during the Iran-Iraq War. Rather than reify the 
growing sectarian and ethnic divisions, many not surprisingly called for the inviolability and 
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cohesion of all Iraqis as part of the Islamic ummah.
385
  For a large number, the sectarian bend of  
post-war Iraqi politics was also the direct result of the state collapse and ensuing chaos, 
insecurity, and violence that came from a disorderly occupation, rather than a long and indicative 
historical process.
386
 Already broken down from years of Ba’athist rule, Iraqi society’s response 
to pressure from extremist groups seeking to ignite a sectarian war naturally fragmented along 
parochial lines in the search for personal security, but there was no reason to believe this indicated 
widespread desire for the end of an Iraqi central state identity and the division into bi- or tri-
national blocks, which was virtually assured in the Kurdish proposal.  
Most importantly though, the extreme division of Iraqi authority away from the center 
could serve to legitimize and reinforce the development of potentially destructive tendencies as 
witnessed in other failed states. While it would be foolhardy to completely embrace the idea that 
Iraqi society largely needed or wanted the return of a unitary state based on opinion polling in a 
time of extreme violence and civil war,
387
 the fact that many Iraqis had developed a genuine sense 
of national belonging could not simply be wished away. By essentially removing any central 
control over the KRG, including Kirkuk, the ground for the division of Iraq into multiple 
secessionist states was a genuine fear. The threat of separatism or ethnic chauvinism was not 
unrealistic, for not every federal state has been created equal and some have in fact ended in 
abject failure. Of particular concern to the Iraqi case are studies showing that federal states that 
have bi-national (or even tri-national) configurations or a very small number of territorially based 
regions are more prone to secessionist conflicts and instability than their peers.
388
 The idea that an 
Arabistan and a Kurdistan (or a Kurdistan, Sunnistan, and Shiastan) would last in perpetuity with 
their own armed forces and almost no policy congruence was not supported by available 
comparative evidence,
389
 and thus is was clear that some sort of balancing factor was needed to 
allow for a degree of flexibility and the development of shifting inter-sectarian alliances.  
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The Kurdish proposal, while acknowledging this reality, maintained that the Kurds 
themselves could be granted far-reaching federal rights without the same being given to other 
Iraqis, an asymmetric-characteristic commonly found in other post-modern states. However, their 
proposal was so far-reaching in its retention of sovereign rights for the KRG it was difficult to see 
how it differed from independence and thus the negotiated destruction of the Iraqi state. The 
federal government would essentially only retain the right to issue a common currency, making 
the union more monetary than political, and rendering the Iraqi state largely impotent in terms of 
power projection over a significant portion of its most vulnerable territory.  
 
The Revival of Centralism in the Pachachi Plan 
The initial confidence of the Kurdish authorities in their alliance with prominent Shia 
groups would be summarily dashed by increasingly strong opposition from both secular Arab 
liberals and some Shi’a religious parties to their confederal plan, leading to growing momentum 
behind a very different form of federalism known generally as the “Pachachi Plan.”390 As the 
clear demographic superiority of the Shia evolved, the natural alliance they had found with the 
Kurds in exile began to wane, drawing some closer instead to Sunni liberal nationalist ideas. 
Stronger Shi’a parties could now envision themselves atop a more unified, centralized, and 
democratic Iraq as electoral gains strengthened their grip on Baghdad. Emboldened and 
recognizing themselves as the most likely candidates for the helm of the central state, Shi’a 
groups that had previously semi-supported a decentralized system increasingly connected 
themselves to the need for a stronger Iraqi state that could continue to play a prominent role in the 
region.
391
  
This evolution was aided by the chaos and bloody sectarian war that gripped the post-
Ba’athist state. The surprising rise of Muqtada Al-Sadr, a firebrand son of the assassinated Grand 
Ayatollah Al-Sadr, on a populist, nationalist message forced several of the major Shia political 
parties, most notably SCIRI (renamed ISCI) and Da’wa to reformulate earlier political 
calculations and move more decisively nationalistic in rhetoric. Declarations by the revered 
Ayatollah Al-Sistani that Iraq remain unitary and the subsequent defeat of the strongest Basrawi 
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advocates for a Shi’a federal region in the 2005 elections,392 also dampened some of the initial 
enthusiasm for a much more decentralized Iraq and opened the door for a more centralized 
version of Iraqi federalism to make significant inroads in constitutional negotiations. 
The position of this developing “Pachachi” coalition,393 was deeply informed by the 
American federal tradition of a strongly centralized, integrationist, and symmetrical arrangement 
that would jettison sectarian identities in favor of a national, liberal Iraqi identity. Just as the 
KRG’s proposal dubbed its parliament a “national assembly,” and in so doing revealed a 
profoundly confederal bias, so too did the Pachachi plan refer to the Iraqi government not as a 
federal government, but as a “national” and “central” government.394  
Not surprisingly, on all of the main points on which federations can differ, this plan 
opposed the KRG proposal. The “national” government would retain exclusive jurisdiction and 
competency to legislate and enforce law on all but the barest of local matters, “subordinating” the 
KRG to its sovereignty. It would control a national army, have sole competency to engage in 
foreign policy, determine monetary and fiscal policy (including taxation and presumably 
expenditures), and would own and operate all of the country’s natural resources.395 A simple 
majority would be needed to enact legislation enforceable throughout the state, and the existing 
institutions of the KRG in police, security, and judicial matters would be subjugated to decisions 
made at the national level.
396
 This would essentially dismantle pre-existing Kurdish institutions 
and seek to recreate in Iraq a contemporary American-style, symmetrical federation with an even 
more pre-eminent national government.
397
  
Like the Kurdish vision, this proposal was not conducive to the healthy establishment of 
an inclusive, democratic Iraq, providing no guarantees for minority rights or hope of Kurdish buy-
in. At its extreme, scholars like Dawisha and Dawisha
398
 even envisioned redrawing the 
provincial map of the Iraqi state, such that most of the provinces would have an artificially 
doctored split between religious and ethnic groups. The Kurds would no longer have their own 
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provinces and would be “forced” into compromises with other groups to achieve representation. 
In fact, the division of Iraq’s 18 provinces into a non-ethnicized American integrationist model 
was unfeasible even with long crescent-shaped provinces running from south to north. The plan 
would have left several provinces predominately Shi’a, in effect only dividing up the Sunni and 
Kurdish minorities, stripping them of any institutionalized base of authority, and promoting intra-
ethnic competition between them while leaving the majority Shi’a ascendant.399 Rather than 
altering the basic sectarian calculus of the state, it would merely have promoted one group to the 
exclusion of others. Similar administrative maneuvering had in fact already proved entirely 
unsuccessful in places like the USSR and Yugoslavia, whose experiences after the removal of the 
coercive boot of totalitarianism indicated the likelihood of an immediate resurgence of ethnic 
identities without heavy coercive suppression.
400
  
The proposal for a centralized, unitary, and symmetrical federalism was thus both 
unrealistic and dangerous to the future stability of the Iraqi state for one main reason: the very real 
division of social and territorial power between Iraq’s various sects. Gerry-mandering provincial 
borders or ignoring the desired association of people across super-imposed provincial boundaries 
could not deny the origin of the Iraqi state, rooted not in singular united people sharing a common 
language (as in the US). The proposal was also grounded in an ahistorical understanding of the 
American federation's provision of minority guarantees and foundational acknowledgment of 
diverse social loyalties. It willfully ignored the fact that even America's founders could not have 
suggested the re-drawing of state boundaries to weaken the citizenry’s affiliations to them without 
raising serious popular objections to the union.
401
 Indeed, the idea that it could be done in Iraq 
merely created dangerous roadblocks to the constitutional drafting process, including Sistani’s 
famous objection to the stipulation that a 2/3 negative vote in any 3 Iraqi provinces would fail to 
ratify the Constitution as an unacceptable Kurdish veto comparable to allowing blacks in America 
to overturn the popular vote of the American people.
402
 In fact, the US federation was built in 
infancy around just such a system designed to protect the identity of its federal units from 
unwanted federal or majoritarian abuse, both through the electoral-college and an upper Senate 
with equal representation regardless of state size. In a state divided on more long-standing and 
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cross-provincial sources of identity like Iraq, some recognition and protection of the identities that 
mattered in its particular society (in this case ethno-sectarian rather than federal units) would have 
to be legitimized if the system was going to be able to legitimately seek to incorporate and 
represent these affiliations rather than contest them. 
The Pachachi and Dawishas Plan would have thus denied Iraq's minority even these basic 
protections found in more ethnically-homogenous early federations. Providing no 
institutionalization of guarantees to Iraq's long-battered minorities, the proposal was dead on 
arrival. It sought to give the Kurds much less than they had been willing to accept historically 
from Iraqi dictators, making the choice of exit through secession and conflict more appealing than 
inclusion. In essentially re-centralizing all power in a 'national' government with only token 
recognition of Kurdish participation and a concerted effort in fact to destroy Kurdish political 
identity, it was hardly distinguishable from the totalitarian regimes of the past in terms of Kurdish 
socio-cultural aspirations. If Iraq was to have a future distinct from this tragic history or 
disintegration, another path would clearly need to be found between these two extremes.  
 
Negotiating a Balanced, Post-Modern Vision for Iraqi Federalism 
From this brief discussion of the first major proposals for Iraq's new federalism, it is clear 
that the end result (contrary to the claims of its critics) would give neither the central 
government’s main detractors or supporters everything they had hoped.403 While it was true that 
in order to break with the destructive centralization of its past, the new Iraqi state would at 
minimum have to recognize some independent social and institutional authority for the KRG; the 
choice in most federal arrangements (and certainly in Iraq) was not simply between complete 
unity or slow disintegration. In fact, federalism demonstrably functions best as a unifying and 
effective form of government when it reflects pre-existing social or political cleavages that render 
alternative and more efficient forms of unitary government unworkable, being almost 
unanimously deployed in contemporary states to avoid the sort of overt coercion necessary to 
hold the Iraqi state together in the past. It achieves minority support by granting legitimacy and 
authority to their defacto power, but also supports majority ascendency through acknowledgment 
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of their claim to territories they would otherwise be unable to secure through force.
404
  If 
majoritarian groups believe they can hold territory without making concessions on sovereignty, 
and could thus reap the benefits of territorial aggrandizement without cost, federalism would be 
unnecessary. Iraq's brutal history shows this is not the case. 
Federalism is thus far from inherently disintegrating. It can bind different social groups 
together by recognizing their difference, seeking not to destroy these identities, but to successfully 
incorporate them into a common mission as was the case in the post-colonial states of Canada 
(due to religious-linguistic cleavages), and the United States and Australia (due to pre-existing 
colonial political cleavages).
405
  However, these cleavages can vary in strength, making further 
devolution necessary to achieve minority support especially where cleavages are based in deeply 
held convictions about a person’s ascriptive identity, as is the case in later post-modern federalist 
states. This was the reality in post-Saddam Iraq which possessed both obvious ethno-linguistic 
cleavages and historical political cleavages, first from the Ottoman vilayet system and later from 
the UN-instituted autonomy.  
While these facts could not be wished away through vague appeals to abstract notions of 
liberal individualism, especially in light of the clear evidence provided previously of the enduring 
strength of such ties and the historical memory of Iraq's tragic suppression of its Kurdish 
minority,
406 
the very real attachment for a majority of Iraqis to a strong national character and the 
potential for disintegration had also to be considered. Post-modern federalism while addressing 
concerns of a divided society for representation and protecting against majoritarian abuses, had 
also to weigh against the potential for secession. These competing visions would require a 
flexible, representative, and negotiated solution that could both avoid the “danger of devolving 
the violent struggle for supremacy” through radical decentralization,407 while still alleviating the 
Kurdish concern with being forcibly reintegrated and dominated by a political order 
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unrepresentative of their unique identity.  From the basis of two diametrically opposed visions for 
the future of Iraqi federalism, an agreement had to be found that could lay the foundation for the 
establishment of common ground between the various communities that could strengthen the 
central state against rising disintegrating tendencies without overburdening it with responsibilities 
beyond its capacity to fulfill. 
The mutual need to move the process forward would consequently force each group to 
make concessions ancillary to their core interests. This process was characterized by compromise, 
with horse-trading amongst the groups forcing a healthy prioritization of interests. Contrary to its 
critics assertions then, the Iraqi Constitution was neither a Kurdish or foreign invention.
408
 The 
two original positions – one strongly federal in a classic sense, the other strongly confederal, 
would be merged through repeated rounds of negotiation to form a post-modern federal system 
commonly (and successfully) found in states with similar demographic and historical 
characteristics, with unique protections for Iraqi-specific considerations and constraints.
409
 
One of the largest hurdles in the process would be resolving questions of symmetry that 
went to the heart of the bi/tri-national secessionist concerns. While the Kurds were willing from 
the outset to allow the rest of the Iraqi state to remain centralized as long as they were granted 
supremacy on their own matters, the early objection of the traditionally politically-quietest Shia 
cleric, Ayatollah al-Sistani, threw a necessary wrench into those plans. In repeated statements, 
Sistani made clear that it would be unacceptable for the state to grant rights to a particular group 
not granted to other citizens, a system used effectively in other post-modern states to alleviate 
differing desires amongst communities. This imposed a conundrum on the resolution of federalist 
rights, whereby the Kurdish solution would need to be accepted by skeptical Shi’a and 
oppositional Sunni Arabs.  
While it is commonly cited that the Kurds were the biggest roadblocks to compromise on 
this issue, in reality, Shi’a leaders were also subject to divisions amongst themselves over how far 
decentralization should progress. The coalition Sistani had cobbled together between ISCI, 
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Da’wa, Fadhila, and smaller Shi’a groups was not ideologically-united. Just as they feared 
renewed Sunni hegemony, they also saw one another as potential rivals, subject to the deep 
mistrust that existed both between and within Iraq's respective sectarian communities about 
investing any one party with control over their affairs. Some of the parties were rooted in strategic 
geographical enclaves that rendered them sympathetic to enhanced local flexibility, not just from 
a Sunni-led Baghdad government, but even from one that shared their broader sectarian 
affiliation. In fact, there were signs that a solid stream of support amongst the Shi’a population for 
the federalist cause remained throughout the negotiation process,
410
 reflecting the deep cleavages 
in inter-societal trust that made Iraq in particular need of institutional safeguards to protect against 
the sort of overweening centralism that had characterized its past.
  
 
A proposal by CPA advisors to lessen Arab concerns over Kurdish irredentism 
consequently broke the logjam.
411
 The proposal granted any province or coalition of provinces up 
to 3 the right to form a Region, obtaining the same rights as the KRG. The limit on the number of 
provinces would effectively prevent an outright break-up into a Shi’astan, Kurdistan, and 
Sunnistan, addressing centralists' legitimate concern with the instability of a bi or tri-national 
state. This would place the inherent risk of destabilizing ethnic parties into a positive arena, where 
the fragmentation of political parties along sub-state and minority nationalist lines has been a 
common feature of successful post-modern federal regimes in a balanced institutional context.
412
  
Rooted in long-term and limited electoral processes, through this deal, Iraq is in fact much less 
assymetrical than many other post-modern states that have done quite well at balancing the 
associated risks.
413
   
The compromise also allowed for the clear asymmetry of the state to be maintained for the 
foreseeable future, preserving the current Kurdish rights, without cutting off the possibility that 
Iraqis might later democratically choose to pursue a more symmetrical or uniformly decentralized 
version of federalism. Such an inclusive state can not only avoid suppressing the deeply held 
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beliefs of its people, but in doing so can give voice to its diversity and thus avoid conflict or the 
forceful shove of dissenters toward reliance on an ‘exit’ option.414  While the final Constitution 
maintained asymmetry through the admixture of Regions and provinces, it was thus balanced by 
the opt-in inclusion of all Iraq’s provinces. The KRG would not enjoy special privileges, but it 
would also be allowed to maintain a large degree of its traditional freedom. By extending the right 
to all Iraqis, it had the added benefit of alleviating fears among Arab Iraqi as well that they could 
be forcibly dominated from Baghdad by a regime hostile to their interests through a one-time 
relinquishment of their rights. This fluidity allows for the evolution and adaptation of state 
institutions to shifting interests, a hallmark of successful post-modern federations, avoiding the 
typical consociational issue with adapting to inevitable demographic and interest changes. It also 
avoided implementing a final resolution during a brutal civil war, where patterns of behavior and 
interest perception were still mired in decades of authoritarian oppression, installing the state with 
a crucial fluidity that can evolve with its society under democratic institutions. 
In order to secure these guarantees the Kurds duly relinquished some of their more 
problematic demands.
415
 Unlike in their initial calculus, the federal Iraqi government would take 
precedence on fiscal matters, with the caveat that they be granted discretion on how to apportion 
their share of the national budget and whether to impose national level taxes; a solution with 
precedence in other post-modern federalist states at effectively addressing concerns for economic 
and cultural autonomy without hollowing out the pivtoal fiscal apparatus of the central state.
416  
They would also acknowledge federal primacy in defense and foreign policy, with representation 
inside a united Iraqi military command, Iraqi embassies and the Iraqi Foreign Ministry
417
 thereby 
securing their representation through central coordination and inter-state federal guarantees.
418
 
Finally, they agreed to share and coordinate responsibilities between the central and regional 
governments in developing Iraq's all-important oil industry and critically conceded some of their 
demands regarding the composition of regional boundaries, most notably over Kirkuk. A repeated 
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breaking point for past agreements between the Kurds and Baghdad, this process would legitimize 
any final decision through a consensual and negotiated electoral procedure.
419
  
These would not be the only compromises embedded in the Iraqi Constitution, which was 
in fact riddled with trade-offs, though they would be some of the most important. While colored 
by the fact that the main parties that negotiated its drafting were “outsiders,” it effectively 
addressed the demons of Iraq's past without trampling on the hope for its future.
420
  As Calhoun 
once argued,
421
 the key question a state must answer at its founding is best determined by the evil 
it is designed to prevent. In Iraq’s case, resisting a return to despotic and destructive 
authoritarianism, international aggression, and bouts of genocidal violence against its citizenry 
was the clear answer. The post-modern federal bargain between its constituent units was 
consequently the best possible answer, breaking the state's defining pattern of insecurity by 
establishing a basis through which all its respective groups could maintain significant authority 
over their own affairs and resist the despotic encroachment from a renewed central government.  
Thus, while federalism is undeniably inefficient, subject to stagnation and in need of 
ongoing compromise, its performance should not be compared against idealistic alternatives. A 
unitary Iraq has already shown itself subject to an insurmountable, incredibly destructive and 
violent security dilemma. The new Iraq jettisons this model for an admittedly messier, but more 
hopeful future. Rather than leave the Kurds hopelessly and permanently in contest with the state, 
it develops a means to incorporate them into its decision-making apparatus and thus allows the 
state to capitalize on the political, social, and cultural capital of the Kurdish leadership. It is 
pragmatic, rather than ideal. Conflict, being endemic to all societies, is managed through state 
institutions designed to establish rules, mitigate violence, and create social order between actually 
existing rival points of authority.  
Indeed, through this process a different pattern of behavior between the Kurds and 
Baghdad was already beginning to emerge, with Kurds repeatedly sending soldiers to Baghdad 
and other hotspots in order to bolster the struggling INA. The first active units of the new national 
army were in fact Kurdish-commanded and largely Kurdish in origin. Thus, while none of the 
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Iraqi groups would get everything they desired in the new Constitution, the Kurdish redlines
422
 
were met without trampling on the aspects of unity necessary to maintain the future of the Iraqi 
state. The end result was admittedly a system of federalism with great potential for 
decentralization, but open to the desire for some to maintain a tightly integrated centralism in 
perpetuity. 
Democratic federations have indeed offered hope to war-plagued societies when they 
reflect pre-existing federal societies with a profound need to accommodate divergent societal 
interests.
423
 The basis for comparable states has never been the “national dream” of American 
folklore, but rather a “national deal” that bonds the community together by a shared commitment 
to its institutions
424
 and recognizes the sort of divided society that early federations did not 
possess.
425
 Iraq thus shares common ancestry with other post-modern states, founded in 
negotiated bargains where “the union of previously separate political entities, [is] prompted by 
“narrow considerations like economic development and defence.”426  This logic is fundamentally 
different from the impetus that led post-colonial states in much of the developing world to view 
difference as something to be overcome. This “idea of supreme power” while compelling, was as 
Krasner contends “irrelevant in practice for many of these states.”427 Indeed, the record of federal 
states reveals a gradual weakening of parochial interests over time
428
 that offers more hope at 
binding divergent societies together than the coerced alternative that undergirded previous Iraqi 
attempts to build a unitary state.
  
 
Its acceptance by the vast majority of Iraqis in a countrywide plebiscite is often 
mistakenly disparaged then because of the messy negotiations, the unfinished business it deferred, 
and the absence of Sunni participation. The new Iraqi system, by protecting the right of its 
provinces to create Regions, ensures precaution against potentially anti-democratic forces by 
imbuing enough strength in its constituent parts to resist federal encroachment. This is a feat 
simple decentralization could not hope to engender given Iraq's historical proclivity toward 
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despotism. By recognizing strong Regions with control over both local policing and natural 
resource development (purse strings), Iraqi federalism allows its institution to remain close 
enough to the liberty of the people to ensure it.
429
 This should be the primary benchmark for the 
Iraqi state’s potential for success, not its mere survival. The Iraqi state is only worth preserving 
after all, if it can begin to protect and serve its people, and live in peace with the international 
community and its neighbors through the provision of political order. The federal bargain that 
emerged in the 2005 Iraqi Constitution offers the best hope of achieving that reality.  
However, this is not to deny that divided states do not face serious challenges even under 
federalism, for it is hardly a panacea. Federal states with divided societies, where citizens’ 
attachments are stronger to their member states instead of the wider political community or 
“where interdependencies of interests are...limited,” often require greater flexibility in their 
institutions with heightened devolution so that member states can practice an effective veto over 
encroachment. This is especially true of democracies where the majority-minority coalition is 
unlikely to change due to its ingrained difference marked by ethnic, religious or other cleavages, 
for if the majority “never has to worry about finding itself in the minority…[it] has no incentive to 
treat minorities justly.”430  Iraq with its overwhelming Shi'a majority is subject to this 
consideration, requiring the construction of consociational checks in order to protect against 
despotism, including but not limited to the need for coalition governments, some form of veto 
over majoritarian rule, and autonomy for individual segments to run internal affairs.
431
 The Iraqi 
Constitution does so predominately by requiring a super-majority to alter existing institutional 
constraints and proportional representation in parliament which requires the inclusion of minority 
parties in order to form a government for the foreseeable future.
432
 
By providing Regions with special rights then, it does not  unduly burden the majority and 
is not essentially different than other post-modern federal regimes that have recognized the 
normal workings of a majoritarian democracy inherently threaten minority interests without due 
consideration.
433
 It does not deny the importance of individual rights, but seeks to look beyond 
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such narrow definitions to protect the cooperative core of a federalist state as an exercise between 
communities with diverse social affiliation
434
 and has been successfully used as such in post-
conflict societies with much stronger historical, cultural, and philosophical attachment to 
individual rights like Northern Ireland.  
Consequently, beyond the necessity of recognizing and incorporating obvious social 
cleavages and responding to the very real desires of its citizenry, the compromises embedded in 
the Iraqi federal system provide a volatile situation with multiple safety valves. Rather than a 
monolith, it is designed as in other ethnically diverse societies to encourage (rather than force) a 
move away from traditional cleavages by introducing a second tier of political decision-making 
and positions of power at the regional level that encourages the expression of class-based 
politics.
435
 This process is already underway in fact, with new cleavages emerging within the 
Kurdish political system, encouraging the KRG's political liberalization and broadening the 
political discourse beyond Kurdish nationalism. In particular, the rise of the Gorran Movement 
(Change in Kurdish), a viable opposition to the dominance of the two party duopoly, has seen the 
Kurdish political scene tilt more to domestic issues of corruption, inefficiency, and inequality. 
The fact that the KRG’s institutions hold real power now is likely to encourage this inter-ethnic 
competition further. 
These sorts of trends are indeed likely to deepen in the future if the Iraqi federal system is 
allowed to mature and the regions expand, providing new alignments of interests and deepening 
cross-cutting cleavages elsewhere as well. Where the Constitution does not meet short-term 
expectations, it provides enough flexibility then to offer all hope by its very democratic and post-
modern federalist nature. The successful mediation of divergent interests in the construction of 
the Constitution denies the argument that Iraq is un-viable due to long-standing ethnic and 
sectarian conflicts,
436
 revealing instead that Iraq has in fact been unstable, externally and 
internally violent due to an extreme centralization that heightened identity conflicts and violent 
competition over its central resources.
437
 While Iraq’s past undeniably reveals a division between 
Kurds and Arabs,
438
 many of Iraq’s sectarian problems are more recent innovations of Ba’athist 
attempts to cling to power. Rather than deny the need for decentralization, this fact actually 
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bolsters the idea that changing the logic of the state is critical to maintaining Iraq's democracy for 
2 main reasons. First, that the impetus toward exploiting ethnic cleavages to maintain coercive 
power is reduced and groups are encouraged,
439
 as the Sunni have recently shown is possible, to 
create ideologies of broad appeal or face electoral defeat. And second, that a decentralized regime 
significantly reduces the most extreme and damaging thrusts of the conflict to control the vast 
resources of the central state bequeathed by Iraq's abundant natural resources, based not on ethnic 
affiliation but on the very real resource-curse that has led to disappointing state-building 
throughout the developing world.  
 A decentralized, post-modern federalism offers not only a solution to the Kurdish-Arab 
ethnic conflict then, but also the overcentralization that has driven groups to engage in near 
constant warfare over the state’s institutions.  In fact, as Krasner has shown, the behavior of the 
Iraqi state  “ placed constraints on the possibilities for the future. The preferences and capabilities 
of political actors cannot be treated as exogenous variables: they can only be understood within 
the context of a given set of institutional arrangements.”440 Only a revolution then of Iraq’s 
institutions could break the horrific pattern of its past.
441 
Challenging the traditional view of the 
modern state, the 2004 Iraqi Constitution sets about instituting this revolution by delegating 
considerable sovereign rights, effectively recognizing Horowitz’s dictum that  
 
“if the major malaise of the ethnically dispersed polity is inertia and lack of direction, that of the 
centralized polity is constant tension and an overheated political system. In general, the room for 
manueveuring without jeopardizing political stability is seriously limited. The neutrality of the 
national regime, often an asset in ethnically dispersed systems at times of stress, is constantly 
under challenge in centralized systems.”442 
 
While there is no debate that the new Iraqi system can be unwieldy, the goal has been to transfer 
conflict between the divergent societal interests of its population from violent conflict to 
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parliamentary debates.
443
 
 
With federal institutions enshrined in its Constitution, Iraq takes a big 
step away from its past, but these paper promises also require a supporting ethos if they are to 
break with the totalitarian bend of Iraq's long and brutal history. The lack of such ethos requires 
strong safeguards based in vertical federalism to prevent the destruction of its democratic 
character or a return to the tempting allure of the Leviathan’s siren call. 
Building the State: The Importance of the Covenant 
 
“Too often federalism is treated as simply an administrative principle or, less frequently, as a 
merely juridical one. The relatively few men who look…with greater breadth of understanding 
recognize federalism as a political principle….In the last analysis, however, federalism is more 
than simply a political principle…it is also a fundamental principle of social organization that 
has to do with the relationships among individuals and families as well as governments and 
polities.”444 
 
In retrospect, the end solution to the Iraqi federal agreement may seem clear. Federalist 
agreements have been touted by contemporary theorists from a broad range of disciplines as the 
best hope for many states suffering from extreme group-based identity conflicts.  Iraq's fissures, 
while re-organized and brought into the open for discussion, have been ever-present, part of the 
initial contestation of forces that had been encountered years before by the British. Subjugated, 
brutalized, and suppressed for over 100 years, the basic divisions of Iraqi society had remained 
relatively constant. At the moment when their dream of independence seemed most at hand, the 
Kurds chose not to move for independence, but instead negotiated inclusion in a new type of Iraqi 
state. The Kurdish decision to “buy-in” to the Iraqi state-building process fundamentally rested 
upon the perceived commitment, backed by the military force of the United States-led Coalition 
Forces, to a process by which differences would be adjudicated between themselves and the 
central state through democratic, just political processes.
445
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While far from perfect, the process through which the Iraqi Constitution would be 
constructed was largely broad-based and inclusive, a non-coercive assessment of diverse societal 
interests.
446
 Through the extension of Kurdish demands for local sovereignty to all Iraq's 
provinces, the interests of even the rejectionist Sunni minority in a democratic Iraq were 
protected.
447
 Unlike the initial plan for a hand-picked ethnically-balanced group of exiles to 
determine its future, the Constitution was negotiated based upon the actual political preferences of 
the Iraqi electorate. Its ratification met the standard not only of a majority of Iraq’s citizens (as 
had originally been planned), but a remarkable super-majority.
448
 This foundational change in 
process would have profound implications for its long term potential to resolve the legacy of 
inter-ethnic warfare that had characterized its past. Most notably, for the first time, the new Iraq 
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marked evolution for the Sunni leadership, recognizing that the Kurdish provisions also ensure that they will receive 
a portion of the overall federal budget in accordance with their population size to be spent at their discretion, 
rather than the Shia-led majoritarian regime in Bahdad. This eliminates some of the concerns of the Sunni 
population that their removal from power will deny them access or control over valuable resources. This evolution 
is clearly demonstrated more broadly in opinion polling dating back to 2007, where only a slim majority of Iraqis 
continued to support a unified, centralized state of Iraq over either the division of the state or federalization, down 
from the overwhelming 79% that had favored centralization in the same poll in 2004 (BBC poll results: << 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/19_03_07_iraqpollnew.pdf>>) 
447
 Once a large political contingent moved away from the rejectionist, extremists groups like al-Qaeda, Sunnis have 
in fact found much in the Constitution to protect their interests, this will be addressed in full in Chapter 6. 
448
 The Sunnis, like the Kurds, had the opportunity to veto the agreement by mustering a two-thirds majority “no” 
vote in three of the four provinces where they represented a preponderance of the population, but were ultimately 
unable to do so in the four provinces where they represented a majority: Anbar, Ninevah, Salahaddin, and Diyala. n 
fact, the Sunnis turned out in considerable numbers for the referendum. Yet, even if the idea that Sunni Arabs 
represented a singular political community vis-à-vis could be sustained in light of this failure, it was unlikely given 
continued Sunni adherence at the time to the coercive governing mentality of the past that they would have been 
ready to accept any fair, respresentative role for the Shia and Kurds in the future governance of the country 
(including American-style federalism). O’Leary, “Power-sharing,” 113-114 makes this point very clearly. As he notes, 
the negotiations that took place at President Barzani’s Baghdad compound which led to the resolution of the most 
difficult issues dividing the respective groups were riddled with Sunni grand-standing and threats that wreaked of 
their unwillingness to engage in any serious attempt to reconstruct a democratic Iraq. Their chief negotiator, Salih 
al-Mutlak said as much. Their behavior was described as behaving as though the Shia Arabs and Kurds were merely 
special interest groups in a state that ultimately belonged and would continue to belong to the Sunni. In fact, many 
heavily favored dictatorship as the “best form of government” for a future Iraq (BBC polls from 2004-2007 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/19_03_07_iraqpollnew.pdf>) viewing de-Baathification as 
synonymous with de-Sunnification (Ajami, “Blind Liberation”) 
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would be built upon a covenant between its various people and the state,
449
 formed with the 
intention of representing the interests of all and setting forth a mechanism for the resolution of 
conflicts between or amongst them. It embodied a set of foundational principles that were deemed 
legitimate, offering each more than they perceived it would take from them and thus subject to a 
logic that established voluntary unions elsewhere.
450
 This was not just a democratic revolution, 
but a federal one as well. Although established through the overthrow of its government by a 
foreign power and overseen by outside forces, as demonstrated above, it was subject to intense 
negotiation and remains open to the sort of informal processes of political negotiation common to 
other post-modern federal regimes.  
Thus, contrary to the perception that there was no logic to the Iraqi state, the reality of the 
regional and international security environment provides Iraqis with a strong reason to continue 
their participation in a state structured to enhance their security, representation, and prosperity. 
This makes it fundamentally different from non-voluntary federal unions that have been prone to 
collapse, such as the USSR and Yugoslavia.
451
 Voluntary federal systems have their own 
internally-recognized logic, and Iraq is no exception. In fact, in a 2007 survey of 80 nations, 
Iraqis ranked 6
th
 in national pride with 86% expressing that they were “very proud” to be Iraqi.452  
As long as Kurdish social diversity is not threatened with destruction by the central government, 
leadership positions offer them legitimacy and power where an open conflict would revert them to 
rogue guerillas fighters. This is a compelling reason to avoid that potential, which opens the door 
                                                 
449
The original process has been highly criticized for not being based on such an inclusive foundation, especially 
given the important role played by American advisors and the lack of Sunni participation to either the drafting of 
the Constitution or its ratification. This will be explored in more detail, but in fact, while Sunni participation was 
lacking, the American weight in the process which tried to design a more unitary state alongside a Shia group that 
sought something similar was largely in line with the preferences of most Sunni political leaders at the time. I would 
also argue though that the Sunni preferences were largely not in-line with their own interests in a democratic Iraqi 
state, being based less in an articulation of their interests than opposition to anything proposed by the American 
occupiers. In fact, the system that developed of checks and balances serves their minority interests much better. 
Where the Constitution breaks from this, most notably in the case of Kirkuk, it established a democratic mechanism 
to weigh the majority of the population’s preferences in determining the outcome. This is in-line with Elazar’s claims 
regarding the need for the system to be based on expression of interests rather than coercion. The actual process 
through which the Kirkuk dilemma is likely to be resolved it also destined to go further than the Constitutional 
stipulations and be the result of informal negotiations that characterize post-modern federal system.  
450
It is important to take into account Riker’s analysis of federalism being first and foremost a means to pursue 
individual self-interest. By seeking out a federal bargain, it is not to say that the Kurds or other Iraqi groups saw this 
as the best option, but merely the most promising one to protect their long-term security interests and ensure their 
survival, Kleinerman, “William Riker’s ‘Rationalist’ Federalism” 
451
 O’Leary’s typology makes this distinction, ibid. 
452
Inglehart,  Moadel, and Tessler, “Xenophobia and In-Group Solidarity”  
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for compromises beyond so-called Kurdish “red lines.” In essence, by providing a process for 
divergent groups to attain a measure of representation and inclusion in the political process, the 
federal states legitimizes otherwise illegitimate and informal authority, and thus supplies its own 
incentive to see the state maintained. As long as the Iraqi state maintains its commitment to its 
covenant then, it creates a space whereby group interests can be negotiated and moves the logic of 
contestation between groups away from a zero-sum calculation of independence or subjugation.  
However, while this system is rooted in a more organic logic moored to the diverse 
interests of its respective groups, it fundamentally requires a federal ethos. As Elazar argues in 
regards to state formation, the Iraqi regime was being thrust away from the hierarchical model of 
state origin most idealized by Jacobin France and rooted historically in the formidable use of 
coercion,
453
 to one that would be based on a covenant between citizens and state.
  
Federal states 
create a grand bargain, stipulating adherence to a set of core principles “beyond the letter of the 
law,” that bind them together in perpetuity.454 While still subject to the rationale of power politics, 
this compact is more than “just a legal device that protects the rights and integrity of parties to the 
covenant,” it requires adherence by the contracting parties to an ethos that acknowledges and 
accepts diversity rather than seeking to destroy it.
455
 It breaks from the Hobbesian (and even 
Lockian) vision of the contractual nature of the state where there is one vote, one time, to 
introduce a certain fluidity, where the parties of the agreement maintain their unique claim to 
sovereignty while agreeing to the mechanisms by which they also relinquish a portion to common 
purpose.
456
 
The new Iraq was indeed formed with the intention to function as a direct act of the 
people, united in their difference, seeking to create a system whereby no one group could 
monopolize the instruments of state power and wealth for their exclusive ends. For the first time 
in modern Iraqi history, as the TAL stipulated, 
 
“The people of Iraq, striving to reclaim their freedom, which was usurped by the previous 
tyrannical regime, rejecting violence and coercion in all their forms, and particularly when used 
                                                 
453Or the “accidental” construction of states through the intermarriage or close relations of their people, Elazar 
“Contrasting Unitary and Federal” 
454
Moots, “The Covenant Tradition,” 393. 
455
Ibid 394. 
456
Aroney, “Before Federalism? Thomas Aquinas” 41-42. 
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as instruments of governance, have determined that they shall hereafter remain a free people 
under the rule of law.”457 [emphasis added] 
 
The importance of this statement for the type of state Iraq is becoming is clear in the history of 
political thought. Past agreements failed to materialize, both because of the lack of political will 
behind the promises, but also because the very ethos of the previous Iraqi institutions ran contrary 
to the acceptance of its societal differences. The maintenance of power at the center, the control 
over appointments, and the way in which the agreements for decentralization were controlled and 
handed down from on high, left little hope that they could meet the demands of the Kurdish 
minority for representation or survive any resumption of conflict of interests between the center 
and periphery.  
The new Iraq had to be more than a shift in institutions then. The construction of these 
checks and balances required a profound shift in the political and moral ethos of its population 
and leaders. While critics would argue that the stipulation that the constitutional referendum could 
only be passed if no more than 2/3 of the population of 3 provinces voted against it amounted to a 
“sectarian veto” that would undermine the unity of the new state, the reality was that this veto was 
necessary to uphold the basic ethos of the new government.
458
 Without the minority 3-province 
veto, the Constitution and basis for federalism in Iraq would have been fatally undermined from 
the outset,
459
  a mere re-institution of the same coercive method of governance. In fact, this 
provision also sets the terms for any future revisions of the Constitution, establishing more than 
any other the dramatic shift in founding principles from the previous Iraq and remaining the most 
vital final arbitrator of its future survival as a constitutional democracy
460
 composed of more than 
one political community, united voluntarily toward a common purpose. 
However, it is this fact that also lies at the heart of Iraqi federalism's ongoing 
vulnerability. Developing a new ethos and establishing a federal pattern of behavior will take 
time. Federal values are not widespread among either the population or its representatives, and 
                                                 
457
 “Law of Administration for the State of Iraq,” Preamble. 
458
Footnote18 
459
Interview with Massoud Barzani, President of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, December 2004, Salahhaddin, Iraq. 
460
The new Constitution was drafted by the elected representatives of the nation, rather than the initial American 
hand-picked council, laying the groundwork for the legitimacy of the new system, Morrow, ‘Deconstituting 
Mesopotamia,” 564, this was in part due to the religious hakum sharii issued by Grand Ayatollah Sistani against the 
drafting of the constitution by un-elected representatives of the people 
(http://www.sistani.org/messages/eng/ir5.htm). 
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there are still significant points of ongoing contestation that could lead to the resumption of 
warfare between various groups if not adjudicated in a manner that is deemed fair to all sides and 
reinforces rather than challenges the logic of the new state. As with other post-modern federal 
states, Iraq will have to wrestle in applying its covenantal agreement to constantly recognize the 
conflicting pull of its different constituent parts and interests.  Chief amongst these will be the 
need to address Schmitt’s federal antimonies: the fact that the main impetus that drives states to 
enter a federation, the preservation of their own independence, must yield at least in some 
measure to the needs of the federation.
461
 It must seek both unity and disunity then as it 
progresses with a focus on the overriding task “to fashion a political bargain in which all major 
Iraqi groups feel they have a stake in the country’s future...whether Iraq can become a democracy 
will depend, most of all, on Iraqi political leaders, and the decisions they make to widen the 
political arena or not, to share power and resources or not, to build a system of mutual security, or 
instead, try to dominate and even crush their opponents.”462 A new ethos must guide this ongoing 
bargaining between its respective peoples
463
 in support of the institutional barriers that have been 
constructed, for it is not in the writing but rather in practice that the contours of this bargain take 
on real meaning.  
While Iraq must chart its own course as all federations do, tailored to the unique 
characteristics of its society,
464
  the new Iraqi federalism remains the best available system to 
offer such hope to its divided society.
465
  In contrasting and examining its foundation with the 
traditional model of statehood practiced by its past regimes, this chapter has established the core 
promise that the new federal system holds in resolving Kurdish contestation to the Iraqi state short 
of secession. However, as the next chapter outlines, there is still ongoing conflict over the 
institutionalization of the federal values established in the constitution that threaten the 
application and promise of this new state-building exercise. The final chapter outlines the 
necessity of resolving these conflicts in a way that bolsters and defines Iraq’s post-modern 
federation in-line with the experiences of other similar states, going beyond the underlining 
                                                 
461
For a discussion of Schmitt and federalism, Patrici, “Looking into Medusa’s Eyes” 
462
Diamond, Squandered Victory, 331. 
463
 Morrow, ‘Deconstituting Mesopotamia,” 564 
464
The world’s federations have an astonishing amount of difference in successful forms, see Chapman, “Structure, 
Process, and Federal,” 87. 
465
Even in the Sunni Arab regions 52% felt their life was either significantly or somewhat better, and another 19% 
felt it was the same, see COSIT and Norwegian Research Institute Faso, “2004 Iraq Living Conditions Survey.” 
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values of federation to address the specific comparative attributes and concerns as relevant to 
establishing a successful state-building experience throughout Iraq. 
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CHAPTER 5:  
Going Astray: The breakdown of Consensus on Post-Modern Federalism 
 
 “Nothing instills [counter]nationalism more than oppression and fear.” – Qubad Talabani, KRG 
Representative to the United States
466
 
 
 In-line with the fact that institutional change rarely takes place outside of a crisis,
467
 the 
trauma of the American-led invasion of Iraq has created the opportunity to establish an entirely 
new pattern of interaction between Iraq's state institutions and the Kurdish portion of its 
population.
468
 The compromise drafted between the Iraqi government and the KRG to divide 
sovereignty has moved the Kurds away from a long history as a de-stabilizing force to one 
determined to protect Iraq's institutions and contribute to its security, development, and stability. 
It is the Iraqi state’s best chance to build an inclusive nationalism that draws together its disparate 
parts, laying the basis through which the state can establish its legitimacy, defined not by the 
effectiveness of its ability to crush the free expression of its people but by “the foundation of such 
governmental power as is exercised both with a consciousness on the government’s part that it has 
a right to govern and with some recognition by the governed of that right.”469 This is the true and 
ultimate measure (as de Tocqueville argued on behalf of British constitutionalism over French 
monarchical absolutism) of state strength
470
 and offers the people of Iraq a pivotal opportunity to 
redirect the course of their tragic history. 
 Most fundamentally, the development of federalism in Iraq has opened new opportunities 
for participation and the articulation of group interests. In doing so it has created avenues for the 
dispersal of political capital in Iraq that not only favor the resolution of the Kurdish crisis, but 
also hold tremendous opportunity to resolve the impetus toward “competition and rivalry” that 
has “historically been the principle course of instability” since its independence.471  In 
                                                 
466
Qubad Talaani is the son of Iraqi President Jalal Talabani and the KRG Representative to the United States, quoted 
Ritz, Huffington Post Blog 
467Krasner calls this “punctuated equilibrium,” borrowing the term from evolutionary biology, see Eldredge and 
Gould, “Punctuated Equilibria”; Gould, “Drawinism and Expansion”; For studies showing its applicability to political 
science, see Grew, Crises of Political Development; Tilly, Formation of National States; Skowronek, Building a New 
American State 
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Among others, Phebe Marr has called this a “revolution,” “Iraq’s Identity Crisis,” 41. 
469
 “Legitimacy,” International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol IX, 244. 
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relinquishing a singular focus on over-centralization and an alienating nationalism rooted solely 
in Arabism, the ground has been laid for the peaceful interaction of its communities. Indeed, the 
Kurds and majority Shi’a Arabs have shown that they can now find common cause with the long-
time guarantors of Iraqi unity, the Sunni Arab middle, for the preservation of a robust Iraqi state 
in the right institutional context. 
 The evidence that these new institutions can offer Iraq deeper unity is clear: rather than the 
harbingers of the state’s demise as federal nay-sayers have long postulated, at its darkest hours in 
the midst of sectarian bloodshed that could have torn the state asunder, the Kurds actively 
defended Iraq. They demonstrated a commitment to preserving a democratic, decentralized Iraqi 
state far beyond mere pronouncements, with Kurdish battalions acting as a steadfast force during 
much of the post-war fighting. Men who had lost entire families in defiance of control from 
Baghdad, marched south to restore stability to a country they had long-sought to destroy.  
Whenever the Iraqi state has foundered, it has been the Kurdish leadership that has stepped up to 
rescue it right up until the current moment when the Barzani Initiative used the prestige of KRG 
President Massoud Barzani to issue guarantees to both Sunni and Shia Arab parties to form a 
broad-based government after the 2010 elections. Clearly, it was not the idea of Iraq itself that 
was inimical to the Kurds' deeply-held interests and identity, but rather a certain type of 
homogenizing state. Their inclusion in the instruments of power offers to not only bind them to 
the state, but also set up the sort of safety valves that resist the despotic recentralization of 
authority by preserving multiple sources of social, coercive, and political power.  While it is 
wisely argued that Kurdish actions have stemmed not out of love for the Iraqi state, but rather as a 
cold hard political calculation of their odds of survival should they secede without international 
support, the proactive nature of their intervention to save Iraq's institutions gives reasonable pause 
and indicates just how deep the geo-political reality of the Middle East pushes the Kurds toward a 
long-term commitment to preserving Iraqi sovereignty over independence.   
 Yet the profound changes that have given birth to this transformation are still very much 
in infancy.  The post-collapse chaos has subsided and some semblance of normalcy has returned, 
but the key axises of Iraqi federalism remain open to political contestation between those seeking 
to maintain the maximum power in central institutions and the largely Kurdish-driven (and since 
joined by a significant group of Sunnis and Shia Arabs) desire to interpret the Constitution in a 
manner that gives life to the federation by granting the Regions significant say over their own 
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affairs. It is clear from an examination of the two largest outstanding issues between the Kurds 
and central government  – territory and resource allocation-- that the disputes indeed revolve 
around very different ideas about the type of state Iraq should become and whether to preserve the 
federalism envisioned in its Constitution. Without agreement on these issues, Iraq cannot 
establish the stability needed to attract foreign investment and achieve the economic development 
required to legitimize itself amongst the population at large. Nor, more fundamental to its long-
term survival as a state, can it signal to all of its population that its guarantees can be trusted; that 
Iraq will now be a state of laws that can incorporate and respond to the desires of its diverse 
citizenry.  
 The periodic efforts then to derail compromise on outstanding issues still present a very 
real threat to the inculcation of democratic and federal values in the new Iraq, and in fact, the very 
survival of Iraq as a unitary state. While some of the disagreements are the result of vague 
language, most stem from interest jockeying between various groups determined to maximize 
their power in the new system using the logic of the old. If Iraq is to move away from the 
centralized totalitarian past, those who seek to dominate or oppress must meet capable and 
successful checks on their designs. The guarantees made to electoral minorities like the Kurds 
cannot be so weakened as to render them meaningless, easily revocable unilaterally from Baghdad 
as under past regimes, or renewed conflict is not only likely but inescapable. This has proven true 
not just between Kurds and Arabs, but seems increasingly likely between Sunni and Shia Arabs as 
well. 
 The most disturbing and potentially derailing moves to the Iraqi state-building experience 
under federalism have thus been sporadic attempts by an amorphous and changing coalition of 
neo-centralists around Prime Minister Maliki to circumvent and ultimately render void the deals 
that offer regional institutions the requisite independence to maintain themselves. Presiding over 
the end of the insurgency, Maliki transformed his initial obscurity into widespread popularity 
amongst Iraq's Shia Arabs as a capable strongman willing to stand up to hated sectarian militias. 
Whereas ISCI had a strong federalist tradition, the Da’wa Party's new predominance within the 
Shia coalition has substantially shifted the rhetoric in Baghdad toward a more virulent and 
exclusionary form of Iraqi nationalism that often attempts to obstruct even the clear lines set out 
for the development of oil resources and the final status of Kirkuk.
472
 While debate on the exact 
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 The best source for the history of Shia political movements and the different appraoches to the issue of 
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parameters specified by the Iraqi Constitution is healthy, where the contest is not over wording or 
points of ambiguity but rather over an unwillingness to stand by the federation, the results are 
much less optimistic. The calculations that drove the model of centralization and control that 
decimated and alienated Iraqi society to abject failure are indeed unchanged whether a Sunni, 
Shia or Kurd sits atop the pyramid.   
 This chapter traces the dissolution of the initial harmony between the Kurds and some of 
their Shia Arab allies
473
 as it has slowly eroded through the rise of Prime Minister Nuri al-
Maliki.
474
  Fleshing out ongoing issues between those seeking to reconstitute power in a 
centralized state
475
  and the Kurdish-led efforts to institute the post-modern federal system 
envisioned in the Iraqi Constitution, this discussion is informed by the political nature of the 
debates to look at the evolving institutions of the Iraqi system in order to both identify and 
articulate the potential for the placement of boundaries between federal and state entities that can 
satisfy the desire to maintain Iraq’s unity while respecting its diversity. This informs the third and 
final chapter's argument that the way forward must resolve the outstanding issues and end the 
ensuing gridlock in Baghdad in a manner that gives life to the post-modern federal regime 
outlined in Iraq's Constitution. 
 
                                                                                                                                                               
federalism is in Reider Visser’s various works. 
473This party is now usually cited in English language sources as ISCI and will be denoted as such from here on out, 
even in historical references. 
474Wikileaks documents have since indicated that the Kurds chose to support Maliki over the ISCI candidate, Adel 
Abdel-Mahdi, due to their own political rivalry. Al-Mahdi was known to be close to President Talabani and the KDP 
felt uncomfortable with his ability to be neutral in potential regional disputes that might arise and threaten their 
unity. This was the last time that ISCI, generally more favorable to Iraqi federalism and Kurdish demands, would put 
up a viable candidate for Prime Minister. Since the meteoric rise of Maliki after the defeat of the insurgency, their 
electoral weight within the Shia Arab coalition has become progressively smaller. It is well-known in Kurdish circles 
that Maliki was seen at the time as a weak candidate who was unlikely to build the federal government into a new 
Leviathan, infamously being forced to wait hours for meetings with Kurdish officials like Iraq Foreign Minister 
Hoshyar Zebari. Interviews with Kurdish officials, March 2011. 
475 As predicated in the previous chapter, the support of Sunni nationalists for this model of the state has gradually 
eroded to the point where they have almost adopted the Kurdish position at the end of 2011. The reasons for this 
are both predictable and logical, as their ability to articulate interests as a minority in a democratic system has 
matured. 
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Kirkuk and the Disputed Territories: Background and Constitutional Provisions
476
 
 The importance of Kirkuk in Iraq’s brutal history along with its large oil deposits have 
made its status one of the most disputed, emotive, and practical issues between the Kurds and 
other Iraqi groups. It is both a microcosm of Iraqi society, bearing a strong emotional attachment 
for Kurds, Arabs, Turkomen, and many minorities, and a very fundamental source of revenue for 
the state. This has not only been the case during the negotiations over federalism, but in fact dates 
back to the very inception of the Iraqi state when both large oil discoveries in Kirkuk and a 
concern for Sunni-Shia demographics drove the inclusion of Kurdish territory into the newly-
formed British vassal state.  
 Likely a majority Turkmen city at the time with predominately Kurdish hinterlands and 
significant Arab minority, Kirkuk had an uncertain and disputed identity from the outset. This 
was deepened through the development of its oil industry, which encouraged in-migration and 
inextricably linked the region to the central Iraqi state, which --as it grew into a rentier police 
state-- demanded increasingly large sums of money to suppress societal discord. If Kirkuk was 
thought to be important to the Iraqi state by the British, the petrol-dominated course of the 20th 
century removed any question. 
                                                 
476
 This chapter will mainly focus on the issue of Kirkuk. Though the final position of Kirkuk and the disputed 
territories are often grouped together, it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to discuss the fully nuanced 
aspects that separate the disputed territories from one another and from Kirkuk. The important themes that impact 
the resolution of Kirkuk and the tensions around this apply to the disputed territories as well. The disputed 
territories as they are referenced are those lands that lay outside the “green line” established by the Iraqi state’s 
retreat from the Kurdish territories after the 1991 uprising and establishment of the no-fly zone. The border was 
arbitrary based upon such considerations by the Hussein regime as the appropriate place to defend from an attack 
from the north, but was also impacted by historical delineation of provincial borders which inevitably left some 
majority Kurdish communities (especially when these were religious minorities like the Yazidis or Shabaks) outside 
of the Kurdish provinces. Others were removed during border re-alignments by the Ba’athist regime out of concern 
for potential oil reserves. Some of the areas are majority Kurdish, but separated and not easily attached to the KRG 
territory because of intervening strips of traditional Arab communities (reminiscent of the issues that have plagued 
the demarcation of a united Palestinian state). Others are areas disputed as being part of the KRG or majority-
Kurdish provinces but being themselves majority-Arab. Article 140 was designed, as with Kirkuk, to provide a way to 
determine where these areas should be located in the Iraqi federal regime though the same three stage process, 
but like Kirkuk and partly because of it, the situation has been repeatedly delayed. Most of those that are majority-
Kurdish have been occupied by the KRG since the initial days of the war to unseat the Ba’ath. Now with oil reserves 
being discovered under KRG exploration contracts in some of the territories like Sinjar, they have become emblems 
themselves of the importance of oil in ongoing political contests in Iraq. Generally, the disputed territories include 
Baladruz/Mandali, Tuz Khurmatu, Khanaqin, Markaz Kirkuk, Hawija, Sinjar, Daquq, Dibis, Tal Afar, Makhmour, 
Sheikhan, Tilkeif, Akre, Hamdaniya. While the issues are distinct and important, a resolution to Kirkuk will likely 
make these minor points in the bargain to move forward on a just resolution to these issues. 
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 Few (if any) would argue that Iraq’s centralized authoritarian regimes were able to cope 
well with this dilemma. Kirkuk’s history is riddled with a legacy of crushing injustices, whereby 
Kurdish and Turkish inhabitants were forcefully relocated or compelled to assimilate, 
neighborhoods were bull-dozed, and Arab immigrants were given preferential jobs and other 
inducements to resettle.  This was couched in zero-sum calculations where the sectarian affiliation 
of the person in question became the definition of both their historical narrative and future 
opportunity. Not surprisingly, by 2003 the lines were so hardened between the communities that 
they could barely agree on what constituted Kirkuk or a Kirkuki. Hardly the booming metropolis 
of other Gulf oil towns, the post-Ba’athist Kirkuk was a devastated wasteland of ethnic 
tension,477 where raw sewage poured down streets lined by a mish-mash of non-functional 
electrical wires and dilapidated houses.  For many Kurds and Turkmen the province's place as 
their wrongfully-denied home was thus irrevocably ground into their psyche through the 
repressive state’s Arabization policies.478   
 It was not surprising then that Kirkuk became a lightning rod for the ability of Iraq’s 
various groups to co-exist under the new federal institutions. Resolution would be complicated by 
the fact that the Ba'athist violence and gerry-mandering had extended to other “disputed 
territories,”479 including both the provinces along the border between the Kurds and Arabs and 
between predominately Shia and Sunni provinces.
480
  Urgency consequently drove the first steps 
to find a democratic solution in Article 58 of the TAL, which devised a three-stage formula now 
commonly short-handed as “normalization, census, referendum.”481 As envisioned, the 
transitional government would lay the foundation for normalization through the establishment of 
an Iraqi Property Claims Commission (IPCC) to help compensate and relocate those brought into 
Kirkuk and disputed areas by the Ba’athists and aid displaced natives in returning and reclaiming 
their homes. This first normalization phase would end upon recommendations made by the 
                                                 
477Turkmen and Kurds in particular engaged in repeated clashes in the city during the late 1950s. The issues were of 
both and ideological and ethnic nature, see Batatu, Old Social Classes, 913-919. Likewise, Arab and Kurd clashes 
between irregular groups were prominent from the early 1960s, Anderson and Stansfield, Crisis in Kirkuk, 35-6. 
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480The fact that Saddam Hussein’s regime considered the cleavage between Sunni and Shia Arabs in Iraq to be 
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Presidency Council to revert borders that had been gerry-mandered to alter the demographic 
character of the provinces.
482
 Any movement toward a final resolution of Kirkuk's federal status 
would be delayed until this had been completed and a permanent constitution adopted, at which 
point Kirkukis were then to be allowed to vote on their status within Iraq's federation. 
 The process immediately ran into a host of problems that made its implementation 
difficult however, most notable of which was the growing insurgency and sectarian war that 
ground governance to a halt. General incompetence, lack of delegation, and corruption in Iraqi 
institutions rendered independent movement by the stipulated bodies difficult, and barely any of 
the tens of thousands of property claims made to the IPCC were ever resolved,483 forcing the 
matter to be rolled over through Article 140 of the new Iraqi Constitution to the first permanent, 
elected Iraqi Government. The new executive acquired the responsibilities of the old along with a 
completion deadline of the 31st of December 2007 meant to hurry along the process and appease 
growing Kurdish frustration over delays.  
 While the bloody sectarian war between Iraq's Sunni and Shia Arabs stole headlines and 
government resources, the stagnation of resolution to Kirkuk's status allowed the development of 
a profound asymmetry of power in the province that dangerously stoked inter-sectarian rivalries. 
The Kurds' active participation in the war, superior organization, and years of prior semi-
independence, naturally poised them to take a prominent role in the post-Ba'athist governing of 
the province and Turkey’s decision to not allow Coalition access to their territory enabled 
thousands of Kurdish troops to move into the northern provinces to fill the vacuum left by the 
rapid Ba’athist capitulation.  While Kurds viewed their decisive action as necessary to prevent the 
violence that occurred elsewhere, local Arabs and Turkmen were justifiably wary of the extreme 
and sudden defacto change in Kirkuk's power differential.
484
  The arrival of radical Shia cleric 
Muqtada al-Sadr’s representative in the province, Abdul Fattah al-Mousawi, deepened these 
tensions and saw the beginning of a Turkmen-Shia Arab alliance against the Kurds that advocated 
a virulent Iraqi nationalism married with Turkmen ethnic advocacy. Bloody anti-federal clashes 
                                                 
482
In the case that the Presidency Council could not agree, a neutral arbitrator was to be assigned first by them and in 
case of further disagreement by the Secretary General of the United Nations. 
483
Ayatollah Sistani was only the most vocal of the transitional government's critics, but there was a widespread belief 
even by those participating in the transitional government that the most difficult of Iraq's problems to resolve should 
be delayed until elections could legitimize the commitments made by the respective parties. 
484Loyd, “Kurdish Ploy Brought Early End”; Notice also that this move revealed the typical fissures in Kurdish policy 
between the KDP and PUK. The KDP withheld their forces under an agreement with the US forces, so it was largely 
PUK forces that entered the city in the immediate aftermath of the war.  
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soon followed between the groups,
485
  with only the active presence of Coalition troops 
preventing a spiral into all-out sectarian blood-letting. 
 Efforts to rectify the perceived imbalance by establishing a council with mandated 
equality between Kurds, Arabs, and Turkmen, and minority representation for Christians,
486
 did 
little to assuage the tension
487
 even though the quotas likely offered Arabs (and probably 
Turkmen) disproportionate representation.488 Kurdish attempts to share power by appointing 
Turkmen to act as the provincial council leadership and deputy police chief also went largely 
ignored by the more virulent sectarian parties, namely the Iraqi Turkomen Front (ITF).
489
 The fact 
that appointees were not affiliated with the most sectarian parties, and were willing to participate 
in cross-sectarian efforts to govern created a strong sense of resentment amongst those already 
skeptical of Kurdish intentions. The crisis consequently deepened as Kurdish control was 
accentuated by the insurgency. Neighboring some of the worst violence and having had “loyal” 
Ba’athist areas attached to it during Arabization, Kirkuk in fact proved one of the most 
challenging recruitment fields for the new order, enhancing the sort of ethnic imbalance that has 
contributed to a rise in intergroup violence in other troubled areas.490  While official estimates of 
the security forces put the ratio within a reasonable realm at around 50% Kurdish, the number of 
unofficial Kurdish intelligence forces that had swarmed into the province from both the KDP’s 
parastin and asayesh, and the PUK’s zanyari was much greater.491  As with most ethnic conflicts, 
the perceived bias of these security forces made their performance suspect and by extension the 
                                                 
485Several were killed in these clashes and there are mixed accounts of what transpired to set off the violence, see 
“Arabs, Turkmen Demonstrate Against” 
486 “Calm Begins to Return to Iraqi City of Kirkuk”  
487Most notably was the inclusion of Turkmen Irfan Kirkuki as the major representative of the Turkmen community. 
Hailing from the Turkmen People’s Party, which had substantial ties to the PUK, he was often vocal in criticizing the 
ITF, see “Iraqi Turkmen Refuse.” Ultimately, the Council was in little position to govern the province anyhow, since it 
had almost no funds and faced US oversight of all decisions. 
488Stansfield and Anderson, Crisis in Kirkuk 
489
 The ITF is now in Allawi’s INA coalition. 
490This has been noted in many developing countries, with a rich literature exploring the importance in conflict 
resolution of creating a trusted and ethnically balanced police and security force in order to give political 
compromises legitimacy, see for example Weitzer, Policing Under Fire . Even where ethnic tensions are low, 
imbalances in security forces between different communities can delegitimize state institutions, see Tyler, “Policing 
in Black and White” 
491These forces had almost unchecked ability to manoeuvre in the area, acting extra-judicially on terrorist threats 
and engaging in secret raids of civilian dwellings. The dangers of this division where well documented if difficult to 
address, with later Wikileaks dispatches revealing that Americans noted a pattern of growing hostility to the Kurds 
among other Kirkuki ethnic groups due to occasional “provocative actions” such as forced, secret abductions by 
Kurdish security forces thought to be part of an effort to tilt the balance of power in their direction, see Shadid, 
“Kurdish Officials Sanction Abductions” 
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provincial government they supported, deepening cross-sectarian antipathy and encouraging the 
further segregation of neighborhoods.
492
 
 This pattern of conflict and growing resentment amidst efforts to nominally share power in 
unelected provincial institutions continued from 2003-2008, largely relegating Kirkuk to a 
simmering, stagnant cold war.  The fact that Article 140 was initially a compromise which denied 
the immediate handover of Kirkuk to the KRG or that the normalization process was first 
advocated by Turkmen parties to compensate for the horrors of Arabization, were gradually lost 
to the annals of history. The prospect of a future referendum encouraged each community to stack 
the deck in their favor and view the actions of rivals as hostile to the ultimate security of their 
own democratic rights. Protests organized by anti-Kurdish Turkmen and Arab groups against 
federalism were juxtaposed against large Kurdish demonstrations on behalf of the new 
government and Constitution. Repeated attacks (presumably by Kurds) on ITF headquarters in the 
city,
493
 kidnappings and assassinations of prominent members of both communities, and episodic 
bouts of small-scale communal violence hardened these growing divisions in lieu of a democratic 
process to resolve the conflict.
494
  
 Contrary to the recommendations of some scholars,
495
 stagnation and ambiguity thus did 
not breed peace. A lack of official recourse and growing unemployment brought only further 
violence, leading to open clashes between Turkmen and Arabs as well as returning Kurds. Since 
only around 5% of property claims were ever officially adjudicated, those left homeless or 
destitute were encouraged to seek extrajudicial recompense. The KRG funded the return of Kurds 
on its own, successfully relocating tens of thousands outside of the established constitutional 
mechanisms, while other groups received external funding for their reciprocal activities. Left to 
fester, new grievances thus quickly compounded old leading to heightened distrust between the 
communities and empowering more radical elements as vulnerable groups looked to their own 
ethnic groups to provide security outside state institutions that were unrepresentative, illegitimate, 
                                                 
492This was particularly true in Northern Ireland and other societies that have witnessed large-scale violence 
between different ethnies or sects. In all of these cases, the communal makeup of the security forces plays a 
prominent role in the peace-making process and the restoration of trust between respective parties. 
493“Arab Tribes Rally Against”; “Iraq Kurds Ransack Turkmen” 
494
The American occupation failed to take effective action to overcome the problem. Distracted by the chaos 
enveloping the rest of Iraq and wavering support for an unpopular war back home, they sought mainly to not upset 
the delicate balance that kept the province teetering on the brink of all-out sectarian war, see “100,000 Arabs Evicted” 
495
 Both Joost Hiltermann of the International Crisis Group and Michael Rubin of the American Enterprise Institute 
have periodically advocated that the issue of Kirkuk should be delayed in order to allow the Iraqi institutions time to 
build themselves up. 
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or unable to meet their needs. With those least likely to compromise peacefully emboldened, 
demands soon far outpaced the actual representation of many groups such as the ITF, which 
received only around 10% of the vote in the province during the 2005 election, but demanded 
32% representation in government institutions. 
 Rather than ease as the deadline for the referendum approached, the heightened tension 
between Kirkuk's respective groups was accentuated by growing disputes over federalism at the 
national level. As the sectarian civil war subsided over the course of 2007-2008 and a permanent, 
democratically elected (and thus more representative and legitimate) government took on more 
responsibility, the opportunity to focus on resolution of outstanding constitutional issues 
nominally became more plausible. The legitimate excuses for inaction however, only gave way to 
a more concerted determination to willfully ignore the compromises embedded in the Iraqi 
Constitution through rising neo-centralism in Baghdad. The Iraqi population’s exhaustion from 
years of sectarian warfare created widespread resurgent popularity in nationalist politics, 
weakening the sway of the traditional federalist proponents in SCIRI
496
 whose historical 
dominance within the Shia coalition had pushed majoritarian agreement on the formation of 
regions during constitutional negotiations, in favor of the growing popularity of the more 
nationalistic Da’wa Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki. Maliki's meteoric personal rise not only rested 
on the defeat of sectarian militias, but his Da'wa party had a long history of antipathy to Iraqi 
federalism having left the INC in 1995 in protest against Kurdish efforts to adopt a federal vision 
for a democratic Iraq.
497
 Da'wa's leadership had in fact historically favored a majoritarian, rather 
than inclusive form of democracy, and had only reluctantly embraced federalism in the 
constitutional negotiations
498
 in order to realize their desire for certain Islamic provisions.
499
  The 
continuing prominence of the Sadrists compounded these changes in the ruling coalition through 
ongoing efforts to stoke sectarian conflicts in support of fellow Shia Turkmen in Kirkuk and 
blockage of efforts to resolve territorial conflicts in Diyala and Nineveh.
500
 
                                                 
496
The support was not universal though. 
497
Feldman and Martinez, Constitutional Politics and Text, 887. 
498
Once widely thought to be the largest and most popular of the Shia political parties, by late 2008 ISCI was running 
a distant third to both Da’wa and the Sadrists. According to polling conducted by the Iraq Center for Research and 
Strategic Studies, Da’wa came in with almost 15% support among the population, followed in the Shia alliance by 
Sadrists at 4.1% and then SCIRI/ISCI at 2.4%. <<http://thegroundtruth.blogspot.com/2008/10/iraq-center-for-
research-strategic.html>>. 
499
Ibid. 
500
 “Iraqi MPs slam planned Kurdish Constitution” 
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  The initial weak support of many in the Shia coalition for the Kurdish position had indeed 
stemmed partly from insecurity about where power would fall in a democratic Iraq, rather than a 
philosophical commitment to democratic or federal principles. Given that many had long-suffered 
as dissidents, the idea that Iraq should re-centralize when viewed as outsiders was a frightening 
prospect, but was much less so from a newfound position of authority in Baghdad. This 
underlying lack of political will was most visible in the failure of the Presidency Council to make 
the necessary recommendations for border revision for the census to be held, which given the 
clear documentation of these changes (in contrast to the complexity of land records) and the lack 
of ambiguity in the Constitution regarding their reversion, would be the most straightforward of 
Kirkuk’s many dilemmas to resolve.501 The fact that it too stalled made clear that there was little 
desire to see the Article 140 process carried forward by the Shia regime in Baghdad. 
 The more nationalist tenor within the ruling Shia alliance and lessening security demands 
elsewhere, especially after Maliki’s success in the provincial election of January 2009,502 freed 
him to turn attention to pressuring Kurdish peshmerga in the northern disputed zones.  The need 
to stave off rising pressure from a rival electoral coalition forming under Prime Minister Allawi 
provided added incentive, leading to growing hostility between the central government and the 
Kurds with the potential for armed confrontation between troops loyal to the KRG and Baghdad 
requiring reinforced American troops along the trigger line. With the introduction of open lists the 
political climate in fact induced Maliki to take a more aggressive stance toward his Kurdish allies 
in the hope of drawing together a party under his personal banner that could appeal across 
sectarian lines to Sunni Arabs locked in conflict over the disputed territories.
503
 A clear cut 
victory at the polls would free him from the unwieldy coalition of parties that had weakly 
supported his run as Prime Minister and sought periodically to unseat him. With Iraqis almost 
                                                 
501
 Beginning with the first Ba’athist regime, Arab districts such as Hawija, Riyadh, and Zab had been gradually 
added into Kirkuk, while predominately Kurdish districts such as Chamchamal, Kalar, and Kifri, as well as Turkmen 
areas like Tux Khurmato and Qadir Karam, were detached from the province and moved to either Sulimeniyah, 
Mosul, Diyala, or Salahaddin.  This demographic manipulation created a clearly Arab majority community in the 
Western part of the Kirkuk governorate that had no historical basis in the province, significantly shrinking the 
governorate and moving it noticeably west, see Anderson and Stansfield, Crisis in Kirkuk, 28 
502“Take them Home Responsibly,” The Economist, 5 Mar, 2009. 
503
ICRSS ibid.  In response to what politician would do best for Iraq, Maliki finished first ahead of Ayad Allawi by a 
slim margin at 17.2% and 16.7% respectively. Jaafari gained only 7.9%, barely more than Kurdish President Massoud 
Barzani at 6.3%. 
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evenly split on whether Maliki’s continuance in office would hurt or benefit the country,504 Maliki 
found himself unable to compromise with the Kurds on important issues. 
 The Kurds were also facing electoral pressures stemming from political fragmentation for 
the first time. One of the two founding partners of Kurdish unity, the Patriotic Union of 
Kurdistan, had experienced a series of defections over issues of corruption, nepotism, and power-
sharing.
505
 The new Gorran, or “Change” Movement offshoot was demonstrating remarkable 
strength in traditional PUK strongholds, leading to occasional violence between security forces 
and protestors from the respective parties. Alongside justifiable criticism on internal matters, 
Gorran was waging an all-out assault on the Kurdish parties for their failure to produce on 
Kurdish nationalist issues such as Kirkuk.
506
  
 The pressures of the 2009-2010 election cycle thus set the stage for ongoing 
confrontations between the KRG-Baghdad, revealing a profound shift in rhetoric regarding 
outstanding federal issues. Maliki's inner circle of advisers matured past his Da’wa roots to 
include many strident centralists that came to oppose the Kurds on a variety of issues. On Kirkuk 
this most notably included, Abbas Al-Bayati, a Turkmen who strongly, vocally, and publicly 
advocated that Kirkuk receive a special status similar to Baghdad or become its own federal entity 
like the KRG in contradiction to the constitutionally-mandated democratic process laid out by 
Article 140. Attempts by Prime Minister Maliki to forge alliances with hard-line anti-Kurdish 
politicians in Kirkuk, Mosul, Diyala, and Nineveh, all of which were home to disputed territories 
languishing in ambiguity, led him to bring in former high-ranking Ba’athist military officers like 
Hassan al-Luhaibi (who led the 1990 invasion of Kuwait) and the virulently anti-Kurdish Al-
Hadba Party in Nineveh in an effort to marginalize the Kurds.
507
 In Kirkuk, Maliki even selected 
Major General Abdul Amir Zaidi to lead the movement of the Iraqi Army into the province, the 
same officer Saddam Hussein had sent a decade earlier to rid the province of Kurds. The 
                                                 
504
Ibid. 
505
The ailing head of the PUK, Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, faced an important secession crisis during this period. 
Gossip surrounding his serious heart condition and frequent trips abroad for treatment led to a conflict in the top 
echelons of the party, which saw longtime deputy Nawshirwan Mustafa leave to found his own media conglomerate 
known as Wisha. From this platform, he began attacking the KRG’s incompetence and corruption, paying particularly 
ferocious attention to the PUK itself. Likewise, 5 other high-ranking members resigned during this period, including 
Kosrat Rosul, and the PUK was forced to delay taking over the Prime Ministership of the KRG from the KDP’s 
Nechirvan Barzani due to a failure to agree on a candidate. 
506Salih, “Changing Kurdistan,” 3; Barzanji, “Kurds Kick off Parliamentary Campaign”  
507
Even American Senators recognized that Al-Hadba was an anti-Kurdish entity, see statement by Senator John 
Kerry, “Kerry Touts Obama’s Nominee for Iraq Envoy” 
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General's first moves were to confiscate Kurdish farmland to establish a bulkhead, make 
antagonistic statements about the need to remove Kurdish forces entirely from the province, and 
begin scouting roads controlled by the Kurds in predominately Kurdish enclaves with the implicit 
threat of re-taking them.
508
 These men shared a radical, rejectionist political platform that 
expressed a repeated desire to strengthen the central government and renege on the federalist 
commitments made to all Iraqis in the Constitution.
509  
Unable to accomplish this through the 
clear legal mechanisms to do so, they increasingly sought extrajudicial maneuvers that raised the 
risk of an all-out conflict.  
 One such move was the establishment of extra-judicial “tribal support councils” in 
Kurdish-controlled areas in Mosul and Kirkuk (and even in the KRG), which Kurdish leaders 
instantly labeled as illegal, unconstitutional, and highly inflammatory attempts to circumvent the 
democratic process and legitimate, electorally-certified state institutions.
510
 The councils were 
reminiscent of Ba’athist jash units, which were paid Kurdish tribal operatives used to destabilize 
inter-Kurdish relations.
511
  The Kurd were not alone in their opposition, with other political 
leaders also seeing them as a thinly veiled attempt by Maliki to use public resources to force his 
will on resistant areas. This was a dangerous personal-narrowing of public power all too familiar 
to Iraqis, and even Shia parties protested openly against the formation of councils in southern 
provinces that had long moved past the violence that necessitated them in the Sunni triangle.
512
 
Not surprisingly then, Sunni parties too cried foul at the increasing centralization of Maliki’s 
power as he pushed into their enclaves, referring to him as Iraq’s new 'dictator in the making' and 
culminating in high-level resignations from the unity government.
513
 The situation got so dire that 
Sunni, Shia, and Kurdish factions eventually convened in Erbil to take serious action to oust him, 
                                                 
508Parker, “Iraq General’s Presence in Kirkuk” 
509
These were not the only examples, Maliki also cultivated ties with Sheikhs throughout Anbar during this time, 
including Ahmed Abu Risha (who described his perspective on Iraq during this time as being “very close” to 
Maliki’s) and Hamid al-Hais (who openly encouraged Maliki’s newfound toughness on the Kurds but urged that he 
needed to go even further), see quotes in Shadid, “Worries about a Kurdish-Arab Conflict.” Another prominent 
example was Sunni cleric and firebrand, Mullah Nadhim Khalil al-Jubori, who had openly been a leader in the 
insurgency that attacked US and Iraqi forces, see Myers, ”Unity is Rallying Cry Ahead of Iraq Elections” 
510
See for example Dagher, “Iraqi Soldier Reportedly Kills 2 G.I.’s” 
511
 “Iraqi PM Feuds with Kurds Over Militias” 
512
Ibid. Namely ISCI, and during this time, Maliki also refused to join and run on the Iraqi National Alliance platform 
as he had before with ISCI and other parties, even refusing diplomatic pressure from Iran to unite with other Shiite 
parties. 
513Rubin, “Iraq Unsettled by Political Power Plays”; Chon, “Iraq’s Reluctant Leader Emerges as Unlikely Force” 
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only stopping short because they failed to agree on an alternative, not because they could not pass 
the benchmark on those wishing to see him removed.  
 Maliki’s response was to simply ratchet up the pressure, declaring in early 2009 that the 
visas long issued for business and travel purposes by the KRG at international borders and 
airports would no longer be valid.
514 The Kurds understandably viewed Maliki’s maneuvering as 
extremely provocative and threatening. The drumbeat for a potential war upon the impending exit 
of American troops gained speed, with the once reliable Kurdish forces progressively pushed out 
of Arab areas through Iraqi military reconfigurations in the now exceedingly volatile border 
provinces. Rather than wait in lieu of a democratic process, the Kurds maintained that the 
peshmerga played an important continuing role in providing security to the minority Kurdish, 
Yezidi, Shabak, Christians, and other communities that were still the victims of mass bombings 
and insurgent attacks
515
 setting the stage for repeated armed confrontations throughout 2008-2009 
between the two forces and between Kurdish units of the Iraqi military and their Arab 
counterparts. Kurds maintained that they would not withdraw from areas beyond the “green line” 
until the promise to account for the will of the people in the Iraqi Constitution was carried out, 
while the GOI and Maliki’s allies began to use words like traitors and secessionists to describe 
Kurdish leaders.
516
 Maliki himself accused the Kurds of dangerous sedition, arguing that the 
presence of peshmerga anywhere outside the borders of the KRG was “unlawful” and a “mutiny 
that must be severely punished.”517  
 The attacks on Iraq's federal nature were soon made even more explicit, threatening not 
only the assymetrical nature of Iraqi federalism but even the independence of the KRG itself with 
Maliki undermining the very basis of his coalition with the Kurds by threatening to see the federal 
government strengthened “at the expense” of the regions (of which there was only one, the 
KRG).
518
 These statements were accompanied by a worrisome effort to create forces in the 
government loyal only to him, namely the Baghdad Brigade and an elite counter-terrorism force 
which led parliamentarians from all sects to note that the country was becoming dangerously 
                                                 
514“Not so Happy,” The Iraqi Army even went so far as to arrest an Italian businessman and tourist who had wandered 
south of the green line on a KRG-issued visa. 
515Dagher, “Fractures in Iraq City as Kurds and Baghdad Vie” 
516
 Maliki repeatedly tried to paint his conflicts with the Kurds as a matter of holding the country together, see Chon, 
“Iraq’s Premier Maliki Says He Plans to Thank US for Sacrifices” 
517Dagher “Fractures in Iraq City as Kurds and Baghdad Vie” 
518Abouzeid, “Arabs-Kurd Tensions Could Threaten Iraq’s Peace” 
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militarized.
519
 Kurdish leaders, along with many others in Baghdad, openly referred to Maliki as a 
new Saddam and a dictator in the making, with ISCI leading a renewal of calls in Basra to 
establish its own federal region.
520 
These were only a partial public glimpse of a dangerous 
escalation in the back room war of words exchanged between those that were once a symbol of 
Iraq’s attempt to build “unity” and “consensus.”  
 Indeed, the conflict was not just between the Kurds and Maliki. As the governing coalition 
crumbled, late 2008 saw the introduction of a series of parliamentarian crises instigated by 
centralist-oriented Arabs of the July 22nd movement, along with a newly formed Arab Political 
Council constructed in Kirkuk to combat Kurdish influence.
521
 The first crisis brewed over 
aborted attempts to stymie the KRG’s development and independence by reducing their share of 
the Iraqi budget from 17% to 12% without a national census (which was being held up over 
Kirkuk) to determine the fair allotment of communal resources.
522
  The provincial election law 
soon followed with efforts being made to block Kirkuk's electoral participation in order to 
mandate power-sharing on the old 32-32-32-4 post-war basis. The ongoing local conflict, notably 
the intransigence of the ITF and Arab political parties on the acceptance of proportional 
democratic representation,
523
 almost plunged the entire Iraqi provincial elections into chaos when 
President Talabani vetoed the election law demanding that Kirkuk not be treated differently than 
other provinces. The Kurds argued that if representation was to be based on radical, rejectionist 
threats rather than electoral strength in Kirkuk, why not in Nineveh, Diyala, or any of the other 
provinces where the Kurds formed a significant minority that would likely be kept out of any 
important provincial offices.
524
 The idea that sectarian quotas would combat sectarianism seemed 
particularly unfounded, but the response to the veto from the ITF was to boycott the scheduled 
October nation-wide census,
525
 a move which quickly gained the support of Arabs in parliament 
to effectively kill it and deny information that could have resolved the important lingering budget, 
                                                 
519Rubin, “Maliki Pushes for Election Gains, Despite Fears,” see quote by Mahmoud Othman. 
520
 “Barzani: Kurdistan supports Basra Region” 
521
Al-Ani, “Arabs Form Bloc to Offset Kurdish Dominance of Kirkuk” 
522Fitfield, “Kurdistan: Other Iraq” 
523
The original provincial election law would have required that 2 seats on the Kirkuk council be reserved for Kurds, 
Turkmen, and Arabs respectively, with one reserved for Christians. Competition for the seats would then occur within 
each community for their allotted total rather than amongst them, see Ibrahim, “Kirkuk Row Holds Up Iraq 
Parliamentary Poll Law” 
524
See for example the quotes by Kurdish leaders in “Iraqis Find Another Blocked Road over Kirkuk” 
525Williams, “Turkmen in Contested Oil-Rich Province Vow to Boycott Iraq’s National Census” 
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governance, and development questions that were hindering the ability of the Iraqi government to 
make informed economic decisions country-wide.
526
 
 The impasse required external mediation and reassurance, notably UN Special 
Representative Staffan de Mistura’s proposal to delay the crucial elections in Kirkuk while they 
went forward elsewhere in exchange for a concerted effort by the international body to establish 
the conditions for expelled Kurds and Turkmen to resettle in the province alongside a non-binding 
proposal on boundary changes within the course of the year. The agreement was attractive to the 
Kurds because it offered internationally-legitimized movement on both fronts of the 
normalization process. However, it was really the US promise to back such movement that sealed 
the deal for the Kurdish abdication on the provincial election law, with a trip in late July by 
Secretary of Defense Gates to Erbil where he promised continued US support for Iraq, the 
Kurdistan Region, and the resolution of outstanding issues based on the Iraqi Constitution.
527
 
 The animosity between Iraq's communities quickly spread however, as the 2009 provincial 
elections saw the return to power of Sunni Arabs along the trigger line. Most troublesome of 
which was the rise of the Ba’athist-affiliated, virulently anti-Kurd Al-Hadba Party in Nineveh.528 
The Kurds had controlled the province and much of its security since the war, but the return of 
Sunni Arabs to governing institutions emboldened Maliki to purge Kurdish officers from both the 
police and military in an effort to curry favor among these potential new allies.
529
  This included 
the replacement of the largely Kurdish 4th Division of the Iraqi Army, with the largely Arab 12th 
in Kirkuk.
530
   
 As a consequence, the summer of 2009 saw a host of violent confrontations between the 
Kurdish list and Al-Hadba in the disputed territories, with the new Nineveh Governor Al-Nujaifi 
claiming all provincial positions, thus defying the consensus-based institutions that had become 
                                                 
526Nordland, “Now it’s a Census that could Rip Iraqi Apart” 
527
It is important to note here the difference in the way this was portrayed by the KRG and the United States 
government. The deal was brokered on a promise by the US to push for a referendum on Kirkuk within the year and 
express public support for the KRG. Instead, the US government releases focused on a continued commitment to Iraq 
and general mediation on outstanding issues based on the Constitution. 
528
Al-Hadba was antagonistic to the Kurds even before they won 19 of the provinces’ 37 seats, striking an 
“uncompromising tone” on all things Kurdish and making statements that promised that should they win election, 
they would clear the city’s security and police forces of every single Kurds (even though Kurds made up an important 
minority in the city), see for example “Mosul Governor Talks Tough on Kurdish Militias”  
529
Garcia-Navarro, “Iraq’s Election Campaign Especially Bitter in Mosul” 
530Recknagel, “Baghdad’s New Security Steps” 
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the bedrock of democratic Iraq.
531
 The Kurds responded by withdrawing the areas under their 
control from governance by the provincial council,
532
 a threat that Nujaifi and his compatriots 
repeatedly tested by seeking to traverse through Kurdish towns while issuing statements that 
efforts would be made to cleanse the province of all Kurdish officials.
533
  Locked in a simmering 
cold war, violent protests were a frequent occurrence in the disputed towns as citizens clamored 
for the promised resolution,
534
 and by the end of summer Kurdish Parliamentarians were referring 
to the Nineveh government as “Ba’athists in different masks”535 and threatening to unilaterally 
secede from the province.
536
 Most of the Kurds living in Mosul west of the Tigris had fled the 
city, contributing to the sort of ethnic segregation that usually precedes violent sectarian 
conflicts.
537
 Kurdish battalions and brigades, like the 34th Garmiyan Brigade, had also shown 
signs of revolting from the Iraqi Army, weakening its coherence.
538
 This was particularly 
worrisome given that 2 of Iraq’s 10 divisions were mostly Kurdish, and Kurds formed a 
significant portion of at least 3 more.
539
 
 Unrest simultaneously grew throughout the summer in the Sunni areas, as the steep drop 
in oil prices over the year from $147 a barrel to just $50 strained Iraq’s ability to integrate the 
Sons of Iraq into the regular Iraqi Army. Under these circumstances, bombings and assassinations 
across Mosul were “relentless”540  and disproportionately brutal,541 leading all sectarian 
                                                 
531Sly, “In Ninevah, Tensions Between” 
532
The Kurds both boycotted the provincial government and some local politicians threatened to unilaterally secede, 
see “Arabic Language Barred in Ba'shiqa Schools” 
533Recknagel, “Baghdad’s New Security Steps” 
534These moves also threatened Maliki’s rivals in the Shia coalition, with ISCI leading a renewal of calls in Basra to 
establish its own federal region. Many protests were held in Sinjar, Telafar, and Shekan during this period.  When 
Nujaifi tried to enter the Kurdish town of Bashiqa on May 8, he was stopped and there were reports that a “shoot to 
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communities to support the desperate need for a stabilizing third party.
542
 The situation became so 
dire that KRG President Barzani and Prime Minister Maliki did not speak or meet for over a year, 
only ending the impasse in August of 2009
543
 when Maliki recognized that he may again need the 
Kurds to form a government after he failed to entice enough Sunnis away from Allawi’s coalition 
(a pattern of behavior not unlike the dictatorial leaders of Iraq’s past catalogued in the historical 
chapter).
544
 Thus, while a Baghdad politician was accurate in noting that one “could win an 
election on an anti-Kurdish platform alone,”545 the fact that one could not rule without Kurdish 
support because of inter-Arab rivalries kept the potential for all-out conflict in check. 
 The confrontation along the border between Kurdish and Arab communities was thus 
moving further from a negotiated solution just as American troops were preparing to leave. A 
rising tide of neo-centralism and neo-nationalism made the likelihood of compromise on keeping 
US troops in the country unlikely,
546
 despite the importance of the American presence to 
preventing an outbreak of violence between the two sides.
547
 Joint patrols between Kurdish and 
Arab troops,
548
 as well as efforts to rectify imbalances in local security and police forces,
549
 barely 
managed to keep the war cold.
550
 The results were clear, lending to an overall uptick in violence 
and halting legislation on oil, but the true toll of stagnation and ambiguity regarding the future 
settlement of the issue was exacted on the inhabitants of these areas. As violence dropped by 91% 
in Baghdad, Kirkuk saw only a 28 percent decline, making the per capita number of attacks 
double in Kirkuk that of the rest of the country.
551
 Insurgent networks that were torn asunder 
elsewhere remained largely intact with very effective and deadly roadside bombings continuing to 
plague civilians.
552
 As experts noted, it was the political situation that made Kirkuk’s security 
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problem so deadly and prevented the development of a stable, trusted, and properly trained police 
force that could serve its multiethnic communities.
553
  
 Baghdad’s refusal to allot Kirkuk’s government its fair share of the federal budget due to 
the perception that Kurds controlled both the police and political instruments effectively hindered 
remedial efforts and reflected how important the regional federal provisions were to preserving 
autonomy in the new Iraq. Ongoing attacks on the vital oil infrastructure, such as the pipeline to 
Turkey, hampered investment in Kirkuk’s super-giant field which was already at risk of serious 
degradation. Lacking regional status, which allowed for straight proportional allotment of federal 
money, Kirkuk was thus left to limp along as the most oil-rich backwater in the Middle East. Its 
people were subject to kidnappings and assassinations, affecting every Kirkuki, and possibly even 
being used to cover for intra-sectarian grievances.
554
 No one was left unscarred, with massive car 
bombs targeting even “simple people” with little hope that perpetrators would ever be brought to 
justice.
555
  Across the disputed territories, violence disrupted the regular patterns of life, leaving 
young men without work and families without access to basic services or healthcare.
556
 Many of 
the people across these areas in fact disregarded the “prospect” of a future Arab-Kurdish civil 
war, arguing that they had already been struggling to survive in the midst of one for years.
557
 
Regardless of sectarian affiliation,
558
 the failure to resolve the status of these areas created a 
dangerous, unsustainable rift vulnerable to exploitation for those seeking to destroy the Iraqi state 
and turn its communities on one another.
559
 
 
 
Oil and Gas: Background and Constitutional Provisions 
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 Intimately tied to Kirkuk and the disputed territories is the pivotal issue of Iraq's vast 
natural resources. The control over the development, sale, and management of its oil are critical to 
the long-term viability of its institutions, not only accounting for the vast preponderance of state 
revenue but potentially lending the capital for the state's disintegration into smaller petrol states. 
Fear that oil revenue will be taken by electoral victors to the exclusion of others indeed remains 
one of the main sources of conflict over the status of the disputed areas and drives intense rivalry 
over the control of its central institutions.  As the preponderant source of state income, the ability 
of the Regions to play an important role in its management and development will be critical to 
their ability to resist federal destruction and a recentralization of the Iraqi state. 
 The applicable statues in the Iraqi Constitution were thus hotly negotiated and carefully 
worded to gain broad-based agreement, requiring also the introduction of some ambiguity and the 
delay of specific issues for future legislation. However, the overall perimeters were clearly 
outlined for a dualist vision that would divide authority between the local, regional, and federal 
governments. Found in Section 4 under the “powers of the federal government,” the relevant 
articles were in fact specifically listed outside of the enumerated exclusive jurisdiction of the 
federal institutions in Article 110. This made them subject to the stipulation that all non-
enumerated federal powers were reserved for the regions, but was balanced by its clear listing 
under the powers of the federal government to ensure coordination of the industry and the fair 
allocation of vital revenue across the country. In fact, the wording repeatedly and clearly stresses 
the importance of the federal and regional/provincial governments sharing authority. Article 111 
in particular takes great care to declare that oil and gas are both owned by all the people of Iraq, in 
all regions and governorates.
560
  
 The intention was clear that neither the federal, regional, or provincial governments were 
to have exclusivity in dealing with these issues in a way that would strip all from obtaining 
equitable benefits. Article 112 continues on to explicitly state as much, providing more detailed 
information about how this sharing of authority and profit should occur.
561
 It outlines that regions, 
provinces, and the federal government should work in conjunction to manage present fields, 
distributing revenues based on a fair representation of population with special consideration for 
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those areas that suffered from economic discrimination under the previous regime and in order to 
ensure balanced development throughout the country. The second part commits all to work 
together under market principles to accomplish these goals. Beyond these general principles 
however, the Constitution is silent.
562
 
 Already containing far more ambiguity surrounding how policy should be implemented, 
the oil issue was thus particularly susceptible to the changing power dynamics within the Shia 
coalition away from the more federalist-minded groups that played a prominent role in the initial 
constitutional negotiations. This was further complicated by the technocratic particularities of the 
industry and the necessity of meeting not just national or state needs, but also accounting for the 
pivotal role that foreign direct investment would play in the execution of any policy. The legacy 
of Iraq's nationalistic oil policy under Ba'athism, and polarizing, strongly-held beliefs among 
many Iraqis that oil should be either governed by market principles or deployed as a national tool 
against an exploitative Western interest, did not aid in resolution. 
 During the initial chaos of the sectarian strife gripping the country, the issue of Iraq's oil 
policy was in fact predominantly focused on obtaining the security needed to attract foreign 
investment, rehabilitate existing fields, and ramp up exports to finance the country's 
reconstruction. With the rejection of democratic institutions by the most nationalistic elements in 
the Iraqi electorate relatively little attention was paid to the implications of an overall national 
strategy for the industry, giving the ephemeral impression that there was some broad agreement 
that best market principles would govern the trade. This opened the door for the KRG to take 
action to establish its own oil policy and exert control over its right to manage natural resources 
found within its jurisdiction without the fierce and vocal criticism that would come later. 
Beginning in 2004, KRG officials in fact signed a number of exploration and joint production-
sharing contracts with small international frontier oil firms in an effort to chart an independent 
policy. While seen as risky and not devoid of controversy at the time, the passage by national 
referendum of an extremely decentralized constitution that appeared to broadly grant such 
authority in 2005 paved the way for a relatively swift transition. 
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 The Kurds viewed these contracts as legal, falling within the specific mention of “present” 
or “current” fields as a restriction on federal institutional reach into the conduct of their 
management of new discoveries. This was a strategic differentiation they had indeed lobbied for 
in constitutional negotiations, whereby the Kurds agreed with their Shia counterparts to share 
control and revenue from the existing super-giant fields in order to gain the authority to continue 
to set oil policy within the KRG.
563
 The Constitution did indeed nominally, if not explicitly, wrest 
regions a predominant role in exploring and managing any new fields, a gamble that paid off for 
the Kurds with large oil deposits being found in several of the KRG's early exploration blocks. 
Thus, while the Kurds were never able to win explicit, formal agreement on new fields the general 
understanding of the Kurdish coalition was that they would have an exclusive right in this regard, 
an interpretation that seemed initially would meet only scattered resistance from the Shia ruling 
coalition with steady progress being made to hash out specifics in a draft law by the Council of 
Ministers to be put before the Iraqi Parliament. 
 Roadblocks began to emerge though, slowing the drafting of national oil policy to a crawl 
as the same election imperatives and power realignments mentioned in relation to Kirkuk shifted 
the rhetoric of major Shia parties in favor of a more centralist orientation. This forced the Kurds 
to agree to an enhanced shared responsibility and coordination even over new fields, additionally 
codifying that the federal government would take the prominent role on tenders for the existing 
fields. With these changes in place, by 2007 all of the major players had thus come to agree on a 
draft federal bill that would govern the industry. In January 2007, a cabinet-level committee 
representing all of Iraq’s communities presented the bill with a flurry of typical rhetoric about 
how its widespread support indicated a renewed national unity and formed the basis for inter-
sectarian cooperation.
564
  
 Giving neither the regions, nor the federal government sole jurisdiction over hydrocarbons 
development, the law stipulated a middle road, ensuring that regions could initiate the contracting 
procedures for oil fields in their jurisdiction, but granting a federal committee the authority to 
disprove the deals on a strictly laid out criteria of principles. Regions, like the KRG, that were 
producing greater than 150,000 barrels per day would also have the option to establish their own 
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operating company. This was meant to avoid allowing the central government to exert the sort of 
dominance over the industry that would fuel despotism and arbitrary encroachment on regional 
rights, while still allowing for a mechanism to ensure productive central oversight and 
coordination. The bill would also privatize the country’s oil resources with the hope that this 
would professionalize its decisions and remove much of the over-politicization that has 
traditionally plagued the industry's development. As had been previously agreed though, the 
revenue from the export of oil would be accrued in a centrally-managed account and then 
distributed out to the regions based upon their established share of the Iraqi population. The 
central government would also develop templates of acceptable oil contracts, establish an overall 
development plan that would determine exploration and extraction priorities, and draw up a list of 
acceptable oil companies. 
 The February 2007 draft law undeniably stepped back from the constitutional promises 
made to the regions, conceding some of the unilateral authority over new fields the Kurds felt 
entitled to by granting the federal government the right to review the secretive KRG contracts in 
order to verify they met mandates for commercial standards and relinquishing profits from the 
sale of KRG oil to the federal pool to be divided evenly based on population. For their part, 
centralists would give up claims to negotiating the terms on contracts or management of new 
fields, approving companion legislation re-iterating the constitutional provision on even 
distribution through lump transfers to the Regions.565   The unconditional nature of these 
transfers, as with other federations, would ensure that the regions maintained an independent 
resource base conducive to the maintenance of a healthy federal-regional power balance. Unless 
Kirkuk joined the KRG, and even if it did so given the fact that it would fall under existing field 
provisions that granted predominant control to national institutions, the wording in the agreed law 
would likely mean that for many years to come the Kurds would receive a net benefit from 
Baghdad's transfer of 17% off all Iraq's sales. It would also ensure that any increase in oil exports 
that resulted from the new finds would evenly benefit all Iraqis, despite Kurdish management of 
the contracts, satisfying the provision that oil ownership remain with all Iraqis. 
 However, underlying dissonance among the ruling coalition on how much the Kurds could 
be pushed to concede halted the progress. The draft bill in fact, never made it to a vote in the 
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Council of Representatives as the schisms between rising centralists and federalists widened, and 
some Shia parties expressed increasingly extreme positions. The most prominent example of the 
rising capital of emboldened neo-nationalists was the vocal Minister of Oil Husayn al-Sharistani. 
A nuclear physicist who was imprisoned and tortured in Abu Ghraib by the Ba'athists, Sharistani 
was appointed to the head the Oil Ministry in 2006 and quickly became a lightning rod for those 
seeking to back down from constitutional concessions to the Kurds. Shahristani took on an 
obstructionist tone from the outset, raising questions about annexes to the bill that would govern 
the review of KRG contracts, stating just after the announcement of the deal that regardless of 
language, the central government would indeed approve or disprove all contracts.
566
 Relying on a 
close relationship with Prime Minister Maliki, he personally intervened to alter the carefully 
worded compromises,
567
 rendering it unpalatable to Kurds by the time it reached a vote and thus 
sabotaging hope for agreement on a national oil policy as long as the Kurds remained a necessary 
partner in the governing coalition. The cadre around this rejectionist policy grew rapidly, with 
both Turkish and Iranian support lending Iraqi vassals to a more stringently centralist vision for 
the management of Iraqi oil than was outlined by the Constitution.  
 Sharistani adeptly handled the impending confrontation. Recognizing that he could not 
force the  Kurds to stop developing their resources since they controlled and governed significant 
territory, he used the Kurdish position as a non-state entity, control over export pipelines, and 
international export rules to instead block the sale of the Kurdish fields' oil production. He 
effectively brought to bear against the Kurds the leverage they had handed the federal government 
in conceding control of existing super giant fields that promised lucrative, large, and secure 
rewards for major oil companies, claiming that not only would Iraq refuse to acknowledge the 
legality of contracts signed by the KRG but also that any foreign company that entered into a 
KRG deal would be blacklisted from auctions for exploitation of Iraq's super giant fields.
568
 This 
effectively served to drive large international players away from risky exploration deals with the 
KRG, but Sharistani went a step further to try and discourage even small-scale ventures by 
putting pressure on other states to dissuade their domestic companies from doing business with 
the KRG. On January 27, 2008, after months of threats, Sharistani made an example out of the 
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Korean National Oil Company which was actively working in the KRG by symbolically halting 
all Iraqi oil exports to the country of South Korea.
569
 Other states like the US responded to 
ongoing diplomatic pressure, continuing to both publicly and privately advise companies to avoid 
engaging in contracts with the KRG until a national oil law was signed.
570
 
 The hard-line taken by Sharistani with at least the silent apathy from the Prime Minister 
drove a reconsideration by the Kurds of their support for the ruling coalition, leading to renewed 
meetings with potential allies to replace Maliki throwing the entire system into question. Tensions 
soon calmed though as the Prime Minister and his allies were forced to at least nominally engage 
in a continued dialogue with the Kurds over the course of 2008 and 2009, being still dependent on 
Kurds for the passage of a federal law that could entice large companies to rehabilitate Iraq's 
decrepit oil infrastructure on terms favorable to the state. As the improving security environment 
opened the way to launch an initial bidding round for service contracts and new refineries the still 
hands-on American military and diplomatic contingent also pushed the Prime Minister to make 
progress in order to reduce its own financial commitment to the unpopular war. However, nothing 
did more to encourage a reproach between the centralists and Kurds as elections drew near than 
depressing oil revenues amidst stagnate oil export numbers and budget shortfalls. Growing 
discontent with government services added fresh incentive, but on such an ad hoc and sporadic 
basis that it prevented the laying of a prosperous, concerted plan that would be befitting the most 
vital aspect of Iraq's economy. Occasional breakthroughs between respective negotiators 
inevitably collapsed, plagued by a failure to agree to payment terms and a basic ideological 
divergence over whether contracts should be production-sharing (favored by Kurds) or fixed-fee 
service contracts (favored by nationalists like Sharistani).  
 Neo-nationalists continued to argue that the production-sharing contracts that the Kurds 
used to entice foreign oil companies were a violation of Article 111's stipulation that the oil of 
Iraq belonged to all of the people of Iraq, because it essentially promised ownership over a 
portion of extracted oil to foreign entities.
571
 A rather weak argument from the perspective of 
constitutional experts, opponents of this philosophy which included both Kurdish and Arab 
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technocrats,
572
 hotly disagreed with this assessment as a ploy to deny regional rights.  Calling the 
terms of Sharistani's proposals sub-economic, they pointed out that production-sharing deals were 
necessary to attract the large upfront capital expenditures from abroad to explore new oil fields in 
a risky, post-conflict state and as the first bidding round neared, the predominantly Arab 
executives in Iraq's Southern Oil Company in fact joined Kurdish officials in accusing Sharistani 
of a profound mismanagement of Iraq's oil resources leading to the loss of billions of dollars of 
revenue.
573
 Calling the fixed service contracts unconstitutional in their failure to live up to fair 
market practices, these executives along with prominent ISCI members correctly predicted that 
the upcoming bidding rounds for Iraq's major oil fields would be a dismal failure despite the 
desperation of major oil companies to win access to the world's third largest oil supply. 
Contrasting the Ministry’s performance with the KRG's over the 6 years since Iraq's liberation, 
they argued that in the time that the Kurds had signed dozens of contracts, discovered new fields, 
and brought production online for export, the already established fields under federal government 
had failed to attract investment from even a single company, seen stagnant or decreasing output, 
and actually degraded the extractable oil estimates due to poor maintenance. 
 These ongoing national failures,
574
 budget shortfalls, and the support of some within the 
Shia coalition forced the Sharistani-led group to at times come close to reaching a compromise 
with the KRG in the coming years. The first such short-lived agreement came in the summer of 
2009, which allowed 100,000 barrels a day to be exported from two new KRG oil fields to ports 
in Turkey. When exporting began, it was viewed as a monumental step toward reconciliation 
between the warring parties, with everyday Kurds breaking into spontaneous street celebrations. 
However, this breakthrough also motivated larger oil companies fed up with the slow pace of the 
federal ministry and skeptical of the service contract terms to move to acquire a foothold in the 
KRG's booming industry. Most notable was the multi-billion dollar acquisition by China's state-
owned Sinopec to buy-out Addax Petroleum with the hope that the oil-thirsty Chinese economy 
would gain access to exports flowing from the Taq Taq field.
575 
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 Unfortunately, these gains represented an existential threat to Sharistani's centralist 
coalition not least of which came from the frequent comparison with their own dismal 
management of the first tender bids for existing fields, the announcement of which was 
continuously delayed until it became clear that the touted awards were limited to the ratification 
of only one contract. As Kurdish and ISCI officials, alongside Iraqi oil technocrats and 
international forecasters had predicted, almost all of the major oil companies decided to walk 
away from the exceedingly poor terms offered by the Iraqi Ministry of Oil. Seemingly to distract 
from this failure, the Ministry quickly turned on the new export agreement with the KRG, 
claiming that since it did not recognize the legality of the contracts private companies had signed, 
it would allow the exports of 100,000 a day to continue, but would not pay the companies the 
contractually-promised revenue.
576
 Since all export revenue was going to Baghdad, the initial 
understanding had been that Baghdad would pay the resulting profits promised to the companies, 
before splitting the remaining revenue with the KRG along the 83-17 population-based terms.
577
  
Instead, the Ministry now demanded the oil companies be paid out of the Kurdish share of the 
revenues, a stipulation that would almost certainly result in a net loss for the Kurds and huge, 
unearned windfalls for the Iraqi government that would render the 83-17 split meaningless and 
violate constitutional stipulations that revenues be split based on population.  Sharistani also 
withheld nearly 400 million dollars from export revenues as “payments” for estimated profits the 
Kurds had made off of other KRG oil deals. As a result, Kurds were soon threatening to keep all 
revenue, and exports were duly suspended.
578 
 These moves essentially destroyed the export deal before it had even really begun. Kurds 
responded by threatening to veto any federal legislation that would encourage investment in the 
larger oilfields as long as the Ministry was run by Sharistani.
579 
Devolving into what would 
become a characteristic tit-for-tat pattern of conflict between the two, the KRG also immediately 
released a statement arguing that any awards signed in the recent bid round held by the Ministry 
were “unconstitutional and against the economic interests of the Iraqi people,” especially pointing 
to Sharistani’s proposed award of 8 fields including super-giants Zubair, West Qurna, North and 
South Rumailia, and Kirkuk as not having gone through the Article 112 constitutionally-mandated 
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consultation with respective regional and provincial governments.
580
 The Kurds were particularly 
critical of the attempt to award contracts for Kirkuk and Bai Hassan, both of which were located 
in the disputed territories. Pointing to the fact that they were still responsible for actual security 
and governance in these areas, the KRG Oil Minister issued a thinly veiled threat to any oil 
company signing agreements for these two fields as a paper fantasy, because the KRG would not 
allow any actual investment or development to occur unless it had first been consulted.
581
 The 
message was clear, if the central government could hold up progress for the KRG's fledgling oil 
industry, so too could the Kurds both as crucial partners in the coalition government supporting 
Maliki and as actual holders of power in the disputed areas and Kirkuk, cause insurmountable 
problems for the federal state's efforts to raise new revenue.
582
 
 The Kurds were joined in this opposition by technocrats and parliamentarians from all of 
Iraq's major sects, whose position was affirmed in a report by Iraq's Oil and Gas Committee. The 
criticism expressed a very real concern that the structure of Sharistani's deals would encourage oil 
companies to maximize cost over production, thereby reducing the gross intake of revenue for the 
Iraqi state and permanently undermining its most valuable resource, a fact backed up by 
international experts.
583
 The response from Maliki and other federal officials was to turn up the 
heat in the media accusing the KRG of engaging in secretive, corrupt oil contracts and illegally 
selling oil to Iran, an accusation that would not only lead to destabilizing, at times violent protests 
against the KRG by the Kurdish opposition, but would also cause an international incident in mid-
2010 when The New York Times seemed to confirm that oil was in fact crossing the border from 
Kurdish fields to Iran in violation of international sanctions.
584
 For their part, Kurdish officials 
claimed the exports were merely by-products and that oil from Kirkuk was also crossing the 
border in illicit deals struck by corrupt officials in Baghdad,
585
 an incident that served only to 
further undermine the legitimacy of government institutions at both the national and regional 
level.
586 
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 The problem was unfortunately not solely confined to Sharistani’s rouble-rousing alone, 
for as KRG Oil Minister Hawrami noted, it was Iraq’s Finance Ministry that was responsible for 
receiving the payments for exports and disbursing payments under the export agreement that 
broke down.
587   
While Sharistani was nominally at the center of a personal push that far 
outstripped his actual powers or responsibilities, the disagreements on how oil should be managed 
went deeper than public pronouncements between a relatively small group of Iraqi politicians 
damaging both the Iraqi oil industry and overall state capacity. Indeed, a great deal of money was 
at stake, with Sharistani's defenders arguing that many of the difficulties were the result of budget 
shortfalls, funds diverted to electric and water grid upgrades or simple corruption.
588   
 Much of 
the allocated federal funding in fact went missing, falling through the cracks of one of the world's 
most corrupt regimes according to most indexes and contributing to suboptimal investment in an 
industry which needed 50 billion to upgrade dilapidated infrastructure. Despite the fact that 
international oil experts argued that the Kurdish contracts were in fact more conducive to anti-
corruption measures,
589
 the MOO continued to use its own model to sign contracts for the 
operation of fields in 2009-2010 and took on the direct operation of another 11 after failing to 
secure contracts. 
 The lack of a federal law and the division of responsibilities it outlined governing the way 
in which contracts should be allocated thus contributed greatly to mismanagement, opening the 
door for extreme levels of corruption not only on the federal level but also within the KRG. 
Without the joint process of oversight and management, along with the ensuing checks and 
balances envisioned under the constitution, Kurdish officials were not obligated to transparency 
either. As long as they were in negotiations which pitted Kurdish national interests against the 
regime in Baghdad, neither popular pressure nor legal instruments could operate in a concerted 
way to stem abuses. During times in which cooperation between the KRG and the central 
government seemed possible, the KRG would in fact be pushed to take such steps but with each 
breakdown came renewed opacity.
590
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 The impact that the failure to agree on a national law was having on the ability to secure 
favorable terms and encourage foreign direct investment was particularly telling as the late 2010 
elections approached, casting doubt on whether the ad hoc contracts the Maliki government had 
signed would be executed should he lose control of the government to radical neo-nationalists 
(namely the Sadrists) or pragmatists. Even at inception, the majority of parliamentarians had after 
all opposed the contracts and questioned the legality of awarding them without a national oil law, 
parliamentary approval, or proper oversight, noting that Sharistani was running the industry as a 
one-man show
591
 and hog-tying the Kurds by pressuring foreign governments to refuse their 
exports without his personal approval.
592
 After billions of dollars of investment, and years of 
improving security, Iraq's annual oil exports were still lagging behind pre-war numbers and 
experts were declaring Iraq's national oil management a colossal flop.
593
  These frustrations at 
least partially accounted for the slight edge Allawi's group gained over Maliki in the final vote 
tally, most easily traced to the pursuant lack of services like electricity.  
 Once again, Maliki was forced to bring the prospect of the original 2007 oil law back to 
the table in order to maintain the necessary Kurdish support for his continued governance.
594
 The 
Kurds also upped the pressure on him through diplomatic channels, wresting a public pledge from 
the US to use its “influence to ensure that the outstanding disputes...were resolved based on the 
Iraqi Constitution and Article 140,” in order to allow the government formation to move 
forward.
595 Since the major sticking point continued to be Sharistani's changes to the original 
draft, namely Baghdad's veto power over regional oil contracts and dangerous re-centralization, 
returning to those terms in exchange for nominal Baghdad oversight over production and policy 
throughout the country was one clear path forward. Fresh discoveries in the KRG upped pressure 
for resolution to enable exports,
596
 but correspondingly raised the stakes on the amount of money 
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involved.
597
 These divergent pressures made the issue particularly dangerous, with analysts 
arguing that while sectarian issues would never destroy the Iraqi state, these tensions certainly 
could.
598
 In fact, with each large oil discovery amidst the ongoing issues with the federal regime, 
the incentive for the Kurds to pursue independence over cooperation increased. American 
Ambassador Christopher Hill was correct in noting that the Kurdish officialdom had long ago 
recognized that they might be better off with 17% of all Iraq's oil rather than 100% of their own if 
Kirkuk's fields could not be wrested from Iraqi control,
599
 but increasingly large deposits found in 
areas that they held unquestionable control and access to began to look exceedingly large enough 
to finance an independent state.
600 
 In an effort to stem this risk and encourage continued investment, the Kurds offered the 
MOO another compromise to get oil exports back on track in lieu of a final agreement in early 
2010. Under the terms of the offer, the two fields would resume the 100,000 bpd production, 
which would be offered first to the Iraqi State Oil Marketing Organization (SOMO) to cover 
operating fees.
601
 Presumably the Kurds would work out a profit-sharing mechanism out of their 
17% of the revenue to further compensate the companies as per their contracts. While it would 
still amount to an unconstitutional split of the profits the Kurds were willing to risk the short-term 
inequity in order to establish a healthy long-term pattern of oil extraction and investment from 
abroad. Indeed, they extracted a commitment over the next few months from Maliki to agree to 
their terms as part of a 19 point program to form the new government,
602
 including a promise to 
ratify the 2007 draft oil law within a year. This paved the way for the resumption of KRG oil 
exports in February 2011
603
 under an agreement that allowed the companies to be paid before 
revenue was split on condition that the payments were merely transfers from the federal 
government for capital expenditures. This was soon followed by a statement from Iraq's new Oil 
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Minister, Abdul Kareem Luiaibi, agreeing that the issue was close to final resolution and that the 
GOI would recognize the legality of contracts signed by the KRG.
604 
 Once again though, Maliki would almost immediately retreat from the principle of his 
commitments. While he appointed the new consensus candidate to run the Ministry, he also 
promoted Sharistani to Deputy Prime Minister with portfolio control over the industry. Around 
this time, secret negotiations between the KRG and Turkey regarding the possibility of building a 
pipeline to transport oil directly from these fields for export gathered speed, moving the Kurds 
one step closer to being able to access outside markets without Baghdad's approval. Publicly, this 
merely took the form of a private investment vehicle to link up to the Kirkuk pipeline. However, 
efforts to connect with the major EU market took a backslide around the same time as Sharistani 
signed a joint energy declaration with the EU’s Energy Commissioner confirming respect for the 
right of Baghdad law over all oil and gas exports.
605
 Of course the MOU merely affirmed a 
commitment to abide by federal law, which did not exist and could not pass without Kurdish 
support. Thus continued the Gordonian knot between Baghdad and Erbil, where neither could act 
to fully take advantage of its oil wealth without the other. 
 However, the results of the election, which seemed to affirm that Iraq's Arabs would 
remain so divided that the Kurds would be a necessity for any governing coalition for the 
foreseeable future, alongside continued frustration with Baghdad and ongoing oil discoveries in 
KRG blocks, fundamentally changed the terms of the debate as even major oil companies began 
to express interest in KRG oil fields behind-the-scenes. Throughout the year a flurry of petrol 
activity engulfed the Region with more medium-sized companies openly entering or buying out 
the small frontier firms that had initially scooped up stakes and majors
606
 engaged in quiet low-
level discussions.
607
 The granting of these new PSCs undermined the commitment the KRG had 
made to stop signing new contracts until passage of a national law. In fact, some of the contracts 
both at this time and dating back to the early post-war years were for areas technically outside of 
the KRG in disputed territories, symbolizing that the perceived reward and ease of working with 
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the KRG was becoming so attractive to oil companies that they were even willing to take on this 
added risk and legal ambiguity.
608
 
 This fact pushed the central government to resolve the issue, with heightened pressure 
coming from Parliament on the newly formed Maliki Cabinet to present it with a bill. While 
delayed as the respective parties negotiated the forming of the government through 2009, and the 
specifics of power-sharing through 2010, by 2011 Sharistani as Chair of the Cabinet Energy 
Committee was again presenting a draft to Parliament that would give the federal government 
nearly unreserved control.
609
 Seeking to nullify past drafts,
610
 the proposed bill was almost 
identical to the changes made to the 2007 draft that was rejected by Parliament due to strong 
Kurdish opposition. The new bill would put the Prime Minister, who was already under attack for 
assuming unconstitutional control over Iraq's financial and security institutions, in charge of a 
powerful national Oil and Gas Committee with the authority to approve or reject all contracts 
signed by the Regions (even over new fields). In a thin attempt to meet with constitutional 
standards, the law allowed the regions to hold their own contract auctions, but gave the federal 
government veto power over them and any previous contracts it felt did not align with national 
priorities. Any control the regions had then would be superficial, confined to choosing companies 
rather than setting policy. The bill would give the federal government control far above and 
beyond that presented by the constitution, which detailed a strategy that was more advisory in 
regards to new oil discoveries.  
 The Kurds responded by promising to block any attempt to vote on Sharistani's version, 
presenting their own rival bill out of the Oil and Gas Committee with a much expanded role for 
regions and governorates, limiting the federal government to mere coordination of overall oil 
policy. The Kurdish bill would also allow for a more diverse, representative committee selection 
based on representation of all parliamentary interests, rather than the Prime Minister alone. Both 
sides immediately condemned the others' bill as a non-starter,
611
 with the Kurds' being joined in 
their opposition by almost all of the major blocks in the Parliament who took exception with the 
extreme level of centralization under the Prime Minister's control proposed by Sharistani's 
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Cabinet draft.
612
 Sharistani for his part, rejected the idea that the bill in question deviated far from 
the already-agreed upon 2007 compromise, arguing that it in fact did not give the Prime Minister 
undue control over the industry
613
 and that recent payments to oil companies based on the 
agreement with the KRG in no way validated the long-term recognition of the contracts' validity 
in the eyes of the federal government.
614
 Not surprisingly, despite promises (and even reports that 
it had been accomplished)
615
 by both sides to either agree on a new draft by the end of 2011 or 
simply revert to the original 2007 draft if they failed, the end of the year came and went with no 
progress.
616
 While both continued to make public pronouncements, the hands of both to take 
action were tied, the Iraqi government because it had no law to function under and thus punish oil 
giants from engaging in ongoing contracts with the KRG,
617
 and the KRG because it could not 
reach the most lucrative foreign markets without Baghdad's approval. 
 Thus, despite its great promise and the vital importance of proper deployment of its oil 
wealth, since the rise of neo-centralism in the governing coalition, Iraq's oil policy can be 
characterized as nothing short of an abject failure riddled with “widespread confusion about 
investment, production and lines of authority.”618 It has bled over into other areas, preventing the 
potentially lucrative exportation of KRG natural gas deposits through the Nabucco pipeline which 
would not only bring immense economic reward to the Iraqi state, but also lower Europe's 
reliance on Iranian and Russian energy supplies.
619
 The lack of legal oversight opened the door 
for widespread corruption, making both the KRG and federal officials subject to plausible 
accusations of extreme corruption
620
  and thus disrupting the trust between state institutions and 
the Iraqi people.  
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 The problem with general mismanagement and lack of coordination emaciated the very 
real benefit the Iraqi people could get from their most valuable asset, creating a situation where 
“across the entire country, there is a major lack of transparency...and without knowing exactly 
how much oil is produced, exactly how much is going to which refineries, exactly what fuel these 
refineries are producing, and exactly what happens to that fuel when it leaves the refinery, you're 
not able to find out who is smuggling and what they're smuggling, and who is selling and what 
they are selling."
621
 The potential consequences of this lack of coordination will increase 
dramatically as the KRG looks to bring online thousands of barrel per day export capacity. With 
the controversial entrance of oil giants like Exxon to the KRG
622
 and an agreement to build and 
export through an independent pipeline via Turkey being announced in 2012, the very real 
possibility has arisen that the KRG will enter the international oil market without a coordinated 
policy with Baghdad necessary to prevent an over-saturation to the detriment of prices and return 
for the Iraqi people.
623
 As a founding member of OPEC, the Iraqi state has long recognized the 
dire risks associated with such a (non)strategy, highlighting the crucial nature of resolving 
expediently ongoing federal conflicts.  
However, the necessity to resolve such conflicts indeed goes much further. As the next 
chapter will draw out, the attempts outlined to re-centralize oil in the exclusive hands of the 
federal government and the Prime Minister threaten to destroy the very character of divided 
sovereignty introduced by post-modern federalism. In seeking to render the regions impotent to 
the designs of the federal government, it risks not only sending the Kurds back into an ‘exit’ 
option, but also to invigorate the destructive competition for central institutions (again unchecked 
by balancing alternative sources of power and authority) that has been a hallmark of Iraq’s 
tumultuous, despotic, and brutal past. 
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CHAPTER 6:  
Getting Back on Track: A Federal Resolution to Conflict-Ridden State-building and the 
Foundation for Constructive Peace in Post-war Iraq  
 
“Power alone can balance power”624 
 The ongoing conflicts over decentralization in Iraq are not surprising. New federalist 
systems are now predominantly found in post-modern states with “profound disagreements 
among the people about how to divide power, authority, and revenue.”625 Previously thought to 
introduce centripetal forces on already weak states, theorists examining the dismal record of 
unitary states in conflict-ridden societies have returned to the idea that the introduction of federal 
or confederal structures can provide the basis for the construction of more viable states in many 
societies. Repeated studies have found in fact that negotiated federal systems typically have an 
important centripetal role to play in holding divergent communities together by providing 
mechanisms for incorporating peripheries into central decision-making (through intrastate 
federalism) or by coordinating decision-making among relatively autonomous levels of 
government that represent diverging societal interests (through interstate federalism).
626
  
Negotiations that imbue institutions with these conflict-ameliorating qualities have unsurprisingly 
been shown to be an effective mechanism to end violent seccessionist attempts by sub-state 
territories, with Iraqi Kurdistan being far from the first example.
627
  
 Rather than undermining the legitimacy of the central state, devolving real authority to 
local or regional leaders with strong social legitimacy can (and has) worked to bolster the 
credibility of the state and its institutions in societies prone to cleavage. The idea that institutional 
settings can affect the nature of inter-communal social struggles stems as Krasner notes, from the 
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fact that “once institutions are in place they can assume a life of their own, extracting societal 
resources, socializing individuals, and even altering the basic nature of civil society itself.”628  
This formula can work in both directions, aggravating or alleviating existing conflicts depending 
on whether the system can attract and incorporate outlying social legitimacy into the institutions 
of the state and create a stable foundation from which to begin the transfer of that authority into 
modern governing institutions, thus ameliorating conflict and institutionalizing resolution within 
the state rather than driving it outside into violence. This has most often involved decentralization 
of power in societies with profound social cleavages, whereby “to date, the most effective means 
for the peaceful management of demands for autonomy have entailed decentralization, such that 
the delineation and subsequent management of public goods devolved upon the concerned 
groups.”629 This devolution eases pressure on central institutions to accommodate conflicting 
interests, allowing the state to represent and maintain multiple centers of legitimacy, authority, 
and power. 
 In the case of Iraq, this suggests that overcoming Ayoob’s security dilemma and meeting 
the challenge posed by Buzan to eliminate the vicious circle of unstable states through the 
strengthening of “socio-political cohesiveness”630 requires the institutionalization over time of a 
set of institutions, norms and practices that can appeal to its disparate population and varied 
centres of socio-political legitimacy.  The administrative division of the Iraqi state is designed to 
do just that by capitalizing on the ‘web-like’ dispersal of social control that has traditionally 
existed in the Kurdistan Region outside of governing institutions. Rather than leaving this power 
external to the state, it seeks to institutionalize it within using both an intrastate and interstate 
model whereby the Kurds participate in national institutions as full citizens for the first time in 
history while maintaining regional institutions to safeguard against majority encroachment on 
their special interests. The goal of such a devolution of power is to overcome the traditionally 
‘vacuous’ nature of Iraq's institutions631 by creating new institutions in line with the loyalty and 
identification of the people.  Rather than pit the defacto legitimacy of the Kurdish state against the 
dejure authority of the Iraqi government, it coordinates their respective sovereign-ties within a 
single institutional system constructed to adjudicate any conflicts of interest. These institutions, 
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agreed to through non-coercive negotiations, lay the bedrock for peace between the Kurds and 
other Iraqi groups, while simultaneously creating a very real democratic benefit throughout the 
country via their resistance to predation by those seeking to create an Iraq that is once again one-
dimensional.
632
  
 Thus, while this process liberates the Kurdish region from external control it 
overwhelmingly does not desire, it also circumscribes the responsibility of the central national 
institutions to a more manageable array of responsibilities. As federalism has demonstrably done 
in Latin America, this process contributes to state-building by allowing historically weak states to 
utilize regional actors to improve their penetration into areas not integrated into the cultural or 
linguistic mainstream.
633  
It devolves responsibility for some of the most strenuous, cost-
producing, and contentious responsibilities onto local actors, easing the burden on already 
strained central institutions to provide a broad range of services and ethno-cultural representation. 
Rather than weaken the Iraqi state then, federalism is designed to save it from a colonial legacy of 
social division that has led to over 100 years of contestation and repetitive dictatorial regimes in 
Baghdad. Perhaps most importantly, it constructs barriers against the overweening centralization 
of power in the hands of a very few, which has been the greatest detriment to the construction of a 
strong modern Iraqi state given the diversity of its society. 
 Leaving outstanding federal disputes to fester in Iraq would consequently be a risky 
mistake. It has been a repeated theme amongst observers that the issue of oil and the disputed 
territories, being so fundamental to the core of the Iraqi state, should not be resolved too 
expediently for fear that they will unduly strain still vulnerable institutions.
634
 This argument bore 
hefty consideration in the initial vagueness of the Iraqi Constitution, delaying more clear-cut 
language and hard compromises from participants. However, just as this ambiguity did not cool 
temperatures but instead merely introduced frustration, competition, and extra-judicial jockeying 
among the respective parties which has ultimately held federal legislation and governance hostage 
to these issues for almost a decade and re-opened the door for destabilizing neo-centralization, 
continued delay that upholds the simmering status quo presents a very serious challenge to the 
long-term survival of the new Iraq. As repeated game theory studies have shown, when conflicts 
enter a phase where one party is gaining militarily at the expense of another and thus upsetting a 
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pre-existing balance of power, the likelihood of conflict increases (rather than decreases) quite 
dramatically.
635
   
 Iraq is entering just such a stage as the Iraqi Army again rebuilds and seeks to assert itself 
vis-a-vis the Kurds. Thus far tensions have been managed largely because of the very nature of 
federalism, which by decentralizing decision-making, “compartmentalizes political tensions and 
therefore allows for the co-existence of varying majorities.”636  However, this devolution of power 
through federalist institutions is now seriously under threat and with it the tension-alleviating 
benefits of the new governing system. The long-term debates over where the bar will fall between 
the federal, regional, and provincial governments will naturally be open to the sort of evolution 
that has occurred in other federations, but what is now at risk of sacrifice is the very foundation of 
divided sovereignty that is part and parcel to the unforced maintenance of the state. As Maliki has 
ascended, the demons of Iraq's long and tragic despotic history, alongside lingering confusion of 
centralization as commensurate with unity and state strength, have opened avenues for the 
creation of a system whereby even his previous international supporters recognize that there is a 
complete refusal to share power with the electoral majority represented by Iraq's other political 
groups despite repeated promises to do so.
637
 This goes beyond O’Donnell’s concern for 
‘delegative democracy” or Zakaria’s “illiberal democracy,” for in a state like Iraq with a post-
modern federal society, the attempt to install even weak majoritarian rule threatens the very 
character of the state’s claim to represent its peoples’ electoral mandate.638 
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Rather than allow the federal institutions promised by the Constitution to blossom, every 
attempt has been made to render the compromises void. Initially supported by a broader group of 
Iraqis, including many Sunni and secular politicians loathe to see the Iraqi state fragment, it has 
become exceedingly clear to the majority of Iraqis now that the picture of a centralized Iraq (even 
if democratic) does not lead unquestionably to unity, but rather holds the potential for profound 
political fragmentation.
639
 Without the checks and balances inherent on central power to the 
federal system, the Prime Minister and a small cohort around him have been free to ignore other 
power-sharing mechanisms, amassing almost sole control over both Iraq's security instruments 
and financial resources to the exclusion of governing partners that together represent the electoral 
majority of Iraqis (including its fellow sectarian partners like the Sadrists). This risks not only the 
inter-state institutions that preserve a sovereign realm for the regions to run their own affairs, but 
also the intra-state federal structures that ensure representation at the federal level for Iraq's varied 
socio-political interests. 
 Despite the evidence that in similar states federalism has been the key to creating a state 
that can possess a logical and eventually emotional attachment for diverse peoples, the association 
with dissolution has profoundly contributed to undermining the realization of the devolution of 
sovereign power necessary to protect against these neo-authoritarian tendencies. Without 
federalism, democracy itself can struggle to overcome the immense exigent pressure upon the 
governing system to consolidate power in the center to the exclusion of the pre-existing diversity 
of federal societies. The questions still outstanding about the exact function of these institutions 
are often mis-characterized then in an unnaturally bifurcated way, between unity or division, 
between strong regions or a strong national government. In fact, there is room to approach the key 
outstanding issues in Iraq with a mind to preserve both – to give the new federal and regional 
institutions the substance they need to defend against the historical proclivity of the Iraqi state to 
centralize and forcibly assimilate minorities, while still maintaining a genuine Iraqi national 
                                                                                                                                                               
an illiberal or delegative democracy impossible. While federalism does not completely alleviate the tendency for 
such practices, it does mitigate the centralization that drives opposition to the state, and provide the sort of 
dispersal of sovereign power necessary to prevent attempts to annihilate its society’s very real diversity. In states 
like Iraq, the practice of illiberal or delegative democracy, without federal institutional checks would in essence be 
non-democratic and return the state to the extreme contestation witnessed under authoritarianism. Unlike in DDs, 
where the head of state enjoys a broad popular mandate, no such authority can be said to be bestowed upon the 
cobbled coalitions necessary to sit atop the Iraqi pyramid. 
639
This is most evident in the coalition seeking to unseat Maliki, and repeated statements now even by Sadrists 
against the accrual of power amongst a small group in Maliki’s parties  (see “Sadrists Lose Faith”). Together the 
Sadrists, INA, and KRG-affiliated political parties represent a clear electoral majority. 
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character better able to defend itself from dangerous internal, regional and international predators. 
Instituting such a resolution to outstanding conflicts that preserves the underlying federal 
principles and ability to maintain separate axis of authority does not only bolster federalism or 
promote a Kurdish agenda, but is foundational to the overall health of the democratic Iraqi state 
and its ability to integrate different political factions into a workable governing structure. While a 
centralized Iraq has been a disaster, a meaningless federalism will consequently fare no better.  
 This chapter argues on behalf of a set of necessary parameters to resolve these key 
outstanding issues in a way that will benefit the vast majority of Iraq's people and lay the 
groundwork for genuine state-building, based on the firm contention presented throughout this 
dissertation that a successful solution must first and foremost protect Iraq's federation.  In the first 
section, the broad lessons of successful post-modern federalism are laid out, informed by 
comparative evidence found in other states to argue that Iraq must seek to preserve the 
independence of institutions at both the federal and regional level in order to avoid the centrifugal 
pull of potential secession and maintain the centripetal tug of cooperative governance inherent to 
the practice of successful post-modern federation. The second section uses this outline of 
principles to analyze the parameters for state-supporting resolutions to the outstanding issues, 
establishing that the positions on oil and gas management and regional formation presented by the 
Maliki-Sharistani contingent threaten to dissolve the Iraqi state and should be abandoned in favor 
of practices and institutions that will preserve a diversity of authority and power. In so doing, it 
lays out the broad overarching principles that a compromise on the finite issues of resource and 
territory allocations must take to present a reasonable defense of Iraqi federalism. The chapter 
concludes with a brief reminder of the importance of establishing post-modern federalist norms 
for moving Iraq past the resource-fueled despotism of its past, contending that the goal of any 
resolution should not be seen as an effort to weaken the Iraqi sovereign but rather to create a 
strong state capable of providing for all its citizens, participating in the international community 
of states, and living in peace with its neighbors. Through the provision of services, representation, 
and security amongst all Iraq's people, an Iraqi federal state while not a panacea for all its ills, 
offers the best hope of building universal legitimacy over time throughout its territory. 
 
A Federal Iraq: Guiding Principles for Resolution of Outstanding Disputes 
 While sometimes treated by experts as secondary to its democratic transition, federalist 
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debates go to the heart of Iraq's new institutional character and will ultimately determine whether 
the state can engage in a genuine, inclusive state-building exercise or return to the oil-fueled 
despotism of its past. The original negotiations over the Iraqi Constitution clearly recognized as 
much, with Article 110 establishing the foundation for a highly decentralized federation where the 
exclusive powers of the federal government are limited.
640  
This makes Iraq a federal system, 
where “reserved” powers are held not in the center, but on the periphery. When combined with the 
stipulation that when there is a conflict in laws at the regional and federal level, regional law will 
trump on issues not exclusively reserved to the federal state these clauses form the basis for the 
empowerment of Iraq's regions to maintain autonomy from the reach of the central government. 
As drafted, the Iraqi Constitution then is undeniably decentralized and empowering to the 
periphery. It is strictly limited in its absolute control to specified areas, which do not include 
mention of natural resources such as oil and gas or the territorial determination of federal units. 
The constitutional implication then is that in both of these areas, the regions and provinces will 
have at minimum an important and significant role to play.  
 The greatest challenge to Iraqi democracy and the implementation of its federal 
constitution indeed now revolve around the application of these clauses to two critical outstanding 
issues: the final status of Kirkuk and the disputed territories and the development, management, 
and dispensation of Iraq's vast oil resources. Given Kirkuk's own substantial oil resources, these 
issues are clearly deeply intertwined, but they are also critical to the entire federal structure of 
sovereign power. The Iraqi state relies on oil and gas for around 90% of its annual income, a 
substantial amount of which comes from Kirkuk's super giant field. If the central state can both 
determine who is privy to the federalist guarantees afforded by the Constitution (through 
territorial manipulation and exemptions), and has sole jurisdiction over the entirety of the purse 
strings, Iraqi federalism will cease to exist in any meaningful way because its institutions will be 
devoid of the basic independence needed to maintain themselves against unilateral destruction 
from the center. This is comparable to the ability to tax in federal states where the vast 
preponderance of state income stems from such powers, whereby it is widely recognized that the 
denial of the ability to tax would render the maintenance of sub-state institutional sovereignty and 
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thus federalism unsustainable.
641
 Likewise, the territorial manipulation of regional boundaries 
strips regions of their sovereignty, rendering them devoid of federal status and making them 
unilateral creations of the unquestionable central sovereign.  
 Independence of character and resources is in fact the sole basis on which stable 
multinational federations have been built,
642
 and is the defining hallmark of federation as opposed 
to the unilateral devolution that has been the signature of unsuccessful past Iraqi attempts to 
address Kurdish concerns.  For real power to exist outside of Baghdad the main avenues of power 
must have more than one source of authority and be able to effectively resist the domination of 
one person or office. This provides the sort of checks and balances that prevent the tyrannical re-
centralization of authority, but also that are critical to resisting less obvious destructive impetuses 
common to multi-national federations to pursue the sort of majoritarian democracy that alienates 
important sub-groups from state institutions and pushes groups toward 'exit' by stripping them of 
the option for 'voice.' 
 A cross-national look at the legacy of multinational federations is instructive on this point. 
Those that have shown themselves to be enduring reveal the sort of pluralistic values and 
practices that once inculcated make stability likely as O’Leary has typified: 
 
Table 1: O’Leary’s factors promoting the failure/success of pluri-national federations643 
Pluri-national federations are likely to fail 
if: 
Pluri-National federations are likely to 
succeed if: 
1) They are established and maintained 
through coercion 
1) They are voluntary unions of constituent 
peoples 
2) They are run by either totalitarian or 
mono-national authoritarian governments 
before they democratize 
2) They are established as democracies and 
maintained as democracies 
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Pluri-national federations are likely to fail 
if: 
Pluri-National federations are likely to 
succeed if: 
3) They maltreat nations, especially those 
situated on the territorial perimeter of the 
federation 
3) They recognize nations and grant them 
territorial self-government and/or cultural 
rights 
4) They experience severe distributive 
conflicts over natural resources or fiscal 
policy 
4) They manage distributive conflicts 
equitably 
5) They experience centralizing coups, 
putsches, or maneuvers that threaten the 
federation's founding pact 
5)They centralize only with the consent of the 
nations, and they decentralize to solve 
potential conflicts 
6) They have a Staatsvolk that behaves as 
1a, 2a, 3a, or 5a 
6) They have a Staatsvolk that is sufficiently 
confident to accommodate minority nations 
7)They are strongly majoritarian in the 
federal government leading to 1a, 2a, 3a, 
and 5a 
7)They share power in consociational ways, 
especially important when there is no 
Staatsvolk 
8) They have irrendentist and intervenionist 
neighbors 
8) They do not have irredentist and 
interventionist neighbors 
9) “Exit” seems a better choice than “voice 9) “Voice” seems a better choice than “exit” 
10) They are economically stagnant or 
block the development of particular regions 
10) They promote economic development 
 
Indeed, these lessons are very pertinent to the ongoing battles over Iraq's federal system, having 
important implications not just for the short-term stability of the democratization process but for 
the long-term development of a state capable of surviving the inevitable stress that comes with 
state-building.
644
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However, again as noted in part in previous chapters, O’Leary’s typology is instructive in 
the Iraqi context but does not fully capture the unique dynamics of the country that make strong 
horizontal checks on power paramount. In many successful federations, there are institutionalized 
practices that buttress horizontal checks on the centralization of power through separation of 
powers principles. These checks are fundamentally buttressed by an underlying democratic ethos 
that respects toleration and has high levels of interpersonal trust,
645
 values that are central to the 
ability of horizontal checks on power to operate effectively. Only the executive wields the sword, 
but underlying democratic ethos prevent the executive from fully discarding the room bequeathed 
to the independent legislative and judicial bodies. This is not the case in Iraq, where the horizontal 
federal guarantees may be the only check to balance a strong centralizing and popularly elected 
executive, as the recent history under Maliki has shown. Horiztonal federal guarantees thus 
buttress not only the group rights of those minorities seeking recognition, but play a vital role in 
the preservation of individual liberty. Unlike separation of powers, horizontal federalism does not 
rest on the sort of trust in institutions, but is more amendable to the practice of outright power as 
the only potential counter-balance to power in a society not yet amendable to the underlying 
democratic values that have been necessary elsewhere. In this regard, horizontal federalism is not 
a system of trust, especially as practiced in the highly devolved post-modern federal states – it is a 
system rooted in distrust, designed to ensure respective groups have the opportunity through 
repeated interactions to build trust over time without suffering the sort of centralization that 
destroys the democratic experiment in infancy. It is not ideal, but it is functional. 
 While O’Leary’s typology only hints at this point, it is useful in observing that in order for 
Iraq to avoid the fate of other failed states, federalism must be maintained in a manner that resists 
the destructive, coerced centralization of column 1. The way to do so in the absence of supporting 
democratic values is through strong horizontal guarantees for the only balancing power that exists 
to resist a powerful executive: the KRG and future regions. Observers should be wary of 
underestimating how much decentralization this will actually require given the brutality and 
volatility of Iraq's past.
646
  Today, there is very little reason for Iraq's groups to view each others' 
intentions as altruistic, and this lack of trust (weighed in terms of real risk and historical fact) has 
important inferences for the independence of Iraq's federal institutions. What could be seen as a 
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guarantee of self-defense in a developed, uni-national, and long-standing federation like the 
United States, is without merit in a transitional, fluid, ethnically diverse, post-conflict state. Iraqi 
institutions like the national army and security instruments located in Baghdad for example are 
not yet seen (or evidenced to be) “national” or neutral institutions in the same way as similar 
institutions found in developed federations, including long-standing post-modern federations like 
India.
647
 This fact begs for the introduction of strong safeguards to protect regions and provinces 
from centralizing coups, whereby the use of Iraq's security instruments could be utilized to uphold 
the rule of one man or group over the electoral proclivity of even large majorities should 
provinces lose the right to form regions and the subsequent independence to ensure their own 
maintenance. In the context of post-modern societies, such a recentralization and personalization 
of state instruments threatens more than the mere federal nature of institutions, but also the 
legitimacy of the state and its ability to credibly act as representative of the people. 
While the boundaries between national and regional governments must be maintained for 
a federation to survive then, they must also be flexible if they are to survive into perpetuity.
648
 
This conundrum, between “strength and flexibility, commitment and mutability,” is not easy for 
any new federation to answer,
649
 but tends particularly toward disaster when the consequences for 
transgression of the rules by one party does not hold serious consequences.
650
  Indeed, without the 
typical institutional safeguards found in developed federations – a vibrant judiciary, developed 
party system, popular set of democratic and pluralist values – the Iraqi federation’s only line of 
defense in its preservation is the ability of the KRG (and other future regions) to enforce the 
federal status quo. Obviously, institutions without their own purse strings are, in addition to 
concerns of identity representation, inevitably vulnerable. This is not only true at the federal level, 
where the dismal performance of the Articles of Confederation almost destroyed the nascent 
American experience for example, but also on the level of sub-state institutions. The resources 
vital to ensuring that the regions can be maintained and the wealth of the nation dispersed fairly 
across the population, rather than utilized for the objectives of one man/group will go to the heart 
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of this ability to resist any effort to once again exclude the vast majority of Iraqis from 
participation in their own government.  
 Indeed, Baghdad has been able to accomplish re-centralization largely because it has been 
the sole recipient of the vast financial resources bequeathed to the state through oil exportation, 
effectively denying provinces like Kirkuk full access to their share of Iraq's bounty through their 
exclusion from regional guarantees. The early knee-jerk reaction of some observers to put oil 
policy solely under federal control to avoid secessionist tendencies in the regions is for this reason 
more bane than “solution” to Iraq's ills, for it aids the dangerous recentralization of Iraq's wealth 
and power that lends to the sort of despotism that has plagued its past. It is this recentralization 
and the threat that it poses to the maintenance of KRG institutions, rather than the opposite, which 
in fact drives the Kurdish minority back toward rejection of the state or secession.  
 Iraq's other groups too are progressively realizing that such control threatens the very 
democratic nature of the Iraqi state by fueling the ability of a strongman to again personalize its 
coercive force through the accumulation of immense unchecked, opaque profits. As with other 
natural resource-rich developing countries, oil can be more curse than benefit to its people when 
control over a few institutions means unimaginable power and wealth, driving destructive 
competition and coups, as a rich literature has shown.
651
  Each state must then develop its own 
particular response to this challenge based on the expression of its respective societal interests and 
particular discord as well as pre-existing institutional legacies. The division of natural resources 
between the Canadian state and its oil rich Western provinces indicates that it is not an 
insurmountable task to develop a system whereby a region and a federation can mutually share in 
the spoils, while maintaining both independence and unity. This must be the goal in Iraq as well, 
both to prevent the over-accumulation of central wealth to the detriment of its democracy, or 
alternatively to provide the regions with so much unilateral control and lack of oversight that the 
door toward secession becomes more tempting than voice. 
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Indeed, there is not much Iraq can do to address its unfortunate historical and geographic 
legacies that push it towards the instability of the first column (see 8a/9a), but there is a lot that 
can be done to avoid falling over the abyss by adhering to the other conditions within the control 
of its governing partners for the principles in the table are highly interdependent and mutually 
supportive.
652
 While the attempts outlined in the previous chapter to render the constitutional 
stipulations requiring coordination between federal and regional institutions on natural resources 
exploitation void clearly threaten to push Iraq toward forced centralization, the implications are in 
fact much broader. These attempts, as the previous chapter indicated, have also threatened to 
splinter the Iraqi Army and instigate conflict between Kurdish peshmerga, local security agents, 
and federal troops, driving Iraq toward the dangerous resource allocation conflicts outlined in 
column 4a. Impending resource conflicts are in addition evident in attempts to deny the KRG its 
fair constitutional share of overall revenue, and have been compounded by further jockeying in 
line with the dangerous drift in column 3a to deny federal rights to both Kurds and Sunni Arabs 
seeking to move from provincial to regional status. Most pertinent to this examination are the 
denial of Article 140's process to adjudicate Kirkuk and disputed territories in a manner that 
represents the will of their peoples and recognizes their distinct nationalities (though not 
necessarily through full inclusion in the KRG). Instead, every effort has been made to keep 
Kirkuk and the disputed territories fully under the thumb of Baghdad, with a concomitant denial 
of their nationalities, distinct history, or popular desires. In seeking the reification of Iraq's gerry-
mandered dictatorial boundaries, specifically designed to deny any recognition of its diversity and 
in fact to destroy it, the Maliki government is setting the Iraqi state on a dangerous collision 
course once again with its own society. 
 Of course, this is not to say that Iraq's outstanding issues should be approached with a one-
size-fits-all mentality. While it is clear that some level of independent regional control and 
federal-regional coordination must be maintained to counteract these destabilizing tendencies, the 
execution of constitutional stipulations is an inherently political matter that will be determined by 
a delicate interplay between Iraq’s respective communities. All federal systems are open to 
evolution that fundamentally affects the initial calculation of power centralization. This is 
especially true in federations, which by the very nature of their basis in a compact between groups 
institute and legitimize diverse avenues of authority and are thus open to change. These changes 
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often happen without formal constitutional modifications, and any historical sketch of federations 
readily reveals the fact that “every federation has changed over time, often in ways that would 
have surprised their founders.”653 However, such an evolution must happen organically through 
negotiations over time in a manner that does not impose the will of the strong on the weak.
654
  As 
Iraq grows and matures past its federal infancy, it too is likely to follow the path of other 
federations in moving from a pre-occupation with unity and security to more high order goals,
655
 
but in order to do so it must first show the short-term flexibility and strong checks necessary to 
hold the state together and overcome the historical impetus toward forcible recentralization.  
 In the end then, regardless of the exact parameters of the resolution over both the status of 
disputed territories and exploitation of Iraq's vast natural resources, the key contribution to the 
future stability of a democratic, peaceful and prosperous Iraq will be the preservation of the 
general spirit of the federalist stipulations set out in the Iraqi Constitution. As both the 
foundational document for the ongoing existence of the Iraqi state and the result of carefully 
negotiated compromises between its respective peoples, any attempt to unilaterally annul 
provisions would fatally undermine the nascent respect for the process of inter-communal 
negotiation and rule of law in the new Iraq. It would signal that Iraqi lawmakers are free to pick 
and choose which constitutional mandates would be followed and which would not be
656
 without 
due consultation, acting extra-judicially to favour some interests over others and violating the 
spirit of continued negotiation foundational to the successful practice of post-modern federalism. 
These sorts of actions would be reminiscent of the Iraqi paper tiger constitutions of the past, 
which clearly failed to establish a broad state-building exercise for the Iraqi people. Recognition 
of this fact does not mean that federalists, led by the KRG or centralists like Prime Minister 
Maliki, will get everything they want in the final interpretation of the details, but rather that the 
Constitution's focus on the preservation of alternative sources of authority and power must be 
preserved in order for federalism to thrive (and its promise for Iraqi state-building to be realized) 
and the particularities worked out between parties in a manner that preserves realms of significant 
and consequential sovereign power for all. The following sections identifies the problems with the 
Maliki-Sharistani proposals, acknowledging that within the realm of possibilities none of the 
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major Iraqi constituents will achieve their optimal outcome in the short-term, but that in 
preserving Iraq's federalist character the ground will be laid over the long-term to establish a 
strong, capable, and democratic state that can potentially serve all the Iraqi people.                                                                                                                                                                   
 
The Outline of a Constructive Agreement 
The final status of the disputed territories and the issue of oil in Iraq will be central to 
preserving Iraqi federalism. As noted earlier, Iraq's vast oil wealth is almost the sole source of 
funding for its governing institutions. While it currently has around 11% of the world’s proven oil 
reserves, only 17 of 80 oil fields have been developed with many likely finds unexplored due to 
the instability and conflict that characterized its tumultuous history.
657  
Thus, the issue of how 
these proven and potential reserves will be managed, collected, and divided between its respective 
governing institutions will largely determine how viable its institutions will be at defending 
against potential rivals from within and outside the state. Kirkuk and the disputed territories, both 
because of their own oil resources and as part and parcel to the maintenance of representative 
sovereign authority and national identity outside Baghdad, are also critical to this process. 
 As the previous chapter outlined, the ongoing federal conflicts over these two issues 
between the Maliki-led government and the KRG have clearly reached a ‘hurting stalemate’ 
which should open opportunities to move toward resolution.
658
  At the inception of the Iraqi 
federal system, the KRG demands threatened the healthy integration of Iraq’s Kurds into the new 
state in seeking unilateral control over their own potentially vast oil resources, without any central 
management or oversight. Coupled with the potential full incorporation of Kirkuk into the KRG, 
the centrifugal tug of Iraq’s federalist society may indeed have been too much for the state to 
bear. However, as the ensuing discussion demonstrates, through both constitutional and later 
negotiations the KRG has in fact given enough ground on these issues to safeguard the federal 
regime from any such attempts, agreeing to federal oversight and dispersal of all Iraqi oil revenue 
and a special relationship with Kirkuk. These capitulations effectively address any lingering fears 
that federal institutions will enable Kurdish or other secessionism to successfully springboard,
659
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and leave the outstanding threat to the preservation of the Iraqi state in the hands of its would-be-
centralizers.  
The failure to move forward then stems largely from lingering confusion of centralization 
as solely commensurate with unity and state strength among some elites and the desire by those in 
control to prevent any dispersal of power outside Baghdad. Under the right institutional context, 
allowing for the sort of dispersal of power that also protects the state from its own inter-rivalries 
and destructive competition affords Iraq the opportunity to create a broad state-building exercise. 
However, it also requires an important break from the politics of the familiar. Without such 
institutional change to reflect and preserve regional authority, the shallow nature of key 
democratic values such as power-sharing will threaten not only Iraq's minorities but the entire 
democratic state. Indeed, it took many observers too long to recognize that the Prime Minister's 
abandonment of federal principles was only the first step in an effort to consolidate power around 
a single post in Iraq. This should have come as no surprise given how vital federal protections are 
to the preservation of diverse avenues of authority and power, acting as the only serious 
safeguards to the encroachment of unwanted rule from a majoritarian (or even minor-itarian) rule 
from Baghdad.  
Indeed, Maliki’s coalition has adeptly capitalized on lingering exaggerated fears (given the 
geo-strategic pull of inclusion in Iraq for all of its communities) that the KRG or a future southern 
region could use oil resources to form the basis for a secessionist state to successfully muddy the 
facts of the ongoing conflicts. Falsely claiming that comparable resources have universally 
belonged to central sovereign authorities elsewhere, the implication has been that any shared or 
devolved responsibilities proposed by either Iraqi technocrats or rival parties will consequently go 
beyond past precedent and threaten Iraq's unity. In fact, federal states have never maintained a 
clear pattern in the exploitation of natural resources
660
 between different levels of government, 
with states with unequal natural resource distribution such as Canada having successfully allowed 
provinces to control their vast oil wealth (including exports) and others like Sudan executing 
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revenue-sharing formulas to account for discrepancies between regions.
661 
 These successful 
models have been the basis for KRG/technocratic proposals on the issue, which have repeatedly 
advocated a division of authority and resources to both ensure effective management and prevent 
unilateral moves by either party that could harm the overall interests of the Iraqi state. 
The issue has been purposefully misconstrued though to drive internal and external 
opposition to the Iraqi Constitution as the final arbitrator of its political conflicts in order to 
undermine the checks and balances inherent to the system. In fact, the laments of Iraqi observers 
have ranged in tone from the exceedingly misleading description of the law as a “punitive” 
exercise against the resource-poor Sunni Arabs
662
 to attempts to argue that it would fatally 
undermine the ability of the federal government in Iraq to survive, despite the fact that the 2007 
oil law preserves a large degree of central power and oversight over the industry above and 
beyond safeguards found in similar resource-rich states. The KRG has indeed gone much further 
than many other federal units in ceding control to the central government via the 2004-2007 
interim negotiations, allowing all revenue to be collected and dispersed centrally. This ensures 
that no region could use the funds to hoard Iraq's oil wealth to the exclusion of others, since the 
federal government will alone collect and disburse with the revenue from all fields based on an 
equal division of the spoils. The implementation of this coordinated effort and the resulting 
equitable dispersal of Iraq's oil revenue has not been impeded because of genuine concerns that 
they will result in the unequal distribution of Iraqi oil wealth, as Maliki has attempted to claim,
663
 
because neither the Constitution or the bill simply offer regions the sufficient authority over 
revenue to do so. 
The actual facts of the proposals are best clarified then by looking at the wording of the 
federal compromises and subsequent draft oil law as constituting either a centralized, dualist, or 
integrated division of power, as Anderson partially typifies.
664
 As previously outlined, a 
centralized vision would essentially destroy Iraq’s nascent federal character because of the vast 
preponderance of revenue accruing from this single source. While perhaps appropriate in some 
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federal states with a more balanced revenue stream, in Iraq such a system would merely strip the 
regions of any ability to maintain against federal encroachment. History has shown that even in 
federal states that initially envisioned a weaker form of centralized government the coalescing of 
much smaller percentages of fiscal resources at the federal level has allowed the federal 
government to trump constituent authorities and encroach upon reserved powers. Sometimes this 
has occurred in a benign manner, but more often in ways that threaten the founding compact of 
the state. This has been the case in states with varied and developed economies like the United 
States, which are inherently difficult to centralize given their complexity, but would be all the 
more dangerous in a state as uni-dimensional as Iraq. Yet, this continues to be the model indicated 
in revisions made by Sharistani to the draft law, whereby the Prime Minister would not only 
appoint the relevant Cabinet in charge of negotiating contracts but also the Commission 
responsible for federal oversight. The regions would maintain no control over the form of the 
contracts, the drafting of regulations for procurement, or the collection of the resulting revenue, 
stripping them through the unilateral appointment by the Prime Minister not only of their intra-
state federal guarantees afforded in the Iraqi Constitution, but also their inter-state participatory 
rights. 
However, this is not to say that the dualist model originally argued for by the KRG (and 
arguably weakly implicated by the Iraqi Constitution) also holds the solutions to Iraq’s ills. 
Again, given the nature of the Iraqi state’s profound dependence on oil revenue (in contrast to 
more varied economies like Canada) and the unequal dispersal of it across provinces, a dualist 
model would clearly hold its own secessionist risks. Although the relevant constitutional 
provisions have rightly been described as “both just and gradualist” in distinguishing between 
new and old fields to ensure only an eventual and slow decrease over the long-term in revenue for 
the central state,
665
 the dualist model could potentially severely curtail the ability of the federal 
government to ensure an equitable distribution of the Iraqi state’s wealth and inhibit its important 
oversight role in the future. With the possibility of a southern region forming should the oil-rich 
southern provinces be excluded from governance in Baghdad and Kirkuk join the KRG, the 
prospect that 90% of the federal budget could reside outside of its immediate control would 
clearly present an existential threat to the survival of a central state. 
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This model has been largely abandoned by the KRG though in favor of an integrated 
approach in the 2007 law, which secures a central role for the collection, oversight, and 
distribution of Iraq's oil wealth.
666
  In agreeing to the law, the KRG has conceded concurrent 
powers over oil, but has continued to resist departing so far from a integrated division of power 
over the industry in subsequent revisions that the vitally important intention of the original dualist 
vision to counteracting resource-fueled despotism is completely lost. The revision toward a more 
integrated model in fact represents a profound effort to offer the central government the necessary 
re-assurance that the KRG's oil wealth will not be used to instigate secession. Great pains were 
also taken to address distribution fears,
667
 with Kurds repeatedly and publicly agreeing to a 
formula for the collection of revenues that either utilizes international safeguards to ensure full 
delivery of payments evenly throughout the country or for the money to be collected centrally and 
then distributed according to population, including not only the constitutionally-mandated 
existing fields but also any new discoveries.
668
 Given these capitulations, ongoing disagreement 
over Iraqi oil thus has much less to do with a genuine fear that some areas will use federalization 
to ensure they prosper at the expense of others, and much more to do with the refusal to allow any 
dispersal of authority to the regions.
669
  
Where the KRG/federalist contingent has shown more outward reluctance to go beyond 
constitutional compromises has been on the issue of Kirkuk’s status vis-à-vis Baghdad, but even 
here the KRG has given the necessary ground to address any secessionist threat. The most 
systematic attempt to analyze the Kirkuk issue by Anderson and Stansfield
670
 is illuminating on 
this score. The scholars rightly point out that a game theoretic charting of the various group’s 
preferences reveals that any compromise must entail either a decision for Kirkuk to retain a 
special status outside of the KRG or for it to join the KRG with clear power-sharing guarantees 
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and a special status.
671
 This dismisses the preferred option of either the Maliki contingent to re-
incorporate Kirkuk as a stand-alone province by ignoring the assumed-majority’s desired 
expression of their Kurdish nationality, and also the KRG’s preferred outcome to unequivocally 
incorporate Kirkuk into the KRG without dual respect for the distinct national character of its 
minority inhabitants. Neither of these preferred outcomes could indeed meet the charted 
requirements for stable post-modern federation, threatening either the Kurds or Kirkuk’s other 
groups with forced majoritarian rule and denying deep, widely held national identities. 
The proposed compromise solutions that avoid this outcome mean that Kirkuk becomes in 
essence, a “federacy within the Kurdistan Region,”672  or alternatively that it remains outside of 
the KRG but subject to typical majority-rule that would likely mean that the Kirkuki Kurds would 
be in charge of the governorate. In the first scenario, the Kurds would be relinquishing some of 
the unity of their administrative system and control over Kirkuk, in return for recognition that is 
was indeed a part of the historical Kurdistan. In the second, the Arabs and Turkmen would get to 
stay outside of the control of the KRG, but would lose much of their say over their own 
governance under the majority rule of the Kurds, for power-sharing could only be mandated by 
either an agreement between Kirkukis or through amendment to the federal constitution which the 
Kurds could veto, neither of which Kurds would agree to without receiving something in 
return.
673
  
When broken down in this manner, it becomes exceedingly clear that the vast 
preponderance of Kirkukis would benefit from choosing the first option over the second, and that 
it is the preferred option for bolstering Iraq’s nascent federation as well. In the second, not only 
would non-Kurds be subject to majoritarian rule by the Kurds that has caused renewed conflict in 
other post-modern states, but they would also be significantly limited in ensuring that the 
province receives its fair share of the overall Iraqi budget. This would extend as well to policy on 
important cultural and communal resources, for communities like the Turkmen can at best hope to 
remain very minor partners in large governing coalitions at the federal level given their numerical 
inferiority across Iraq. Only the regions receive constitutionally-mandated block grants based on 
population, and it is the federal government that determines from there how to disburse with 
funds among the provinces. Its record at doing so as long as Kurds sit atop the electoral structure 
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is dismal, and most observers agree Kurdish electoral success is the most likely outcome of any 
elections for the foreseeable future in Kirkuk.  
A negotiated dual-relationship by contrast has had a clear record at setting the stage for 
cooperation between warring groups by introducing external security guarantees, addressing 
identity concerns by offering inhabitants more than one option to choose from, and ensuring a 
stabilizing external role for patrons to protect guarantees for all relevant parties.
674
 The most 
obvious example of this can be found in the Northern Ireland-Ireland-United Kingdom deal which 
introduced a novel role for Ireland to bring balance to the Catholic-Unionist conflict, recognizing 
the historical, cultural, and religious ties of North Ireland’s Catholics to Ireland without removing 
it from the United Kingdom. The same type of principled deal, which could allow Kirkuk to join 
the KRG in an asymmetrical way (as compared to the full and unilateral incorporation of the 3 
predominately-Kurdish provinces that now constitute it), with significant guarantees of power-
sharing for its minorities ensured by ongoing institutional relations with Baghdad, could offer the 
same sort of stabilizing influence for Iraq’s effort to devolve sovereign authority from the center.  
In fact, there has been movement toward acceptance of such a special status among 
Kirkukis. While Arabs originally demanded that Kirkuk remain under central government control, 
in May 2006, they joined the Turkmen members of the Kirkuk Council to demand a referendum 
on a special regional status for Kirkuk.
675
  Sunni Arabs’ continued disenfranchisement from the 
central government in Baghdad have emboldened Sunni-majority provinces in Nineveh and 
Diyala to petition to establish federal regions of their own and claim the autonomy granted the 
KRG.  This is rooted not so much in an understanding among Iraqis [Arabs] nationalists “that, if 
they want security to the north, they have to compromise with the Kurds,”676 but rather with a re-
alignment of interests within the new democratic institutions that has led many Sunni Arabs to 
recognize that in a democratic system, they will most likely be unable to topple Shia Arab control 
over the central government. This opens the idea that their best interests might be better served in 
taking ahold of their own governance, an extremely positive sign for the resolution of the Kirkuk 
issue which has been largely hindered by the previous rejection among the majority of Iraq’s 
Arabs of federalism writ large. While Sunni MP, Osama al-Najafi in 2009 was ready to discount 
haphazardly the suggestion in the UN report on Kirkuk that the region should be jointly 
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administered as “unjust and one-sided,”677 the new movement in much of Sunni Arab Iraq and 
reliance on Kurdistan peshmergas for protection from the Iraqi Army units under Maliki has 
shifted the calculus dramatically.  
Iraq’s Turkmen have also become more moderate in their stance, with several prominent 
Turkmen having left the ITF and establishing closer relations with Kurdish parties, demonstrating 
the potential for compromise given the right power-sharing guarantees.
678
 These movements are 
the start of an acknowledgement that entry into the KRG under the above model would mean 
special treatment and access to resources not afforded to their community by the federal 
government or their fair electoral weight.
679
 In fact, one of the traditional stumbling blocks to 
resolving the Kirkuk issue has been a reluctance by minority communities to accept positions 
based on their own established popularity and numerical prominence, namely through electoral 
results. Both Arabs and Turkmen have repeatedly cried foul over Kurdish domination of Kirkuk 
in ways that do not hold up under close statistical analysis.
680
 Power-sharing that legitimizes their 
concern for an important stake in their own governance, beyond narrow considerations of 
electoral results holds potential to address the concerns represented in these claims. 
The KRG has duly recognized that any peaceful solution in Kirkuk must in fact be led by 
such negotiations, which would offer important guarantees to other communities. President 
Barzani has openly stated that even should Kirkuk vote to join the KRG, it would still (of course) 
remain an Iraqi city,
681
 and has grown 
682 
progressively closer to other protagonists, including 
those most opposed initially such as Al-Hadba. More than words will clearly be needed to re-
assure Kirkuk’s minority communities, but power-sharing is not new to the KRG, which has 
already shown a capacity to divide power between former rivals in its internal politics above-and-
beyond electoral considerations, alongside absorbing large numbers of Christians from other parts 
of Iraq.
683 Guarantees for Kirkuk’s more ingrained and prominent diversity will of course need to 
go further. The Kurds must accept that they will have to relinquish some central control over the 
                                                 
677
Nuajafi even at this time showed a profound ignorance about what he was talking about, lamenting that it was 
unfair because it compared the situation of Iraq and Kurdistan to that of Northern Ireland and the UK as though 
Iraq-Kurdistan were two separate countries. Chulov “Kurds Lay Claim to Oil” 
678
Including, the Independent Turkmen Group and The Turkmen Democratic Movement 
679
Dawde, “New Strategy for Turkmen” 
680
 Anderson and Stansfield, who looked at the administrative and security posts based on ethnicity and found that 
while Arabs are often over-represented, Kurds have not been, ibid. 
681
 Interview, Apr 2005. 
682
Quote by President Barzani in Khalaf, “Kurds Look Anxiously” 
683
Salih, “Kirkuk: A Constitutional Issue,” 2. 
Page 176 of 239 
 
governorate under the KRG Constitution in order to make room for Kirkuk, which they have 
indicated a willingness to do in negotiations dating back to official responses to secret UNAMI 
proposals in 2008.
684
  This will most likely demand constitutional protections that exempt Kirkuk 
from many of the powers that the KRG Parliament holds to redistrict governorates or prevents the 
unequal privilege of some governorates over others internally. In fact, the Kurds have already 
publicly tabled discussion of whether Kirkukis could have a referendum that gave them the option 
of joining the KRG, becoming an independent region, or even joining another region.
685
 The 
institutionalization of such a resolution would greatly enhance nascent federal and power-sharing 
values in the new Iraq, and go a long way to re-assuring its minorities that they will be 
represented in new regional institutions. A grand bargain which combines such a special status for 
Kirkuk with an integrated model for the management of Iraq’s vast oil wealth between the regions 
and Baghdad will set the Iraqi federation on course to inculcate the sort of values necessary for a 
widespread, inclusive state-building exercise. 
 
The Importance of Federation 
There is little doubt that the future of the Iraqi state will hinge on the adjudication of the 
outstanding issues over oil and territory between the federal government and KRG. As the Iraqi 
Army rebuilds itself and the Kurds face the prospect of steeper loses down the road should they 
allow the status quo to remain, the possibility that Iraq's experiment with the peaceful resolution 
of long-standing internal conflicts will surrender to its perpetual demons becomes more likely.
686
 
Without resolution, the respective communities inch ever-closer to war. Already Kirkukis are 
leading different lives, enclosed in ethnic neighbourhoods and attending school at different times 
in different languages. The harbingers for a brutal and bloody war are growing from a past where 
those in mixed communities commingled and learned one another’s languages, in Kirkuk today, 
youth describe growing up with “no Arab or Turkmen friends…only Kurdish friends...” unable to 
communicate across a widening cultural and linguistic divide.
687  
 With the Kurds already armed, 
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both the Turkomen and Arab communities have progressively taken up arms as well, first in 
neighbourhood watches and now in the form of pseudo-legitimate Iraqi military encroachment 
into the area. Violence has correspondingly upticked, with a profound growth in the number of 
'martyrs' to the Kirkuk cause across the ethno-sectarian divide.
 
The province's history compounds 
these growing differences and lends the issue an even deeper emotive connection that renders the 
situation inherently unstable and resistant to the sort of comforting analysis that relies solely on 
rationality. Indeed, there is a level of path dependency involved, whereby the decision to fight and 
the bloodshed spilled over the city makes compromise more, rather than less, difficult with 
time.
688 
 
If left to fester, these two issues consequently have a very real potential to deepen 
animosity between respective parties and encourage extra-judicial moves that will enhance 
tensions and lay the groundwork for a more retracted armed conflict over the province. Instead of 
allowing the hostility to grow unabated, there is every reason to believe that both issues can be 
resolved in a way that will ultimately strengthen the Iraqi state in this critical transitional period. 
As the previous section outlines, there is the potential to ensure that the KRG will have the 
necessary financial and institutional independence to defend the existence of Iraq's federal 
character and preserve the unique Kurdish identity, while also safeguarding the state from the 
possibility of secession. Reaching such an arrangement through the enactment of federal divisions 
of power will diminish the incentive to engage in violent jockeying and bolster respect for the 
legal, institutionalized character of the new Iraqi state. By relinquishing some control over the 
lucrative oil exportation business, the volatile competition over central institutions between Shia 
and Sunni groups will also decrease as each instead seeks to carve out positions of power in a 
much wider field. 
All of these benefits are in addition to two additional critical reasons that emerged in the 
previous chapter.  First, the very real consequences in terms of both security and development for 
the residents of these areas living bereft of a functioning government and under a constant state of 
war for over a decade now. And second, the dire need to encourage the sort of foreign investment 
necessary to rehabilitate Iraqi's dilapidated oil infrastructure and establish the faith of 
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international investors that the country is on the right course to stability and peace. Accomplishing 
this will be critical to the ability of the Iraqi state to provide the services and security needed to 
build its legitimacy throughout Iraqi territory. Otherwise, it will likely see already intensifying 
protests against the regime from a population inspired by political upheavals throughout the 
region.
689
 In fact, Iraq has long struggled to increase oil revenues in league with population hikes, 
and has seen the most targeted frustration aimed not at its sectarian fringes, but rather at officials 
in the south that are part of the governing coalition.
690 
Available evidence from other federal states 
indicates that sovereignty-devolving compromises are very difficult to implement when the state 
if facing budget restrictions, rendering the importance of positively resolving the oil issue and 
thus increasing the resources available to implement compromises on a range of smaller issues 
particularly critical. 
Of course, the fact that new federalist states often posses high-levels of societal discord 
does not make the healthy deployment and inculcation of federal values, institutions, and norms 
easy. Iraq in particular is beset by a host of common problems. As documented, chief among these 
and consistent with most post-conflict societies, are deep areas of mutual distrust between its 
respective communities stemming from a history of betrayals, coups, and infighting. This distrust 
has created a classic (in)security dilemma, whereby the respective parties are likely to break with 
negotiated agreements even when faced with sub-optimal returns out of fear that they will receive 
even worse returns in the future when the other parties opt for exit or coercive action. On the 
Kurdish side, is the fear that (as has repeatedly happened in the past), once the central government 
under Arab leadership has regained the necessary strength, it will abandon its promises of 
decentralization and seek to reclaim complete hegemony over its territory. On the flip side, 
amongst both Sunni and Shia Arabs is a concern that adherence to the federal compromises will 
lead the already booming KRG into an even wider divide with the rest of Iraq --economically, 
culturally, linguistically, and politically-- and eventually lay the groundwork for a Kurdish exit 
from the state that will make Iraq as a whole vulnerable to the designs of powerful neighbours 
that may wish to dominate its people or natural resources for their own ends.   
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As argued, state-level and international processes that have mistakenly favoured a unitary 
view of state-building in the developing world have compounded these issues. Once laid, these 
belief systems and patterns of behaviour are not easy to transform, resting on an ingrained value 
system that resists more creative approaches. Iraq's people thus not only hold very different 
assessments of their interests, but also harbour vastly different intellectual legacies about the 
direction needed to maintain their unity, security, and statehood.  While the Kurds and a growing 
number of both Shia and Sunni Arabs have embraced the idea that federalism can be used to 
create a more stable political environment, a hefty legacy still supports the idea that a strong Iraq 
must be centralized, unquestionable, and institutionally unitary (as well as discernibly Arab).  
Those Iraqis that harbour this view are supported by an international community that is reticent to 
see the survival of existing states brought into question, and exhibits a knee-jerk reaction against 
any suggestion of potential secession.   
However, these beliefs are moored in an archaic understanding of early European state-
building that is ill-suited to the late-development of conflict-ridden states in the post-colonial 
developing world, and rests on an overly narrow, shallow understanding of sovereignty itself. 
When centralism is combined with social diversity and vast natural resources, the impetus for 
destructive despotism is indeed profound.
691
 
 
The quest for a misunderstood strength when 
weighed against the very real social dispersal of power noted in Migdal's famous thesis
692
 fails to 
acknowledge that the real problem in many late-developing states is actually extreme autonomy 
from society, ultimately resulting in a predatory state.
693
 Indeed, it is the predatory state more than 
the weak state that has contributed to long-run weakness and instability in places like Iraq.  
Despite this fact, nationalists like Prime Minister Maliki are still inclined to view state-
building through a logical prism rooted in the same calculation that Mann identified in early 
Europe, where sovereigns engaged in an unending quest to control critical territory in order to 
possess the sort of resource-rich territory necessary to extract ever larger sums of both men and 
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money.
694
  The predominant method of state-building in the early modern era, its translation into 
the contemporary setting has revealed a pre-occupation with the “loss of control over critical 
space” leading to the sort of revenue depletion critical to the state’s administrative capacity.”695 
 While not applicable to many resource-poor modern states, especially in Africa,
696
 it is a 
pivotal concern in oil-rich Iraq. The fear of losing valuable territory has long-driven attempts to 
centralize political authority and has been the chief motivation historically behind efforts to 
suppress Kurdish national movements, present even at the foundation of the state. Unfortunately, 
the fact that this logic has been a major factor in creating “resource fueled despotism” has been 
well-documented throughout the developing world, whether in relation to diamonds in Africa or 
oil in the Middle East. In both cases, rentier economies sit above rather than embed within their 
societies. They rely not on the sort of productive social or economic activity that requires an 
educated, healthy, and compliant population, but rather on the extraction and export of a single 
natural resource bequeathed as both treasure and curse.  This singular reliance breaks down the 
usual leverage a citizenry has over its government founded on mutual dependency. Rentier states 
as have traditionally existed in Iraq, can survive for lengthy periods of time by centralizing wealth 
and power in the hands of a very few, a fact that both encourages corruption and allows the 
government to build extensive patron-client relations throughout society. These relationships can 
be traditional in the sense of a direct relationship between patron-client or much more systemic, 
involving the large-scale silencing of opposition through state-led welfare programs, extensive 
subsidies, and coercive measures that eventually bring the population into a relationship of inert 
dependency on the government.
697
 While outwardly strong in terms of coercive and economic 
power, such a state is “inherently unstable, because it rests [solely] on its ability to continue 
paying for the loyalty of the population.”698 It is perpetually vulnerable to sudden crisis.  
Rather than perform as Mann observed in early Europe, territory that is both valuable and 
resistant to control weighs heavily on this innate vulnerability in the Rentier state for the equation 
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only works if the territory in question can be brought to heel in a relatively short time frame with 
reasonable expenditure in blood and treasure.
699
 When a modern rentier state, like Iraq, instead 
faces long, sustained, and intense opposition to its expansion, as has proven true of the Kurdish 
areas, it is more likely to collapse than expand, weaken rather than strengthen.
700
 Culturally and 
territorially peripheral areas like the KRG drain the potential windfalls from resources that form 
the very core of state control, leading to repeated coups and violence of a scale that eventually 
threatens state collapse. While the result in previous epochs to this over-extension would have 
been the destruction of the state and re-ordering of boundaries, the post-modern world allows the 
state to limp along engulfed in a sustained war against its own population, rocked by periodic 
coups. 
 In order to dominate the Kurdish territory, the Iraqi state has traditionally taken on these 
overburdening, heavy logistical loads that
701 
 were unsurprisingly fatal to authoritarian rentier 
regimes. Tilly's classic calculation whereby “states make war, and war makes states,” has been 
turned on its head in Iraq. Like in so many developing states, the unending quest for greater 
control and centralization created a vicious cycle of despotism, state collapse, civil war, and 
chaos. Through its over-extension, the Iraqi state became exactly what it sought to avoid, 
demonstrated in both power projections and social indicators. Once a leader in its region, it 
became the least developed of its peers, with the majority of citizens unable to access safe 
drinking water, high infant mortality rates revealing a stark lack of basic government services, and 
a dilapidated infrastructure unable to support proper economic growth.
702 
Nor did it achieve 
widespread external respect for its sovereignty, unable to defeat its rival Iran even in the midst of 
the other's revolutionary turmoil, and engaging in internally-destructive external wars that peeled 
off its coercive facade.  
 It is this same battle that tragically rages on today in Iraq, between a failed vision of unity 
and the promise of federalism.
703
  The lessons of the past are clear, a centralized Iraq has weighed 
heavily on the vast majority of Iraqis, bereft any role in their own governance. While the 
institutionalization of federalism cannot alone cure all Iraq’s ills or tendency toward despotism, it 
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provides essential checks on the designs of would-be oppressors and lays the groundwork for a 
more resilient government founded in widespread social legitimacy. Indeed, the pronounced threat 
that an overweening, unchecked sovereign could have drove the Kurds and their Shia allies to 
originally negotiate a very different vision for a democratic Iraq. Both long-time victims of 
machinations in Baghdad, they crafted a system which established a decentralized regime to 
govern oil and allowed for the possible establishment of a powerful pan-Kurdish region 
encompassing Kirkuk. This vision rejected a shallow understanding of state-building and state 
strength, codifying devolution of power and recognizing different sources of legitimacy in an 
effort to allow the state to expand its reach through them, rather than force their destruction in 
order to assume their place.  
 While these compromises were at points intentionally vague, reflecting both lingering 
desires among some for re-centralization (including external overseers) and acknowledgment that 
the very foundation of successful post-modern federalism rests on flexibility and perpetual 
negotiation between contending social components,
704
 the transformative potential was clear. 
State-building theory has long held that stable political communities must be grounded in “the 
establishment of defensible units, internally pacified and [with a] hard-shelled rimmed.”705  Even 
under oil-fielded despotism the Iraqi state has never (and cannot) accomplish this reality as a 
centralized, unitary state. Overly centralized states with restrictive national narratives 
characteristic of Iraq's past, isolate segments of their population, destroying any potential to 
overcome the ignominy of their birth and achieve the sort of common social purpose and cohesion 
necessary for developmental benefits and stability. Indeed, the most important and critical 
distinction between strong and weak states in the post-modern world is not based in military 
strength, but in socio-political cohesion, whereby “anarchic states possess neither a widely 
accepted and coherent idea of the state among their populations, nor a governing power strong 
enough to impose unity in the absence of political consensus.”706 
The development of federal units has finally integrated the Kurdish areas into an 
institutionalized system of power-sharing that offers a very real possibility to build just such an 
Iraqi state capable of projecting power throughout its territory and maintaining widely-held social 
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legitimacy. This vision should not now be abandoned under the headiness of fleeting electoral 
success. The Maliki regime has fallen prey to the same sort of damaging pattern that existed prior 
to Iraq's democratic regime, which Riggs' has dubbed “prismatic behavior,” which seeks to 
accommodate contradictory norms, like respect for the rule of law and universal rules for equal 
treatment, while engaging in corruption and favoritism for the benefit only of friends, supporters, 
and co-ethnics to the determinant of competitors in different communities.
707
  While some 
contestation is still expected, even healthy in post-modern states, the gradual weakening of 
support for Iraq's federation amongst those in power in Baghdad stands in defiance to the most 
basic logic of state-building, where history has shown repeatedly that the “imposition of greater 
centralization or authoritarianism is more likely to drive nationalists into the secessionist camp 
than it is to preserve national unity.”708  Those states that have heeded the desire for greater 
autonomy and power-sharing, bending institutions to ensure that rivalries can be resolved within 
the system, have survived in spite of the existent social pressures on them to dissolve.    
Iraq has in fact undergone a profound shift in favour of federalism amongst all but a 
determined group surrounding Prime Minister Maliki. This is not surprising or new for Iraq, 
which as this dissertation has argued, is best served by a federal system that can accommodate the 
deep differences in opinion amongst its respective population groups. This fact has always been 
resisted by those currently in power, but unanimous amongst the rest of Iraqis. However, like 
those regimes before, the Maliki government is now facing down the collapse of control in 
Baghdad due to intransigence on these issues and the over-centralization of power.
709
 While 
authoritarian attempts to force centralization have failed, so too will attempts to do so under 
democratic auspices meet profound resistance regardless of the majority status or sectarian 
colouring of those in control. Unable to deny Kurdish identity without force, the new Iraq must 
therefore be founded in the logic of a “federalist bargain,” whereby “politicians who offer the 
bargain” accomplish their desire to expand their territorial control, and those that accept the 
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bargain solidify an opportunity to peacefully engage in their own governance,
710
 before it drives 
the Kurds into renewed secession. 
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CONCLUSION 
Re-building the Iraqi State 
 Just as Iraqis have not found a way out of the chronic instability that has plagued their 
nation, so have outsiders faced tribulations…Neighboring countries have been damaged by their 
conflicts…The international community at large has also met failure.711 
 
Over three decades ago, Hedley Bull argued in The Anarchical Society that the primary 
historical goal of international society was the preservation of the state system. Today, as in the 
past, that survival is facing a host of challenges, both from the failure of many recognized 
sovereigns to establish effective state-building projects and the rise of a set of state-like entities 
that lack traditional juridical sovereignty but are grounded in an empirical sovereignty often 
beyond that of the recognized states in which they are located. Best described by Pegg as 
“defacto” states, these political entities undermine the central principle of international law, 
grounded in the rights of recognized, territorially-bound sovereigns to complete authority over 
their own jurisdiction. The conundrum for international society is how to harness the potential of 
some of these defacto states to contribute to order in regions of the globe where states are so weak 
that their continued existence is dependent upon foreign mercenaries,
712
 never-ending 
contributions of external support,
713
 or despotic deployments of profound coercive force, without 
opening the destructive potential of a wholesale re-ordering of state boundaries. 
 Using Iraqi Kurdistan as one example, I have argued the most promising path toward 
doing so in some cases is through an evolution of state-building norms and practices, whereby the 
impetus in the developing world to strive for the elusive centralization of the Unitarian Weberian 
state as it has been understood is discarded in exchange for decentralized, post-modern federalist 
arrangements. Federalism that reflects existing societal cleavages allows the state to incorporate 
rather than contest pre-existing federal societies and is better suited to state-building in places that 
have profound social cleavages like Iraq. This resolution requires reliance on an old lesson that 
rulers have been forced to recognize “that their effective control can be enhanced by walking 
away from issues they cannot resolve.” The outcome of such actions is not a weakening of 
authority, but instead a strengthening of political stability found through a limitation to realms 
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that can be effectively managed and controlled.
714
  The core of the bargain between the Kurds and 
the Iraqi state thus resides in a similar acknowledgment that despotic power has failed to bring the 
imagined Iraqi state into being throughout its territory, and the concomitant recognition that the 
new federalist institutions will likely enhance the infrastructural power and capacity of the Iraqi 
state by incorporating social and political power that has long contested its existence into state 
institutions.
715
  
 Rather than holding on to a perception of the modern state, which was “a unique social 
invention devised to solve the specific crises of the western European societies at a particular 
point in their development,” the construction of political order throughout Iraqi territory 
consequently requires a state-society bargaining process that recognizes the inherent limits of the 
state project.
716
 This bargain must reflect the fact that the logistical costs of controlling territory 
removed from the central ethno-cultural hub of the state is subject to an extreme form of the law 
of diminishing returns,
717
 amplified by the different socio-economic imperatives of late-
developing nations that prevent the sort of coerced ethnocide of earlier state-building.
718
 The 
consequent repeated attempts by past Iraqi regimes to build a unitary, centralized state 
unsurprisingly demonstrated this fact, leading only to further socio-political fragmentation which 
eventually challenged the very existence of the state itself. While federation may not be the most 
efficient form of sovereign governance available, it is the most likely to hold Iraq together and 
create the sort of stability so desperately lacking from its history. The previous chapter argued 
that such a plan is best attained through a grand bargain that resolves outstanding disagreements 
over federalist principles between the center and regions with an eye to preserving the 
independence of sovereign institutions at both levels. This independence of resources and clear 
lines of authority will enable the Iraqi state to resist the historical impetus toward despotic 
centralism that has been its greatest demon.  
 However, the lingering desire to achieve the sort of overweening authority associated with 
the traditional Weberian state and ongoing distrust between different societal elements, 
characteristic of states where one group has a long, bloody track record of deploying state 
resources to the exclusion or oppression of another, makes success unlikely without a supportive 
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commitment by the international community of states to provide the security guarantees necessary 
to move parties to the negotiating table. The new Iraqi government will face a number of critical 
challenges as it sets about attempting to construct viable political institutions out of a legacy of 
conflict. A dearth in human capacity, pervasive corruption, and regional instability will 
undoubtedly strain newly democratic institutions.
719
  These hindrances contribute to 
miscommunication, undermine power devolution and continue to present the Iraqi regime and 
those committed to its success with an ongoing array of internal security threats.  
 As in other developing nations, the Iraqi and Kurdish governments must also be 
considered “swollen.”720  Both have huge payrolls that have been estimated to make up between 
65-85% of the working population.
721
 Most Iraqis thus rely on the government for their 
livelihood, creating a heightened stake for control over its resources and contributing not only to 
conflict between the KRG and the federal government, but also stressing state institutions with 
intra-ethnic competition to assert dominance over lucrative and powerful positions.  Those in 
charge of the government will need to overcome the impetus to avoid accountability, a situation 
that proved disastrous for previous regimes,
722
 and act in the interests of maintaining structures 
and power outside their immediate control to overcome these problems. Without an active and 
persistent outside mediation role, success seems unlikely, given the historical proclivities and 
ingrained practices that must be surmounted. 
 Indeed, the history of the Iraqi Kurdish conflict makes it clear that a strong pattern has 
emerged whereby the strengthening of the central government has led to renewed attempts to 
forcibly incorporate the Kurds into governing structures, indicating that maintaining a federal 
bargain will at minimum require the fledgling institutions of the new Iraqi state have a chance to 
take root and solidify the establishment of new norms and patterns of behavior between its 
respective parties. This process can be greatly aided by providing the sort of security to each side 
that prevents sub-optimal actions taken out of fear of even worse returns later, such as a move by 
either party to forcefully assert control over Kirkuk as the power balance inevitably shifts between 
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them. Such active and clear international guarantees have been the key in fact to the end of bloody 
intercommunal conflicts elsewhere, with a broad-based study of “nation-building” operations 
finding that the single variable best explaining the success of peace agreements was the length of 
international engagement.
723
  Without such engagement, Marshall and Gurr’s empirical findings 
in the case of 72 self-determination conflicts signals that the majority will continue to plague the 
international community rather than resolve themselves.
724  
 
The need for external guarantees is thus clear and the precedence for an external 
commitment is not entirely revolutionary either. Concerned interest in the internal affairs of weak 
sovereigns has a long historical legacy in international relations theory and practice, traceable not 
only to the pre-modern writings of Grotius who defended the ruler’s right to intervene in the 
affairs of another sovereign in order to defend oppressed subjects,
725
 but also in the Westphalian 
era’s preoccupation with the religious tolerance of recognized sovereigns.  As Krasner has argued, 
“the struggle to compel leaders to treat their subjects in a certain way has been going on for a long 
time,” shifting over time from an emphasis on “religious toleration, to minority rights (often 
focusing on specific ethnic groups in specific countries), to human rights (emphasizing rights 
enjoyed by all or broad classes of individuals).”726 It is only natural that the continued evolution 
of these efforts must of necessity fall in line with changing contemporary security concerns,
727
 
where state-sponsored violence toward ethnic and political groups now causes more death than 
“all other forms of deadly conflict.”728 At their core, these conflicts revolve around internal state 
processes that have failed to provide legitimate political order to much of the world's population, 
driving incessant and deadly conflicts that defy the easy state vs international or individual vs 
group right dichotomies of previous epochs.  
 Indeed there is ample evidence to encourage the international community to take an active 
interest in internal state forms, not only on humanitarian grounds, but also for their own vital 
interests. Extensive evidence has shown that ongoing conflict in the international system is 
intimately tied to the continued weakness and chaos of many states. As states solidified in Europe, 
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North America, and East Asia around a set of civic values protected by effective states, the 
incidence of war plummeted while it congruently rose throughout the Middle East, Africa, and 
South and Central Asia.
729
  Violence rather than a characteristic of an anarchic international 
system is at least partially tied to the individual characteristics of the state.
730
 While not every 
internally-stable state will contribute to the global order, the reality of the contemporary world--
with an increasingly large global elite, world-wide instantaneous media coverage, transportable 
weapons of mass destruction, global telecommunications, travel, and trade links-- is much 
smaller, more difficult to compartmentalize territorially than its pre-modern predecessors. The 
problems of the weak and chaotic are thus easily transformed across time and space to the centre 
of the even stable and powerful states, potentially threatening the most deeply held norms of the 
modern system and its foundation in the replication of universal political order. Far from impotent 
in the face of this onslaught, many studies have pointed to the importance of external pressure in 
the development of effective states in war-torn countries, most notably, Trimberger’s assessment 
of Japan, Turkey, Egypt and Peru.
731
 As Krasner surmises, “such external pressures are almost 
certainly more compelling than internal ones” when societies reach an impasse.732  
 We should not make the mistake then of assuming that states can only be constructed 
through one process, the myopic view of a small group of European states that incidentally led to 
the gross excesses of devastating world wars. Ignoring this fact leads to the dangerous relativism 
of arguments which end up justifying genocide on the basis that, “while there would be no 
justification for such genocidal practices on the part of more developed states…the same cannot 
be said in the case of similar actions undertaken by ethnic entrepreneurs in newer post-colonial 
states.”733 Indeed, Buzan’s claim that due to its resemblance of early European violence, 
genocidal “violence is as likely to be a sign of the accumulation of central state power as it is to 
be a symptom of political decay,”734 has proven ill-conceived for even Charles Tilly has 
acknowledged that while it once was, violence is no longer indicative of state-building due to the 
evolution of the state system since the European experience.
735
 Those that disparage peace-
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keeping as a mere freezing of the boundaries of still simmering conflicts, which inevitably fail to 
push the necessary construction of states along the path toward modern statehood,
736
 are in fact 
missing the point. Genocidal violence has not led over nearly a century to the construction of 
viable states throughout the developing world.  
 It would in fact be remiss to assume, as some have, that endemic conflict in states like Iraq 
are merely
737
  mirroring the early stages of state formation as witnessed in Europe. While the 
violence characteristic of such states may correlate to this period, it is unclear how modern states 
are now meant to progress along the path of their European predecessors, which were couched in 
genocidal violence and oppression coupled with boundary changes and the natural selection of the 
weakest states.
738
  As Thomson reminds, the state’s historic “function was to make war and to 
build power vis-à-vis other states and society. ‘Society’ was largely an adversary in this process 
as it resisted state rulers’ efforts to extract resources and monopolize political and judicial 
authority.”739  The reality, was that “state-makers who were ultimately successful at building 
centralized, differentiated organizations with a monopoly of coercion over a defined territory 
were those who undid and then redid the structure of society according to their own agendas.”740 
In the first modern states, this often meant the destruction of entire ethnies. In the current 
technological context, the consequences of such efforts would be on a horrific scale with the 
potential both to appall the conscious and destabilize regimes far from the epicentre of these 
conflicts. The choice is clear, if it will not accept such extreme forms of violence against societies 
(which it clearly can not), the international community must embrace and work toward an 
alternative path to the construction of strong states in places with continued levels of extreme 
societal discord. This is a new era and a concomitant new path must be forged to bring together 
diverse societies in stable, empirically-capable political communities without actions that violate 
the human conscious. Some modern states have avoided this disastrous ethnic chauvinism namely 
through negotiated agreements between respective communities or federalism
 
 
Perhaps the greatest impetus towards ongoing inaction however stems not from fear of 
failure, but rather of success. The reluctance to provide much-needed security guarantees from the 
international community continues to stem chiefly from a mistaken attachment to an imaginary 
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form of absolute sovereignty which has traditionally viewed defacto state likes the KRG through 
a narrow prism of potential challengers to the status quo borders in which they operate.
741
 The 
preference of the international community bound by this rationale has been on “teaching” 
societies how to practice modern governance in order to build their state, rather than seeking to 
build upon the realities of the already existing patterns of authority and control. While paying 
service to the idea that local institutions should not be ignored in state-building, and 
acknowledging that state-building is most successful when it builds on local institutions and 
capacity, the idea that alternatives to national institutions could bolster rather than detract from 
the functioning of the central state is rarely seen in practice.
742
 The overwhelming preference of 
most of the international community and its theorists remains “boosting the state to replace 
substate groups in the provision of services and in the affection of local people.”743 This has 
constrained constructive recognition of defacto state legitimacy and limited the willingness of 
international actors to provide needed security guarantees for the preservation of their 
sovereignty. While ad hoc agreements between concerned third parties states, as with Irish 
participation in the Northern Ireland peace deal, have been acknowledged to play a fundamental 
role in building trust between combative communities and easing violent conflict, the 
international community has unwisely resisted similar trust-building measures for defacto states.  
 In breaking from this pattern, the international community will be moving closer to the 
development of a set of norms meant to overcome the challenges to international order today, 
namely the changing nature of conflict from inter-state to that of intra or trans-state, rather than 
remaining mired in the solutions to the “security dilemma” created for a historical past. Indeed, 
many scholars have argued that we are now reaching a pivotal point in the development of 
effective post-modern norms, as the international state system is beset by a host of challenges 
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ranging from weapons of mass destruction to global communications technology.
744
 The 
centralizing, all-powerful state is ill-positioned to address these challenges alone, forcing the 
world into “transition from strict acceptance of sovereign jurisdiction and non-intervention to 
more and more readiness to undertake…action, up to and including military action that would 
have in the past been considered intervention in domestic affairs.”745 This sort of cyclical view of 
sovereignty is more closely in-line with the reality of the evolution of sovereignty norms than the 
static and inflexible one found in the work of realist scholars, for as Barkin and Cronin articulate, 
the norm of sovereignty as a legitimising principle in world affairs has gone through periodic 
systemic crises due to major upheavals or wars. It has previously acted as both a protectorate of 
state sovereignty that precluded changes in the territory of existent states, and as a support for 
national self-determination during periods when national sovereignty was seen as paramount.
746
 
Rather than a fixed concept then, international relations scholars have historically imbued 
sovereignty with the flexibility necessary to meet the challenges presented to stability of the 
international system of states during particular epochs, and it is out of necessity that it must 
continue to do so for its own preservation now. Without such a creative movement, the future 
may be relegated to the vulgarities of medievalism as many scholars fear.
747  
  
 However, while internationally-supported federal arrangements may be the solution to 
some of the worst cases of human suffering on the planet today and is certainly the most 
promising answer for Iraq, this paper must also pay homage to the recognized fact that the 
complexities of the modern world ultimately doom “all grand theories.”748 Certainly in the case of 
defacto states, not all are created equal. For normative and practical reasons, some are certainly 
more palatable and feasible than others, and while it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to 
address all possible parameters for consideration some appear ripe for brief consideration. Cases 
in which the above arguments apply certainly require that both partners are viable end players in 
governance. In Iraq, the presence of a viable partner, the Kurdistan Regional Government, with its 
multi-party system, rejection of terrorism, and inclusive non-national political philosophy make it 
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a prime candidate for international support.
749
 Other like-minded regimes can be found in the case 
of the Eritrean defacto state, which is now independent, and Somaliland. These established and 
more sophisticated defacto regimes have at least minimally earned consideration by the 
international community and could feasibly perform responsibly in international organizations, 
treaties, and the like. 
 This example stands in sharp contrast to the realities of other defacto states, such as that 
which existed in the Tamil areas of Sri Lanka. Governed by a regime with an extremely ethnic 
mentality that excluded large numbers within its own territorial jurisdiction, the primary political 
movement at the time being, the LTTE, was hardly a viable partner for the sort of international 
recognition argued for in this work. Its vilification of ethnic Sinhalas and often brutal treatment of 
minorities within its territory, a product of an extreme nationalism that claims the homeland to be 
exclusive for Tamil-speaking Hindus,
750
 does not offer the same hope for peaceful co-existence 
that a resolution based on state rather than national identities clearly possess. As witnessed by the 
failed attempt by the Indian army to negotiate a settlement between the LTTE and the Sinhalese 
government, in these situations, the defensive and ethno-centric mentality of the defacto state’s 
political representation prevents it ability to interact and accept the authority of the international 
community or its norms. These regimes, engaged in rape, torture, extrajudicial kidnappings, the 
targeting of civilians, and the recruitment of child soldiers are not a significant improvement upon 
the already existing chaos of their states. While this is just one extreme and case, many other 
defacto states have also maintained questionable legitimacy among their populations untested by 
electoral processes, such as in South Ossetia or Abkhazia, where the overt and profound support 
of external patrons muddies the clarity of actual socio-political support for their ongoing 
existence. Without extensive social legitimacy of their own, it is unlikely they can contribute 
much to the questionable legitimacy of their contested sovereigns through inclusion in power-
sharing arrangements. 
 Yet even though many of these defacto states might not qualify for support, even this brief 
glance outlines the importance of a pro-active stance by the international community to recognize 
potential negotiations for autonomous political entities, driving the sort of competitive 
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democratization characteristic of the most established defacto states, which have been shown to 
drive institutionalization of their legitimacy and by extension that of their host states through a 
realization that their continued existence rests on adherence to international governing norms.
751
 
As the case of the non-recognition of “Bantustans” and Transkei, which would have continued the 
distasteful domestic practice of apartheid demonstrate, “the character of domestic policies or 
regimes becomes a factor in external legitimacy” and likely should continue to do so as the 
international community examines the rise of future defacto states. The implication of course is 
that the KRG and other defacto states know that the international commitment to their existence 
remains rooted in the domestic character of their regime.
752
 Conversely, without hope of such 
recognition in many places, the international society loses much of its pressure to push these 
regimes to conform to international state norms, contributing to the devolution of conflicts and 
promotion of more virulent ethnic entrepreneurs. The initial conflict between the Tamils and the 
Sinhalese state were after all centered around peaceful aspirations for greater autonomy and 
federalism,
753
 where repeated failure to attain any movement toward recognition saw the gradual 
weakening of moderates and a concomitant intensification of blood-letting between the respective 
parties. It is not difficult to imagine the same future of bloodshed and radicalism could be in the 
works for more benign defacto states like Somaliland should it continue to be excluded from any 
form of international recognition and face renewed hostility from neighboring clans. These sorts 
of attacks could lead its statest ideology back down a dangerous path toward clan-centered 
exclusivism and radicalization that would have a devastating impact on its own population, 
neighboring states, and what is left of Somalia. Without active engagement, the international 
community loses sway to prevent such back-sliding and cannot positively inculcate the spread of 
its norms and values to these infant political entities. Developing a system whereby states can 
recognize the sovereignty of these political entities short of independence allows the society of 
states to do so, spreading important lessons about the proper construction of universal political 
order and post-modern governance’s treatment of diversity as well.  
 The above study of Iraqi Kurdistan thus provides only one possible, but very important 
example, of the potential for new and innovative solutions to the impending crisis of political 
authority and control in the 21
st
 century.  As a case study, it highlights some of the potential for 
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negotiated federal solutions to move defacto states into active participation in the construction of 
more stable, viable states in areas that have traditionally been plagued by repeated state instability 
and high levels of socio-political violence.  
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Addendum A: Article 64 of the Treaty of Sevres 
 
Article 64 of the Treaty, which was never formally adopted due to ongoing political and 
military changes in Turkey, states that: 
“If within one year from the coming into force of the present Treaty the Kurdish peoples 
within the areas defined in Article 62 shall address themselves to the Council of the 
League of Nations in such a manner as to show that a majority of the population of these 
areas desires independence from Turkey, and if the Council then considers that these 
peoples are capable of such independence and recommends that it should be granted to 
them, Turkey hereby agrees to execute such a recommendation, and to renounce all rights 
and title over these areas… 
 
If and when such renunciation takes place, no objection will be raised by the Principal 
Allied Powers to the voluntary adhesion to such an independent Kurdish State of the 
Kurds inhabiting that part of Kurdistan which has hitherto been included in the Mosul 
vilayet.”754 
 
 
Thus, according to the provisions of Article 62, a three person British, French, and Italian 
committee would visit the 'predominantly Kurdish areas lying east of the Euphrates, south of the 
southern boundary of Armenia as it may be hereafter determined, and north of the frontier of 
Turkey with Syria and Mesopotamia” to determine the exact boundaries of the new Kurdish state, 
consider revising the Turkish-Persian border based upon its findings, and include the Kurdish 
areas of modern day Iraq within the new Kurdish state if it was created.
.755
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Addendum B: Article 110 of the Iraqi Constitution 
1)   Formulating foreign policy and diplomatic representation; negotiating, signing, and 
ratifying international agreements and treaties; negotiating signing, and ratifying debt 
policies and formulating foreign sovereign economic and trade policy 
2)   Formulating and executing national security policy, including establishing and 
managing armed forces to secure the protection and guarantee the security of Iraq’s 
borders and to defend Iraq. 
3)  Formulating fiscal and customs policy; issuing currency; regulating commercial policy 
across regional and governorate boundaries in Iraq; drawing up the national budget 
of the State; formulating monetary policy; and establishing and administering a 
central bank. 
4)  Regulating standards, weights, and measures 
5)  Regulating issues of citizenship, naturalizations, residency, and the right to apply for 
political asylum 
6)  Regulating the policies of broadcasting frequencies and mail 
7)  Drawing up the general and investment budget bill 
8)  Planning policies relating to water sources from outside Iraq and guaranteeing the 
rate of water flow to Iraq and its just distribution inside Iraq in accordance with 
international law and conventions 
9)  General population statistics and census
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Addendum C: Article 58 of the TAL and Article 140 of the Iraqi Constitution 
 
The text of Article 140 in fact largely grand-fathered in “all subparagraphs” of the compromise 
established by Article 58 of the Transitional Administrative Law, committing the new Iraqi 
government to the same stipulations, which read:  
 
“(A) The Iraqi Transitional Government, and especially the Iraqi Property Claims Commission 
and other relevant bodies, shall act expeditiously to take measures to remedy the injustice caused 
by the previous regime’s practices in altering the demographic character of certain regions, 
including Kirkuk, by deporting and expelling individuals from their places of residence, forcing 
migration in and out of the region, settling individuals alien to the region, depriving inhabitants of 
work, and correcting nationality. To remedy this injustice, the Iraqi Transitional Government shall 
take the following steps: 
(1)  With regard to residents who were deported, expelled, or who emigrated; it shall, 
in accordance with the statute of the Iraqi Property Claims Commission and other 
measures within the law, within a reasonable period of time, restore the residents to 
their homes and property, or where this is unfeasible, shall provide just compensation. 
(2)  With regard to the individuals newly introduced to specific regions and territories, 
it shall act in accordance with Article 10 of the Iraqi Property Claims Commission 
statute to ensure that such individuals may be resettled, may receive compensation 
from the state, may receive new land from the state near their residence in the 
governorate from which they came, or may receive compensation for the cost of 
moving to such areas. 
(3)  With regard to persons deprived of employment or other means of support in order 
to force migration out of their regions and territories, it shall promote new 
employment opportunities in the regions and territories 
(4)  With regard to nationality correction, it shall repeal all relevant decrees and shall 
permit affected persons the right to determine their own national indentity and ethnic 
affiliation free from coercion or duress 
 (B) The previous regime also manipulated and changed administrative boundaries for 
political ends. The Presidency Council of the Iraqi Transitional Government shall make 
recommendations to the National Assembly on remedying these unjust changes in the permanent 
constitution. In the even the Presidency council is unable to agree unanimously on a set of 
recommendations, it shall unanimously appoint a neutral arbitrator to examine the issue and make 
recommendations. In the event the Presidency Council is unable to agree on an arbitrator, it shall 
request the Secretary General of the United Nations to appoint a distinguished international 
person to be the arbitrator. 
 ( C) The permanent resolution of disputed territories, including Kirkuk, shall be deferred 
until after these measures are completed, a fair and transparent census has been conducted and the 
permanent constitution has been ratified. This resolution shall be consistent with the principle of 
justice, taking into account the will of the people of those territories.” 
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Addendum D: The relevant articles INCLUDE: 
 
Article 111: 
 Oil and gas are owned by all the people of Iraq in all the regions and governorates. 
 
Article 112:  
First: The federal government, with the producing governorates and regional 
governments, shall undertake the management of oil and gas extracted from present 
fields, provided that it distributes its revenues in a fair manner in proportion to the 
population distribution in all parts of the country, specifying an allotment for a specified 
period for the damaged regions which were unjustly deprived of them by the former 
regime, and the regions that were damaged afterwards in a way that ensures balanced 
development in different areas of the country, and this shall be regulated by a law 
 
Second: The federal government, with the producing regional and governorate 
governments, shall together formulate the necessary strategic policies to develop the oil 
and gas wealth in a way that achieves the highest benefit to the Iraqi people using the most 
advanced techniques of the market principles and encouraging investment. 
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